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ABSTRACT
Essays on Female Self-Employment
by
Katherine C. Lim
Chair: Jeffrey Smith and Kevin Stange
This dissertation explores the determinants and consequences of self-employment
among American women. In the first essay, I quantify the value of self-
employment as a flexible work alternative for mothers with young children and
estimate the impact of self-employment experience on women’s future employ-
ment and earnings. Using data from the NLSY79, I incorporate self-employment
into a life-cycle model of married women’s fertility and employment decisions.
I find that mothers with preschool-aged children value the package of flexible
amenities in self-employment at around $7,400 annually. My model suggests that
this additional flexibility encourages mothers to switch from wage and salary em-
ployment to self-employment, which lowers their lifetime earnings. Overall, the
findings suggest that workplace flexibility is highly valued by mothers and that
it is an important driver of their fertility and employment decisions. The second
essay investigates the effect that young children have on women’s likelihood of
becoming self-employed. Using panel data from the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation, I show that the self-employment rate among women with a
two year old child is 11-17 percent higher due to the birth of that child.
xi
I analyze time use data to show that self-employed women appear to have more
flexibility in their work location, hours, and schedule. My findings suggest that
self-employment itself allows women to spend more time with their children.
These results contribute to a deeper understanding of the varied work decisions
of women with young children. The third essay, which is collaborative work
with Katherine Michelmore, examines the effect of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) on married women’s decision to become self-employed. Using data from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation, we find that increases in the
EITC between 1990 and 2012 led to a 4 percentage point, or 50%, increase in
married women’s self-employment rates. We measure self-employment as work-
ing positive hours at a business, which provides evidence that this increase in
self-employment is real work effort. Our results suggest that the EITC affects
women’s type of employment in addition to their overall labor force participation.
xii
CHAPTER 1
Self-Employment, Workplace Flexibility, and
Maternal Labor Supply: A Life-Cycle Model
This paper quantifies the value of self-employment as a flexible work alternative for moth-
ers with young children and estimates how the additional flexibility affects women’s long-
term employment and fertility. On average, self-employed women have more control over
their work schedule, hours and location than wage and salary employed women. I incorpo-
rate self-employment into a life-cycle model of married women’s fertility and employment
decisions and use data from the NLSY79 to estimate the value of self-employment flexi-
bility for mothers. I find that mothers with preschool-aged children value the package of
flexible amenities in self-employment at around $7,400 annually, which represents around
25% of their average wage and salary earnings. A partial equilibrium counterfactual exer-
cise suggests that self-employment flexibility encourages some married women to switch
from wage and salary employment to self-employment, lowering women’s median lifetime
earnings by 1.2%. Overall, my findings offer evidence that workplace flexibility is highly
valued by mothers and that it is an important driver of their fertility and employment deci-
sions.
1
1.1 Introduction
American mothers have increased their labor force participation substantially since the
1970s, but nearly a third of women still reduce their work hours or stop working alto-
gether after having their first child (Laughlin (2011)). This decline in employment may
harm women’s future earning potential (Bertrand et al. (2010), Waldfogel (1998)). The
fraction of women who are self-employed, however, does not decrease following the birth
of a child.1 These distinct employment patterns suggest that, for some mothers, self-
employment is more compatible with the demands of caring for young children than wage
and salary employment. Previous research suggests that self-employment provides greater
flexibility in terms of work hours, schedule, and location (Devine (2001), Gurley-Calvez
et al. (2009)). This flexibility may allow the self-employed to balance their work and family
responsibilities and avoid a potentially costly gap in employment.
In this paper, I develop a life-cycle model of married women’s fertility and labor supply
to estimate the value of workplace flexibility in self-employment and to study the long-
term effects of self-employment experience on earnings. In the model, having children
can increase the costs of working, and this increase may vary between self-employment
and wage and salary employment. The difference in the costs of working associated with
children between the two types of employment captures the relative value of flexibility in
self-employment. In addition to estimating how mothers value self-employment flexibility,
this paper examines the long-term effects of this flexibility on earnings and employment.
By studying women’s self-employment experience within the broader career context, I am
able to examine transitions between employment types and the returns to self-employment
experience. This expands on the previous self-employment literature, which considers self-
employment as a fixed characteristic (e.g. Devine (1994), Wellington (2006)). Estimating
the returns to self-employment experience over a woman’s career also provides more in-
sight into its effect on the gender earnings gap, which increases with age (Goldin (2014)).
This is the first paper to include self-employment as a choice in a life-cycle model of
women’s decisions. A number of papers study the interaction between fertility and labor
supply decisions ((Hotz and Miller (1998), Francesconi (2002), Adda et al. (2011), Keane
and Wolpin (2010)), but they do not distinguish self-employment from wage and salary
employment. Separating the two employment types allows me to estimate differences in
their returns to experience and costs of working.
By developing a dynamic model of women’s decisions, I address several difficulties
in the existing self-employment literature. First, the model allows for unobserved hetero-
1See Lim (2016) for evidence on the relationship between female self-employment and fertility.
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geneity in earning ability and preferences for children to account for selection into self-
employment based on unobserved characteristics. Second, it can account for the forward-
looking nature of employment and fertility decisions and exploit revealed preferences to
uncover the value of self-employment flexibility. Finally, by examining the workplace
flexibility of self-employment, my paper adds to the compensating differentials literature
and builds on papers estimating the non-pecuniary benefits of self-employment.2
My estimates suggest that, while wage and salary experience has the highest return for
future lifetime earnings, time spent in self-employment is better for future earnings than
time spent not working. Estimates of women’s utility functions reveal that the net utility
cost of working is higher in self-employment than in wage and salary employment. This
may reflect the stress and risk involved with being self-employed as well as a potential loss
of fringe benefits. It may also explain why self-employment rates are low even though 55%
of US workers state a preference for self-employment (The Gallup Organization (2010)).
I find that mothers with young children face additional utility costs of working in either
type of employment. However, this additional cost is about $7,400 larger for wage and
salary employment. I interpret this difference as the value of self-employment flexibility
for mothers. It represents around 25% of average wage and salary earnings, which suggests
that mothers value workplace flexibility highly.
I use the estimates of my model to perform three partial equilibrium counterfactual ex-
ercises. First, I simulate a version of the model where self-employment is as inflexible for
mothers as wage and salary employment to estimate the effect of self-employment flex-
ibility. My simulations imply that self-employment flexibility raises women’s fertility by
3.0% by lowering the costs of working while they have young children. I find that women’s
median lifetime earnings are 1.2% lower with flexible self-employment because it encour-
ages women to work in relatively lower paying self-employment rather than in wage and
salary employment. In a second counterfactual exercise, I consider the effect of increasing
flexibility for mothers in wage and salary employment to equal the flexibility provided in
self-employment.3 I find that increasing wage and salary flexibility raises women’s fertil-
ity, increases their overall work experience, and increases their median lifetime earnings
2See Hurst and Pugsley (2014) and Hamilton (2000) on the non-pecuniary benefits of self-employment.
There is a large literature on compensating differentials including work on the impact of fatality risk (e.g.
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) and Dorman and Hagstrom (1998)), income risk (e.g. Hammermesh and Wolfe
(1990) and Dillon (2015)), and fringe benefits (e.g. Lehrer and Pereira (2007)) on compensation.
3This exercise does not include a wage adjustment to compensate firms for the costs of implementing
flexible work policies for mothers, and therefore the estimates likely overstate the effect of these policies.
The counterfactual makes wage and salary employment as flexible for mothers as self-employment, however,
some flexible work policies could make wage and salary employment more flexible for all workers. This
could yield additional benefits to women without young children and men who may also value workplace
flexibility.
3
by 12.5%. My third counterfactual models the effect of policies to promote female self-
employment by lowering the entry costs to self-employment. I find that lowering entry
costs by 10% raises self-employment rates substantially, but decreases women’s median
earnings by 0.9% because it encourages women to switch from wage and salary employ-
ment to self-employment. Although it makes the flexible work alternative less costly, I find
that reducing the entry costs to self-employment has only a small positive effect on fertility.
While all three counterfactuals suggest that increased access to flexible work raises
women’s employment, only increasing the flexibility of wage and salary employment di-
minishes the overall gender earnings gap. In general, increasing flexibility for mothers
raises women’s lifetime work experience and earnings by encouraging them to work while
they have young children. However, increasing flexibility or access to self-employment en-
courages women to switch to self-employment, where women’s earnings are around 30%
less than in wage and salary employment. In addition, increases in flexibility encourage
relatively lower-earning women to work, which decreases the average earnings among em-
ployed women. In my counterfactual exercise with increased wage and salary flexibility,
I find that the effect of additional work experience and shifts from self-employment to
wage and salary employment outweigh the selection of lower-earning women into employ-
ment. In contrast, I estimate that the flexibility provided by self-employment and policies
to lower the entry costs to self-employment exacerbate the gender earnings gap by lower-
ing employed women’s earnings. Nevertheless, the flexibility of self-employment makes
women better off. This highlights the importance of considering non-pecuniary benefits
and labor force participation in addition to the earnings of employed women.
My results offer additional evidence that workplace flexibility decreases employment
gaps during the childbearing years, complementing previous work by Goldin (2014), Herr
and Wolfram (2012), and others. This paper takes a different approach by using self-
employment to study workplace flexibility, but reaches the same conclusion: a lack of
workplace flexibility causes some mothers to leave the labor force. Many of the aspects of
self-employment flexibility can be seen in the existing policies of some firms. Policies like
flextime mimic the ability to choose different work hours, while telecommuting allows em-
ployees to work from home. My model provides a monetary estimate for the value of the
flexibility offered by self-employment, which can be compared to firms’ costs when evalu-
ating whether to implement these policies. While these results show that self-employment
is one way that mothers gain flexibility, I also estimate substantial costs associated with
self-employment. This suggests that self-employment is not for everyone and highlights
the potential value of more flexible work alternatives within wage and salary employment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some back-
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ground on female self-employment. Section 3 describes the model of fertility and labor
supply and discusses identification of the model parameters. Section 4 describes the data I
use to estimate the model. In section 5, I discuss the parameter estimates from the model,
with a particular focus on women’s earnings and utility parameters. Section 6 describes the
results from the three counterfactual exercises. In section 7, I discuss the interpretation and
robustness of the estimates and section 8 concludes.
1.2 Background: Self-Employment and Flexibility
1.2.1 Female Self-Employment and Children
Previous research has found that women with young children are more likely to be self-
employed than women without young kids. A number of papers have shown that women’s
self-employment is positively associated with both marriage and children (Devine (2001),
Lombard (2001), Wellington (2006)). In other work, I have studied how self-employment
behavior changes with the age of a woman’s youngest child (Lim (2016)). I find that the
presence of a child between the ages of one and six has a positive effect on a woman’s
self-employment propensity that is both substantively and statistically significant. This
association follows an inverted U-shape with respect to the age of a woman’s youngest
child; the effect is strongest when the youngest child is two years of age. The shape of
this relationship is consistent with the hypothesis that self-employment provides a means
to work while caring for children during the years when they require the most attention.
Because the empirical evidence suggests that the decision to be self-employed and the
decision to have children are interrelated, I model them as a joint decision. My model
allows the presence of children to affect the decision to become self-employed and for the
option of self-employment to influence fertility, something that previous work has been
unable to address.4
1.2.2 Workplace Flexibility and Female Self-Employment
Researchers have focused on workplace flexibility as a primary explanation for the positive
relationship between female self-employment and children. They have identified the ability
to work from home, the ability to work fewer hours, and control over work load and sched-
ule as primary factors that explain why mothers with young children are more likely to
be self-employed. The characteristics of work look quite different between self-employed
4The one exception is Noseleit (2014) who uses the sibling-sex composition as an instrument for fertility
and the share of local employees working in small businesses as an instrument for self-employment.
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mothers and wage and salary employed mothers. While 5% of wage and salary employed
mothers with young children work from home, around 25% of self-employed mothers do
all of their work at home (Lim (2016)). Time use analyses find that self-employed mothers
spend more time with their children, work fewer hours, and spend more time on housework
(Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009), Hundley (2000), Lim (2016)). The self-employed have more
varied usual work hours than the wage and salary employed and are more likely to change
their work hours throughout the year 5 The evidence suggests that self-employment allows
mothers additional control over some aspects of their work arrangements.
Although self-employment provides a more flexible work environment, there are many
reasons why only 5% of married women are self-employed. First, the ability to be self-
employed and the flexibility of self-employment varies across occupations. As Figure 1.1
shows, the most common occupations among the self-employed are child care workers,
administrative workers, managers, and sales workers.6 The level and type of flexibility that
each occupation achieves in self-employment can differ and may be less flexible in some
ways than working a similar job in wage and salary employment.7 Second, becoming self-
employed can be financially risky and require startup capital. It can also result in the loss of
fringe benefits such as employer retirement contributions and employer-sponsored health
insurance.
Although only a small fraction of women are self-employed at any given time, nearly
30% of women are self-employed at some point in their career.8 Very few women, how-
ever, spend the majority of their working lives in self-employment, making the question of
how self-employment experience affects future earning potential in wage and salary em-
ployment relevant.
1.2.3 Workplace Flexibility: Access and Impacts
Many of the features of general flexible work arrangements are incorporated in self-employment,
but many workers do not have access to these types of flexibility within wage and salary
5See Lim (2016) for evidence on differences in the distributions of work hours between the self-employed
and wage and salary employed. See Devine (2001) for evidence that self-employed women are more likely to
change their work hours throughout the year. There is little evidence that changes in hours in self-employment
are due to slack demand. Devine (2001) finds that temporary part-time work among the self-employed is
involuntary only 3% of the time compared to 10% of the time for wage and salary employed women.
6These tabulations are for my sample of NLSY79 married, white women. For a more comprehensive look
at the top occupations among all self-employed American women over time see Table A.1.
7For example, Goldin and Katz (2012) argue that pharmacists represent an occupation that is less flexible
in self-employment.
8Author’s tabulations from NLSY79 data.
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employment.9 In 2011, 56% of US wage and salary employees had the ability to vary
their schedule or the location of their work (Council of Economic Advisors (2014)). Al-
though the majority of employers offer flexible work policies for some employees, rela-
tively few offer the programs to all or most of their employees (Matos and Galinsky (2014)).
Individual-level data suggest that workers with a Bachelor’s degree are more likely to have
access to flexibility in their schedules and place of work than less educated employees
(Golden (2001), Council of Economic Advisors (2014)). Overall, the evidence suggests
that a sizable share workers do not have access to a flexible work environment at their
current employer.
There is some research suggesting that workplace flexibility is an important determi-
nant of mothers’ employment decisions. Much of the work has focused on the effect of
maternity leave. Paid leave seems to be more effective than unpaid leave in encouraging
employment among mothers. Both Rossin-Slater et al. (2013) and Byker (2014) find that
paid leave in California raised women’s employment, while Han et al. (2009) find no re-
lationship between employment and the short and unpaid maternity leave provided by the
1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, although the effect is relatively imprecisely estimated.
Other papers have focused on measuring the flexibility within an occupation and estimating
its impact on women’s choices. Herr and Wolfram (2012) find that among Harvard grad-
uates, women in flexible jobs are 5-6 percentage points less likely to stop working after
having children. Goldin (2014) provides some evidence that the most flexible occupations
have the smallest gender earnings gaps. This paper estimates the effect of the package of
flexible amenities self-employment provides on women’s short and long-term employment
decisions.
1.3 Model
In this section, I describe my model of the employment and fertility decisions of married
white women over their working lives. I study married women for two reasons. Empiri-
cally, the effect of young children on self-employment rates is largest for this group, making
it a relevant population to study (Lim (2016)). Additionally, self-employment rates among
married women are around 9% compared to 3% for never married women (Roche (2014)).
Second, single women face different constraints in making employment and fertility deci-
sions than married women. Because the model takes husbands’ employment as exogenous
and does not include household bargaining over child care and home production, I limit the
9See www.workplaceflexibility2010.org at Georgetown Law for details on a variety of flex-
ible work policies.
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scope of the analysis to married women. I focus on white women in order to reduce the
number of estimated parameters by focusing on a relatively homogenous sample.10 Addi-
tionally this sample selection allows me to compare my results to previous work on married
white women.11
Figure 1.2 depicts the overall timeline of the model. The model begins at ageA0, which
is individual specific and is defined as the first year when all three of the following events
have occurred: the woman is at least 18 years of age, she is married, and she has been
out of school for at least two years. The estimation begins after almost all schooling has
been completed because I am not modeling education decisions.12 Similarly the estimation
begins after women marry because the model abstracts from the marriage decision and
does not allow for divorce.13 In each year between ages A0 and 50, women decide between
wage and salary employment, self-employment, or non-employment. If the woman has
fewer than four children and is under the age of 40, she also chooses whether to have a
child that year.14 In years when women make both an employment decision and a fertility
decision they choose from six alternatives, and in years with only an employment decision
they choose from three. At age 51, women receive the continuation value from all of their
previous choices. This value is equal to the utility their would receive from making a
static optimal employment decision each year through age 65 given the values of their state
variables at age 50. At age 65, women retire and the model ends.15
The model incorporates two dynamic considerations: human capital accumulation through
work experience and children. When women decide whether to be employed, they consider
the effect of the decision on their future earning potential. Likewise, when women have
children they fully anticipate the need to care for the child and the benefits of having chil-
dren. In the remainder of this section, I discuss the empirical specification of the model,
describe the estimation procedure, and discuss the identification of key parameters.
10Black and Hispanic women have different self-employment rates, may face different earnings processes
or have differing preferences over children and work, which would require estimating separate parameters by
race. In the data, I do not have the sample size to run a separate model for Blacks and Hispanics.
11For example Francesconi (2002) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1989).
12In the data, I consider the beginning of the first two consecutive years out of school as the beginning of
the eligible sample period. Women remain in the sample even if they return to school later.
13In the data, I focus on women who do not divorce during the survey period. Incorporating the decision
to divorce greatly complicates the model, and I leave this extension to future work.
14This maximum was set to ease computation. Around 2.1% of women in my sample have more than 4
children and 2.8% have children after age 40. I assume perfect control over fertility, but unexpected pregnan-
cies will be captured in the model by a large positive fertility shock.
15Women may receive utility in retirement but it must be unrelated to any state variables in the model such
as number of children, work experience, and demographics. This implies that earlier employment and fertility
decisions are not motivated by a desire for grandkids or large retirement savings. These considerations are
beyond the scope of my model.
8
1.3.1 Utility Function
Women make decisions to maximize the present value of their expected utility:
Et
[ 65∑
τ=t
δτ−tU(cτ , djτ , Nτ , aτ , 
jn
τ )
]
(1.1)
where δ is the discount factor, cτ is the woman’s consumption in year τ , djτ is a vector of
indicators for the employment choice where j ∈ {ws, se, ne} for wage and salary, self-
employment, and non-employed respectively. Nτ is the total number of children a woman
has (including a child born in period τ ), n is an indicator for a birth, and aτ is the age
of the woman’s youngest child. In each year, women receive utility from consumption,
their children, and leisure. Leisure is not explicitly modeled, but the loss of leisure from
working is reflected in the cost of employment. Women’s period-specific utility is specified
as follows:
Ut =

βj1ct + β
j
2 + β
j
31(at ∈ [0, 5]) + βj41(at ∈ [6, 9]) + βse5 1(Dset = 0) if j ∈ {ws,se}
+β6Nt + β7(Nt)
2 + jnt
ct + β6Nt + β7(Nt)
2 + jnt if j = ne
(1.2)
The first part of the equation describes women’s utility if they work and the second de-
scribes their utility when they are not employed. Parameters and variables with j super-
scripts vary by the employment choice, while those with n superscripts vary with the fer-
tility decision. The vector Djt represents the stock of type j employment experience.
The marginal utility of consumption, βj1, can differ by employment status, which allows
for husband’s earnings to affect women’s decisions.16 An estimate of βj1 that is less than
1 suggests that, all else equal, women with wealthier husbands are less likely to work in
that employment type than to not work. An estimate greater than 1 implies that women
with high earning spouses are more likely to work in that employment type relative to not
working.
The utility costs of working may vary by employment type and the presence of young
children. The net utility costs of working in either self-employment or wage and salary
employment are given by βj2. These costs are modified by the presence of young children
through βj3 and β
j
4. Specifically, β
j
3 describes the additional psychic costs of working when
16My model only includes the wife’s employment decision, and I model the husband’s earnings as an
exogenous process. I assume a unitary household model, where income is pooled and not bargained over. This
simplifies the analysis, but it implies that the model does not incorporate considerations such as bargaining
power in determining women’s employment decisions.
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a woman’s youngest child is between the ages of 0 and 5. Similarly, βj4 represents the
additional utility cost of working associated with having a youngest child aged 6 to 9. I
allow for different effects for preschool-aged children and older children because schools
may provide care that makes it easier for women to work.17 I interpret the differences
βse3 − βws3 and βse4 − βws4 as the value of self-employment flexibility for mothers with
young children. The overall benefit of self-employment flexibility that all workers enjoy
will be captured in the βse2 term. This particular specification assumes that women with
no children and women with a youngest child 10 years of age or older face the same util-
ity costs of working. This specification is motivated by my previous work showing that
employment rates among mothers with children older than 10 are similar to those without
children. It also reduces the computational requirements of the model because I only fol-
low the youngest child through age 9.18 Finally, βse5 represents a fixed cost paid the first
time a woman becomes self-employed. This cost represents any extra effort spent moving
into self-employment for the first time including time spent learning about how to start a
business and time spent securing financing and proper licensing for the business.19
I allow the number of children a woman has to affect her utility directly. I assume
that children arrive in the same year that women decide to have a child. The utility from
children is modeled as a quadratic in the number of children. Women receive this utility
from children regardless of their employment choice.
For each of the six possible choices in each year, there is a choice-specific random utility
shock, ntt . These shocks are assumed to be serially uncorrelated, and independent and
identically distributed according to a type 1 extreme value distribution with variance ρ2 pi
2
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where ρ is an estimated parameter. This error structure greatly reduces the computational
burden associated with estimating the model, but has a number of strong implications.
First, the variance of the shocks to self-employment and wage and salary employment are
equal, ruling out different second moments for the earnings in each employment type.20
Second, the shock to utility in each employment type with a birth is uncorrelated with the
17My model includes estimates of expected child care costs, which will reflect the lower monetary costs of
child care as children age. The disutility parameters β3 and β4 should be interpreted as non-pecuniary costs
of working with children such as less time spent with children.
18See Lim (2016) for patterns of employment and self-employment as a function of the age of a woman’s
youngest child. For computational reasons, I only keep track of the youngest child’s age through 9.
19This specification does not include a switching cost for moving in and out of self-employment. These
costs might be minimal if the woman re-starts a business in a similar occupation or large if the woman moves
into a different occupation. I do not model occupational choice so I chose to have a one time fixed cost of
becoming self-employed for the first time.
20Although  is a utility shock, a transformation of the shock could instead be added to wages and inter-
preted as a wage shock. Given the risk neutral utility function, this assumption is not as restrictive as it would
be if the utility function had curvature.
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shock to utility in that same employment type with no birth. Likewise the shocks to utility
across the employment types with a birth are uncorrelated. Third, this specification rules
out persistent shocks by assuming that the errors are uncorrelated over time.21
1.3.2 Budget Constraint
The budget constraint determines women’s consumption levels each year. Consumption is
equal to the sum of the woman’s earnings, mjt , and her husband’s expected income, yt, less
the family’s predicted child care costs, CCjt :
cjt = m
j
t + yt − CCjt (1.3)
There is no saving or borrowing in the model, so women consume their full net income
each year.22
I assume that the husband’s expected earnings, yt, are exogenous to their decisions, but
they are modeled as a function of the wife’s characteristics (Francesconi (2002), Van der
Klaauw (1996)). I assume that the husband’s earnings in each year are realized after the
wife makes her employment and fertility decisions, so women make decisions based on the
expected earnings of their husbands. The husband’s log income is modeled as a function
of the wife’s age interacted with whether or not she is college educated. This allows for
his earnings to grow over time at a different rate depending on the wife’s education level.
I also control for the unemployment rate and an individual level fixed effect, which cap-
tures fixed characteristics that determine a husband’s average lifetime earning levels. These
characteristics could include his education level, college major, or unobserved ability.
Women’s earnings when employed depend on their previous experience in each type of
employment, Dwst and D
se
t , and the cumulative number of years spent not employed, D
ne
t .
Earnings also depend on the national unemployment rate, ut, and the woman’s education
level, Educi, both of which are assumed to be exogenously determined outside of the
model. I assume that women have no earnings if they choose not to work: mnet = 0. Log
annual earnings in each employment type are specified by the following earnings equation:
ln(mjt) = γ
j
0 + γ
j
1ut + f
j(Dwst , D
se
t , D
ne
t ) + γ
jEduci + ξ
j
t ; j = ws, se (1.4)
21As described below, I allow women to have fixed unobserved characteristics so the  terms must be
serially uncorrelated conditional on the woman’s unobserved type.
22This assumption is made for tractability reasons and is common in the literature (see Van der Klaauw
(1996), Francesconi (2002), Keane and Wolpin (2010)). A savings decision represents a continuous choice
that would greatly increase the computational burden of solving the model. With linear utility and no savings
the problem is equivalent to a lifetime wealth maximization problem modified by the non-pecuniary costs
and benefits of children and work.
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The functions f j are piece-wise linear functions that capture how log earnings in each
employment type vary with years of experience and years spent not employed. The func-
tions include a top experience category after which additional years of experience no longer
contribute to changes in earnings. I model log earnings this way because it provides a better
fit to the data than a quadratic function. Additionally, the model requires extrapolation out-
side of the empirical support of the experience distribution for predicting earnings at high
levels of self-employment experience, which was particularly problematic using a quadratic
function. This specification flexibly allows the returns to each type of employment expe-
rience to vary between wage and salary employment and self-employment. I include time
spent not employed in the earnings equation to allow for an earning penalty for breaks in
employment. Previous research suggests that both the length of time spent not-employed
as well as how recent the time out was matter (e.g. Jacobsen and Levin (1995), Hotchkiss
and Pitts (2007)). While this specification does not capture the timing of the employment
gap, it will represent the average penalty to earnings over many years associated with an
employment gap.
In order to accurately model mothers’ employment decisions, I explicitly estimate ex-
pected child care costs. Previous research has found that the labor supply of married women
is sensitive to the cost of child care (Ribar (1992), Connelly and Kimmel (2003), Heeb and
Kilburn (2004), Haeck et al. (2015)). Ideally, I would model women’s child care decision
using data on child care options and prices. Unfortunately these data were unavailable, so
I use data on child care expenditures to estimate women’s expected child care costs under
each employment and fertility decision.
I predict women’s child care expenditures as a function of the mother’s characteristics,
the age of her youngest child, the number of children in her family, and her employment
type. The expected child care expenditure is the product of the probability that a working
married mother pays a positive amount for child care and the expected amount paid con-
ditional on positive payment.23 Around 55% of working mothers with children under 10
do not make a monetary payment for child care services, so zero payments are empirically
important for estimating the expected child care cost. The probability of a positive payment
is described by the following equation:
23This is a reduced form model to predict the monetary costs that women can expect to pay in each employ-
ment type. If women who do not work are systematically different on unobserved dimensions that influence
their cost of child care, this procedure may overestimate or underestimate their expected child care costs. For
example, suppose women who do not work tend to not live nearby a grandparent and therefore would have a
higher probability of having to pay for child care costs than those who do work. Child care costs would be
underestimated for these women, and the disutility of work would be overestimated.
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Pr(Paymentjt) =
3+∑
l=1
νl1(Nt = l) + ν41(d
se
t ) + ν51(at ∈ {0, 1}) (1.5)
+ ν61(at ∈ [2, 5]) + ν7yeart + νXt; j = ws, se (1.6)
The expected amount paid conditional on positive payment takes the exact same functional
form:
E(Costjt |Paymentjt) =
3+∑
l=1
φl1(Nt = l) + φ41(d
se
t ) + φ51(at ∈ {0, 1}) (1.7)
+ φ61(at ∈ [2, 5]) + φ7yeart + φXt; j = ws, se (1.8)
Then the expected child care cost is:
CCjt = Pr(Payment
j
t) ∗ E(Costjt |Paymentjt); j = ws, se (1.9)
This specification takes into account that most daycares charge more for infants than
preschool or school-age children. It also implicitly allows for differences in the number of
hours of care purchased for school-age children relative to preschoolers. I assume that there
are no child care costs for women whose youngest child is 10 or older and for those who
are not employed.24 The vector of individual level characteristics, Xt, includes education
level and a quadratic in the mother’s age. This accounts for differences across education
levels and age in the decision to use child care and the type and quality of care selected. A
linear time trend is included to pick up changes over time in real child care prices.25
I allow child care costs to differ for self-employed mothers because my previous re-
search suggests that they are more likely to work from home and spend more time super-
vising their children (Lim (2016)). They also may have an easier time rearranging their
work schedules allowing them to coordinate child care with their husbands. By allowing
child care costs to be lower for self-employed women, I am in some sense controlling for
some of the benefits of self-employment flexibility. I will interpret my results on self-
24In the Survey of Income and Program Participation child care data, around 5.6% of working married
mothers with a youngest child 10-14 have positive child care expenditures and the unconditional average
expenditure is only $2 per week.
25The time trend will pick up average changes in prices arising both from changes in the underlying costs
of providing the same quality care as well as changes in the average quality of care utilized. See Laughlin
(2011) for trends in real child care costs over time.
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employment flexibility as net of child care expenses because these costs are already taken
out of women’s consumption. This approach biases my estimates of the additional flexi-
bility in self-employment downward so I choose to explicitly account for lower child care
costs and discuss them as an additional benefit of self-employment for mothers.
1.3.3 Unobserved Types
Women may vary in their preferences and their earning abilities due to factors that are
unobserved to the researcher. In order to allow for unobserved traits to affect women’s
choices, I allow for three latent types of women indexed by k.26 The types are represented
as discrete mass points as in Heckman and Singer (1984) and the proportions of each type,
µk are estimated parameters. These latent types are unknown to the researcher but are
known to each woman. I allow women’s preferences for children to reflect underlying
differences across the population in the desire to have children. This modifies the utility
equation, (1.2), by allowing the parameters on the utility of children to vary by type: βk6 and
βk7 . I also allow women to vary in their abilities in both wage and salary employment and
self-employment to account for selection on unobserved traits in the earnings equations.
The women’s earning equation, (1.4), is modified to have an intercept term that can vary
by type: γjk0 . These intercept differences will reflect differences in preferences for part-
time work or for work in low paying occupations in addition to differences in underlying
abilities. Any of these three underlying reasons could explain why women have relatively
low or high earnings throughout their life.
1.3.4 State Space Evolution
Women’s decisions depend on their previous fertility and employment choices, the val-
ues of the exogenous variables that affect utility, and the realizations of their choice spe-
cific utility shocks. The relevant state space that determines their optimal choice includes
yt, CC
j
t ,Xt, k,Nt, D
ws
t , D
se
t , D
ne
t , ut, at, 
jn
t , which I denote as Ωt. Women have full infor-
mation regarding the models determining husband’s income, child care expenditures, their
own earnings, and their utility. The only remaining sources of uncertainty in the model are
the choice specific utility shocks. The years of employment experience, the number of chil-
dren, and the age of the youngest child all evolve deterministically according to women’s
choices in the model. Work experience and children born prior to the estimation period are
included in women’s state values.
26Allowing for three types fit the data well and were tractable to estimate.
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The parameters of the model are represented in the vector θ. Vt(Ωt, θ) represents the
present value of a woman’s expected utility in year t given Ωt and θ:
Vt(Ωt, θ) =
maxj,n
[
V jnt (Ωt, θ)
]
, if t ∈ [A0, 40] and Nt < 4
maxj
[
V j0t (Ωt, θ)
]
, if t ∈ [41, 50] or Nt = 4
(1.10)
I make a number of simplifications to make the model more empirically tractable. I
model childbirth through age 40 or 4 children and employment decisions through age 50.
These simplifications are not particularly restrictive because only about 4% of women in
my sample have a child after age 40 or have more than 4 children. I focus on employ-
ment decisions through age 50 because the research question focuses on mothers’ labor
supply while they have young children at home. At age 51, women receive a continuation
value equal to the utility their would receive from making a static optimal employment
decision each year through age 65, which incorporates the role of higher future earnings
into women’s earlier employment decisions. V¯ jnt represents the alternative specific value
functions for each of the possible choices, which can be represented as a Bellman equation:
For t ∈ [A0, 50] : V¯ jnt (Ωt, θ) = Ut(djt , nt,Ωt, θ) + δE(Vt+1(Ωt+1, θ)|Ωt, djt , nt) (1.11)
where nt = 0 for t ∈ [40, 50] or Nt = 4 (1.12)
and E(V51(Ω51, θ)) = E
65∑
t=51
δt−51 max
j
[
Ut(d
j
t ,Ωt, θ|Ω50)
]
(1.13)
1.3.5 Identification
In my model, the parameters are identified by the choice and earnings data combined with
the functional form assumptions, the distributional assumptions, and exclusion restrictions.
Although the parameters are jointly determined, in this section I provide an intuitive de-
scription of specific types of variation in the data that are particularly relevant to identify
certain parameters. Table A.2 summarizes the parameters of the model and the identifying
variation in the data.
Women’s earnings parameters are primarily identified by the earnings data. The unem-
ployment rate, women’s education level, and women’s cumulative work experience are ex-
clusion restrictions that help identify the earnings parameters because they affect women’s
earnings but not utility directly. The parameters in the piece-wise linear functions that
describe the relationship between experience and earnings are identified by earnings data
observed for women with the same education level in the same year, but with different
previous experience levels. To address the selection problem in observed earnings, I al-
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low for unobserved differences across women to affect their log earnings through the three
unobserved types in the model.
Women’s utility parameters are identified by the choices women make in the data. The
number of children a woman has, the age of her youngest child, and her husband’s predicted
income act as exclusion restrictions that affect women’s utility in the different choices, but
do not influence her potential earnings in employment. The overall share of women work-
ing in wage and salary employment and self-employment identify βj2. The difference be-
tween the observed employment choices for women with young children and those without
identify the costs of working associated with children, βj3 and β
j
4. Finally the fixed cost of
entering self-employment for the first time, βse5 , is identified by the fraction of women who
ever become self-employed.
My main estimate of interest is the difference in the additional costs of working associ-
ated with having young children at home between wage and salary employment and self-
employment, βws3 − βse3 . This difference is identified by the differential effect of having
young children on women’s self-employment and wage and salary employment rates. For
example, descriptive analyses show that wage and salary employment rates decline sharply
with the presence of young children while self-employment rates do not (Lim (2016)).
These differences in behavior are identifying the difference in these parameters.
The panel nature of the data allow me to identify the fraction of individuals in each
latent type and the type-specific parameters. By observing the same woman multiple times,
I can estimate the unobserved constant contribution to earnings and utility separately from
the unobserved idiosyncratic error term. These type specific parameters are identified by
women who look similar on observed characteristics making consistently different choices
or having different earnings.
1.3.6 Estimation
The estimation procedure consists of two stages. First, I estimate the husband’s earnings
equation and the child care cost equations using OLS and probit regressions. I use these
predicted values in the second step to estimate the utility parameters and women’s earnings
equations. In the second stage, for each guess of θ, I solve the full dynamic program-
ming problem for each individual using backward induction and construct the likelihood
of the observed data. Given the distributional and independence assumptions on , the log
likelihood of observing a sequence of choices and log earnings over time for a number of
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women, I , can be written as:
` =
I∑
i=1
ln
(
3∑
k=1
T∏
t=A0
µk
eV¯
h
t (Ωt,θ)/ρ∑H
h=1 e
V¯ ht (Ωt,θ)/ρ
(
φ
( ˆln(mt)− ln(mt)
σ
)))
(1.14)
Instead of normalizing the variance of the random utility error, I use women’s earnings,
husband’s expected income, and child care costs to denote utility levels in dollars. All
dollar values in the model are measured in real 2000$, and I estimate the variance of . I
fix the discount factor, δ, to be 0.95.27
1.4 Data
In this section, I explain how I map women’s employment, fertility, and earnings histories
into an annual level dataset that I use to estimate my model. I also describe the data used
to estimate the expected child care costs associated with working.
1.4.1 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79)
My primary data source is the NLSY79, which follows 12,686 individuals who were 14-22
years of age in 1979 through the present day. The survey interviews respondents annually
from 1979 through 1993 and bi-annually starting in 1994.
My primary sample includes white women who marry and do not divorce during the
survey.28 Nearly 50% of married white women divorce during the survey.29 In Table A.3,
I show that individuals in my sample who are always married do differ along observed
characteristics from individuals who get divorced. Women who divorce marry earlier and
have less education than those who remain married for the entire sample. These differences
are statistically significant and economically large, and they fit with known patterns of
divorce (e.g. Bramlett and Mosher (2002)). However, the differences in employment and
fertility choices between the women who divorce and those who remain married are not
27A variety of papers use similar discount factors. Francesconi (2002), Adda et al. (2011), and Keane
and Wolpin (2010) fix the discount factor to something between 0.93 and 0.952. Keane and Wolpin (1997)
estimate the discount factor to be 0.936.
28Women in my sample may get divorced after leaving the survey. I do not consider cohabiting women
as married, however evidence on white men in the NLSY79 suggests that 70% of live-in relationships began
as marriage and 30% as cohabitation. The majority of cohabitations led to marriage with the same partner
(Oppenheimer (2003)).
29An alternative sample is one that includes women while they are married regardless of whether they
divorce. If women change their behavior in anticipation of divorce (see Poortman (2005)), the estimates will
be biased.
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particularly large from an economic standpoint, although most are statistically different.30
There are two general sources of bias caused by this sample selection. First, system-
atic differences in preferences for work and children between women who divorce and
those who do not. Second, systematic differences in unobserved factors that affect earn-
ing potential, such as ability. In practice, as shown in Table 1.10, the model estimates
are qualitatively similar when including all white married women in the estimation sample
suggesting that women who divorce behave similarly to women who do not while they are
married.
My estimation sample only includes the nationally representative sample from the
NLSY79. I make a number of smaller refinements to the original NLSY79 sample to create
the data I use to estimate my model. These are explained in detail in Appendix B and Table
B.1 shows how each restriction affects the sample size. The final sample includes 1,035
women and 23,851 person-year observations.
The NLSY79 includes detailed information on marriage, fertility and employment and
covers the relevant age range for my life-cycle model. I use this information to construct
an annual level dataset of employment and fertility choices.31 In each year, women are
categorized as self-employed, wage and salary employed or not employed according to the
type of employment they spent the most weeks at during that year. I consider women who
were unemployed or out of the labor force to be not employed.32 Within a year, many
women have weeks assigned to different employment types highlighting the importance of
interpreting the effect of self-employment as the effect of a year of being primarily self-
employed. I calculate women’s annual earnings as the sum of their weekly earnings from all
of their jobs. There is some evidence that survey measures of self-employment income are
underestimated because individuals under-report this income for tax reasons (Hurst et al.
(2014)). My earnings measure does not use questions about annual income, and instead
uses job specific information on pay rates and hours. This may mitigate some of the under-
reporting, but any remaining systematic under-reporting would positively bias the utility
cost of working in self-employment.33 As a robustness check, I re-estimate the model with
inflated self-employment earnings using Hurst et al. (2014)’s estimate of under-reporting
30See Francesconi (2002) for similar findings on these two samples. He argues ever married and always
married women are similar in their employment and fertility decisions.
31If women have a birth after 40, I ignore it and assign them to their employment status with no birth.
Around 2% of women in the sample have births after 40.
32This will affect the long-term unemployed. My model assumes that if women want to work at their
predicted wage rate, which will be lower in worse economic times, they can find a job.
33I do find that both hourly wages and earnings are lower in self-employment. This is consistent with
previous work on self-employment (Hamilton (2000)), and it is not clear what portion is from under-reporting
of self-employment earnings versus real lower earnings in self-employment.
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of 25%, and I find very similar results (see Table 1.10).
Information about the estimation sample of married, white, women can be seen in Table
1.1. The average age at the beginning of estimation is 25 and on average there are 23 years
of data for each woman. Average earnings during years when women are categorized as
wage and salary employed are around 28 thousand dollars, which is much higher than
the 20 thousand dollar average for years when women are self-employed. These earnings
differences include differences arising both from hourly wage rates and from hours worked
decisions. Around 41% of the sample have a high school degree or less, 23% have some
college, and 36% have a Bachelor’s degree.
Table 1.2 shows the variation in the percentage of women selecting each choice by age
and number of children. Around 27% of person-years are spent not-employed, 67% are
spent in wage and salary employment and 7% in self-employment. Overall employment
rates are increasing in age. Consistent with previous evidence that there is a strong positive
relationship between age and self-employment, older women are more likely to be self-
employed. Self-employment rates generally rise with the number of children in contrast to
the percentage of women working in wage and salary positions. Women with many kids are
also more likely not to work. Table 1.3 shows the year-to-year transitions between choices.
There is a high level of persistence in the employment choice with nearly 90 percent of
women who worked in wage and salary employment last year continuing in a wage and
salary position. Self-employment and non-employment are slightly less persistent with
continuation rates of closer to 80 percent.
In each interview, women in the NLSY79 are asked about their spouse’s income, which
I use to estimate a model of husband’s income in the first stage of estimation. The estimates
from the husband’s income regression are shown in Table A.5. Husband’s earnings increase
with the wife’s age, and husbands of women with a Bachelor’s degree have higher earnings
growth.
1.4.2 Child Care Expenditure Data
Child care expenditure data come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). The SIPP is a longitudinal panel that follows individuals for up to 4 years and
periodically asks questions about child care expenses. I use SIPP panels from 1984 through
2008, which have child care expenditure data for 15 different years spanning 1986-2011.
See appendix Table B.2 for more information on the specific panels and survey waves used.
I limit the sample to white married employed mothers with a youngest child under the age
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of 10.34
In the first stage of estimation, I generate predictions for expected child care costs using
these SIPP data. The results from the regressions predicting positive child care payment and
child care expenditures conditional on positive payment are shown in Table A.4. Women
with infants, older women, and more educated women tend to pay more for child care. The
self-employed are around 25 percentage points less likely to make positive payments for
child care, but conditional on payment they pay only slightly less per week.
1.5 Parameter Estimates
In this section, I discuss the parameter estimates from the second stage of estimation and
provide evidence that the model fits the life-cycle patterns and overall employment and
fertility choices observed in the data.
1.5.1 Women’s Earnings
Figure 1.3, which plots the effect of experience on earnings, shows that self-employment
experience has a small negative effect on women’s future wage and salary earnings, but
the effect is not as severe as time spent not employed. These results indicate that being
self-employed is relatively better for women’s future earning potential in wage and salary
employment than not working. Wage and salary experience has strong positive effects on
wage and salary earnings and more moderate positive effects on self-employment earnings.
I use different linear spline specifications for self-employment and wage and salary em-
ployment because the densities of experience across the two types of employment are very
different. In the figure, the returns at each year of experience represents the change in log
earnings associated with that level of experience relative to zero years of that type of ex-
perience with all other factors held constant. The effects are additive because there are no
interactions between experience types. Table 1.4 shows the earnings parameter estimates
and the returns to experience in table format.
My results are consistent with previous estimates of the returns to self-employment.
Bruce and Schuetze (2004) estimate the effects of self-employment and unemployment
spells on wage and salary earnings relative to wage and salary experience; however, their
results for women are too noisy and varied across years to draw any firm conclusions. They
do find that for men self-employment consistently is worse for wage and salary earnings
34Although women who aren’t working do purchase child care, the SIPP did not record expenditures for
non-employed women across all panels.
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than wage and salary employment, but better than unemployment. In a similar analysis,
Williams (2000) finds evidence that self-employment experience for women is not as re-
warded as wage and salary employment experience in terms of wage and salary earnings,
but his estimates also suffer from relatively large standard errors.
The magnitudes of the returns to experience in wage and salary employment are in line
with previous estimates. Although they use a different specification, dataset, and focus on
log wages, my estimates are similar to Light and Ureta (1995). They estimate that 3, 5,
and 8 years of actual experience increase white women’s log wages by 0.20, 0.31, and 0.44
log points respectively. I find estimates of 0.28, 0.34, and 0.41 log points, which at low
levels of experience are a bit higher than their estimates but are closer to their preferred
richer specification.35 My estimates of the effect of years spent not employed on wage and
salary earnings are also generally consistent with previous research. Jacobsen and Levin
(1995) focus on the rebound in earnings after an employment gap and find that the log
wage penalty varies from -0.30 log points 1 year after the gap to around -0.05 log points
20 years after the gap. I estimate that a 1 year gap leads to a 0.12 log point decline in wage
and salary earnings, which seems reasonable because the estimate is the average penalty to
earnings in all future years.36
I estimate that self-employment experience has strong positive returns within self-
employment earnings, and that wage and salary experience is associated with a small pos-
itive effect on self-employment earnings. Returns are higher for experience in the same
type of employment. Employers may value wage and salary experience more highly be-
cause self-employment experience is difficult to verify. There could also be skills devel-
oped through experience that are specific to the type of employment. For example, the
self-employed need to learn about filing taxes, managing cash flow, marketing their busi-
ness, and other skills that may not have been a part of wage and salary employment. The
higher returns could also be picking up tenure effects within a job or type of job, which are
not otherwise explicitly accounted for in this analysis. As in wage and salary earnings, I
estimate a negative effect of years spent not employed on self-employment earnings.
Because the model describes log earnings and not log wages, the parameter estimates
35Light and Ureta (1995) prefer a model that keeps track of the percentage of each year a woman was
employed and controls for the order of their employment history. I compare my results to the specification
that is the most similar to mine, which uses cumulative actual experience. In this specification, they use a
quadratic form, which is known to underestimate returns to very low levels of experience. This might explain
why my estimates are larger for 1 and 3 years. Additionally their study focuses on women’s work behavior
between the ages of 24 and 30, who were born a decade before the NLSY79 sample, and it includes additional
control variables like job tenure.
36A preferred specification would allow earnings to depend on the length of time since the employment
gap occurred, but that would increase the computational burden of estimation substantially.
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reflect the combined effect on women’s wage rates and their hours worked. This could
be important for interpreting the coefficients because if women who spend time in self-
employment or not working tend to be women who also work part-time in wage and salary
employment, this could explain part of the negative effect on earnings of these two types of
experience. Additionally many self-employed women work part-time (Devine (2001)), so
a switch from wage and salary employment to self-employment could represent a change
from full-time to part-time work, depressing the returns to wage and salary experience
within self-employment earnings.
As Table 1.4 shows, there are positive returns to education in both wage and salary
employment and self-employment. Women with some college education earn 16% more in
wage and salary employment than women with a high school degree or less, while women
with a Bachelor’s degree earn around 30% more. The magnitudes are similar but a bit
higher in self-employment, where women with some college education earn 19% more
than high school educated women and those with a Bachelor’s degree earn 38% more. A
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases women’s earnings in
both types of employment by about 2%.
The estimates from Table 1.4 show that there are important unobserved factors affect-
ing women’s earnings. I estimate that around 23% of the population are type 1 individuals
who are relatively low earners in both wage and salary and self-employment. They earn,
on average, around 0.7 log points less in wage and salary employment and 1.0 log point
less in self-employment relative to medium earners. A little over half of women are type
2 or medium earners in both types of employment. Type 3 individuals make up 24% of
the population and are high earners in both wage and salary and self-employment. These
women earn 0.5 log points more than medium type earners in wage and salary employment
and 0.65 log points more in self-employment. These levels of heterogeneity in earnings
across types are similar in magnitude to those found in Francesconi (2002). These differ-
ences represent both underlying differences in productivity across women, which would
affect their wage rate, and differences in preferences for hours worked, which would also
affect their earnings.
Overall, these earnings equations imply that self-employment experience is better for
future earnings than spending a year not employed. The comparison between a year of self-
employment and spending a year in wage and salary employment is less clear. Wage and
salary experience has higher returns in wage and salary earnings, but self-employment ex-
perience has stronger positive effects on self-employment earnings. Because most women
spend the majority of their careers in wage and salary employment, wage and salary expe-
rience is likely to be the choice that maximizes future earning potential.
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1.5.2 Women’s Utility
The estimates of women’s utility parameters confirm that working has utility costs, and as
Table 1.5 shows, self-employment is the relatively more costly employment type. I estimate
that the there is a utility cost equivalent to $95,200 incurred the first time a woman enters
self-employment. This entry cost can be thought of as the time and effort spent developing
the business idea and gathering all the necessary material and licenses to become self-
employed. There is an additional annual utility cost of $14,900 for each year spent working
in self-employment. This cost includes any loss in leisure associated with working in self-
employment relative to non-employment and additional stress associated with being self-
employed. Working in wage and salary employment also has a net utility cost of around
$4,000 which similarly represents the loss of leisure and stress associated with working.
These utility costs represent net costs and so also include positive traits associated with
working, like a sense of accomplishment, fringe benefits, and having a social network of
co-workers. The difference in the provision of fringe benefits may contribute to the much
larger net utility cost of self-employment relative to wage and salary employment.
While in general the utility costs of working in self-employment are higher than in wage
and salary employment, the additional costs of working associated with having children
are smaller in self-employment. I find that women whose youngest child is 0-5 years of
age incur an additional cost of working in wage and salary employment of $11,300. The
cost for these mothers in self-employment is around $3,900. I interpret this difference
of around $7,400 as the value of flexibility offered by self-employment for mothers with
young children. This flexibility is also important for mothers whose youngest child is 6-9
years old, and I estimate its value at around $3,400. These estimates are consistent with my
hypothesis that self-employment offers additional non-pecuniary benefits to mothers with
young children. Additionally the lower value for women whose youngest child is 6-9 years
of age is consistent with the idea that self-employment provides a means to take care of
children when they require the most care.
My estimates of the marginal utility of consumption suggest that all else equal women
with higher earning husbands are less likely to work, which is consistent with general pat-
terns of female employment and spousal income. I find that the effect of husband’s income
on employment is smaller in self-employment, which may partially reflect differences be-
tween women with high earning and low earning spouses in access to financial or human
capital that make it easier to be self-employed. My estimate for the marginal utility of con-
sumption in wage and salary employment is 0.91 and for self-employment it is 0.95, which
are similar in magnitude to Francesconi (2002) who estimates a value of 0.98 for full-time
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wage and salary employment and 0.94 for part-time wage and salary employment.37
There is substantial heterogeneity in the parameter estimates for the utility women re-
ceive from children. I find that medium earning type 2 and high earning type 3 individuals
receive very similar utility from children, while lower earning type 1 individuals receive
a lower value from children. Simulations of the baseline model show that type 1 women
have on average 2.4 children, type 2 women have 2.0 children, and the high earning type 3
women have 1.8 children. Although type 1 women receive lower levels of utility from their
children, they have lower overall levels of utility and lower opportunity costs of having
children because of their relatively low earning potential.
I estimate the standard deviation of the utility shock to be $21,000, which suggests that
there is a relatively large role for unobserved factors to influence choices. This value repre-
sents around 25% of their average annual utility. The size of this utility shock implies that
there will be many instances where women make different choices from the one with the
highest expected value because of a positive utility shock to one alternative. While a richer
model could better explain women’s choices and decrease the variance of the utility shock, I
view this model as capturing the primary aspects of preference heterogeneity across women
and the main differences between wage and salary employment and self-employment.
1.5.3 Model Fit
In order to check the fit of the model, I simulate women’s decisions according to the base-
line model using each woman’s actual initial conditions at the beginning of the estimation
period. The values in this section are calculated from the simulated data in years when the
actual NLSY data were used in estimation.38 Table 1.6 compares the overall percentages
of women making each employment-fertility choice and their completed fertility between
the NLSY79 data and the simulated data. The model fits the overall distribution of choices
very well and the distribution of children reasonably well given the quadratic functional
form for the utility from children. Chi-squared tests fail to reject the model.
I investigate the fit of the model over the life-cycle by plotting the fraction of women
making each choice as a function of their age. I compare the prevalence of the six choices
over the lifecycle between the simulated choices and the NLSY79 data in Figure 1.4. The
model fits the age profile for self-employment behavior pretty closely. It over-predicts wage
37Van der Klaauw (1996) has a different specification that is not directly comparable, but qualitatively he
also finds that women with wealthier husbands have lower marginal utilities of consumption in working than
in non-employment.
38For example, if a woman leaves the sample at age 40, the model can simulate her choices through age
50, however these data will not be in the sample statistics in the NLSY so are not used in assessing the model
fit.
24
and salary employment among young individuals and under-predicts non-employment. In
later ages, the pattern is reversed and the model under-predicts wage and salary employ-
ment and over-predicts non-employment. Chi-squared tests of the choices at each age reject
the model at a 5% level for ages 18 to 21, but fail to reject the model from ages 22 through
50.
There are a number of reasons that the model may not match employment choices
at young ages. First, there are relatively few women in the sample at young ages be-
cause women do not enter the estimation until they are married and no longer enrolled in
school.39 Second, the women who are in the sample at young ages might be different along
unobserved dimensions as well as observed characteristics. These women did not attend a
four-year college directly after high school, and they married relatively early.
Table 1.7 shows the year-to-year transitions implied by the simulated data from the
model. In comparison to the transitions in the underlying data, shown in Table 1.3, women
are more likely to move between employment types in the model. This is especially true
for women in non-employment and self-employment. In the model, movements between
types of employment are costless, but in reality there are likely frictions that limit these
transitions. Figure 1.5 plots the distribution of the total number of years each woman
made each choice over her lifetime. These diagrams show that the simulated data fit the
distribution of time spent in self-employment and non-employment, but do not have enough
individuals with very low levels of wage and salary employment. Overall, the model fits
the life-cycle pattern of fertility and employment choices from the data relatively well,
particularly at ages 25 and above.
1.5.4 Implications of Modeling Simplifications
I make a number of modeling simplifications to balance computational tractability with
realism. Some of the most important simplifications are not allowing savings, having risk
neutral agents, and not modeling the intensive labor supply decision.
My model abstracts from savings and borrowing decisions, by assuming that women
consume all of their income each year. If women are motivated to work to save for retire-
ment, this incentive could make working look more attractive, positively biasing the cost to
working parameters. If there is little heterogeneity in the preference for saving for retire-
ment in my population, this will not cause bias in the other parameters. Additionally, the
magnitude of this bias may be smaller for my sample because their earnings make up only
a third of household income.
39At age 21, 27% of the sample is present, and by age 22, 37% of the sample is present.
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Second, my model does not allow for risk averse agents, which implies that the relative
riskiness of self-employment versus wage and salary employment does not affect women’s
decisions. If self-employment is more risky than wage and salary employment and women
are risk averse, then the costs of working in self-employment will be negatively biased.
The omission of savings and earnings risk interact and together they reduce the problem
to a lifetime wealth maximization modified by the psychic value of work and children
(Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)). Including one without the other is likely to have small
effects on the parameter estimates, but including both could change the incentives reflected
in the model substantially. If women see riskiness in their future income stream and have
the ability to save, we might see a lot more employment at young ages to gain a buffer
stock to insure against future shocks. While these are interesting incentives to investigate,
they are beyond the scope of this paper. If this incentive to work to gain savings is large
β2 could be positively biased. If these working years coincide with having young kids at
home, β3 and β4 could also be positively biased.
Finally, this paper focuses on women’s extensive labor supply decisions missing any
changes to the number of hours they work. This omission is particularly relevant for my
research question because women with young kids are more likely to work part-time or
to choose family friendly jobs, both of which may lower their earnings.40 In the model,
this causes women with young kids to have earnings that are overestimated leading to a
negative bias in the parameters that estimate the costs of working associated with hav-
ing young children, β3 and β4. If the self-employed and wage and salary employed react
differently to the presence of a young child, this could bias my estimate of the value of
flexibility. For example, suppose that the self-employed are more able to adjust their hours
downward in response to having a child, then the self-employment disutility of work term
will be too negative and the value of self-employment flexibility will be underestimated. If
instead, self-employment allows women to maintain their level of hours better than wage
and salary employment while still caring for children, the self-employment flexibility will
be overestimated.
In order to estimate the sign and potential effect of this omission, I examine whether the
earnings residuals vary differentially with the presence of young children for women in self-
employment and wage and salary employment. Specifically, I regress log earnings residuals
on an indicator for self-employment status, an indicator for having a youngest child ages 0
40For example, women with young kids have shorter commutes on average, which could reflect their
desire to work closer to home (Black et al. (2014)). There is also evidence that at least part of the motherhood
penalty is attributable to part-time work and family friendly jobs (Gangl and Ziefle (2009), Budig and England
(2001)).
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to 5 and one for having a youngest child 6 to 9 years of age, and their interactions.41 I find
that the earnings for mothers in general are over-predicted. The estimates suggest that for
mothers with preschool-aged children, their self-employment earnings are over-predicted
by a greater amount than their wage and salary earnings, but a large standard error makes
the difference statistically insignificant. I estimate that for mothers who have a youngest
child ages 6-9 years of age, self-employment earnings and wage and salary earnings are
both over-predicted, but by similar amounts. The effect has a small point estimate but
a large standard error. The signs and magnitudes of the estimates suggest that the value
of self-employment flexibility for women with children between the ages of 0 and 5 is
underestimated and that the value of self-employment flexibility for women with children
between the ages of 6 and 9 is not biased by the hours omission. Neither of the interaction
terms are statistically significant and the estimates are imprecise so it’s difficult to evaluate
how large the bias is likely to be.
Overall, I do not think that the omission of modeling job characteristics or the hours de-
cision is likely to change the overall qualitative conclusion of the paper that self-employment
represents a more flexible option for mothers with young children.
1.6 Counterfactual Exercises
In this section, I describe three partial equilibrium counterfactual exercises I conduct using
the model. Together these exercises provide evidence that workplace flexibility influences
women’s employment and fertility decisions, which in turn affect their lifetime utility and
earnings.
1.6.1 Value of Self-Employment Flexibility
In the first counterfactual, I estimate the value of self-employment flexibility by assuming
that mothers with young children in self-employment face the same utility costs of working
as mothers in wage and salary employment. Specifically, I set a new value for the disutility
of working in self-employment with a preschool-aged child, β˜se3 , to equal the baseline
estimated utility cost in wage and salary employment, βˆws3 . I do the same for the cost of
working associated with having children 6 to 9 years of age: β˜se4 = βˆ
ws
4 . I interpret the
difference between the estimated model and this counterfactual as quantifying the impact
of the additional flexibility mothers receive in self-employment.
41The regression results can be found in the appendix Table A.6.
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I find that self-employment flexibility is a big motivator for women to become self-
employed. Table 1.8 provides a summary of how the counterfactual exercises affect women’s
earnings, work experience, fertility and utility. Without the additional flexibility, self-
employment rates fall from 7.8% to 4.0%. The availability of self-employment flexibil-
ity increases completed fertility by around 3.0%. This estimate is similar in magnitude to
Adda et al. (2011) who find that doubling the annual cash transfer per child in Germany
would increase fertility by 2% in the long run.
I estimate that self-employment flexibility has a small negative effect on the present
value of women’s median lifetime earnings. Among the women who were induced to
become self-employed by the additional flexibility, I find that around 80% of the years
that they would have spent in self-employment they instead spend working in wage and
salary employment. Because, on average, wage and salary employment earnings are higher,
and wage and salary employment experience has higher returns in future wage and salary
employment, making self-employment as inflexible for mothers as wage and salary em-
ployment reduces women’s lifetime earnings by around 1.2%. On average women who
switched from self-employment to wage and salary employment earned around $3,200
more that year, while women who switched to non-employment lost $15,400 in earnings.
The additional years of wage and salary employment experience paid off because for years
when the women worked in wage and salary employment in both scenarios they earned
$2,700 more when self-employment was no more flexible for mothers than wage and salary
employment.
As Figure 1.9 shows, without the additional flexibility in self-employment, overall em-
ployment rates fall relative to the baseline at every age, but fall the most during the ages
when the largest share of women have children at home. The lower earnings resulting from
these lower employment rates are more than compensated for by higher earnings among
women who remain employed and increase their wage and salary employment experience.
I estimate a much smaller effect of self-employment flexibility on women’s utility; on
average it increases women’s utility by 0.15%. Table 1.8 shows that the average lifetime
utility in present value terms is $1.33 million so the willingness to pay for the additional
flexibility is around $2,000 per woman.42 The willingness to pay among the marginal
women who became self-employed when self-employment was more flexible is $8,700.
In order to benefit from the added flexibility in self-employment, I estimate that women
have to pay high utility costs to become and stay self-employed. Therefore, when self-
42Present value in this case is the value of future utility discounted to the start of estimation for each
woman. Figures are expressed in year 2000$. The $2,000 figure would be the amount of money the average
woman would be willing to pay at the beginning of the estimation period to have self-employment flexibility.
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employment becomes less flexible, those women lose out on the flexibility but they also no
longer have to pay the large costs of becoming self-employed. Women who decide not to be
employed gain in leisure and women who decide to work in wage and salary employment
pay a much lower cost of working and earn more. These results suggest that the evaluation
of policies should consider changes to leisure and home production in addition to changes
in earnings.43
1.6.2 More Flexible Wage and Salary Employment
In this section, I estimate how women’s choices change if wage and salary employment
were as flexible as self-employment. This counterfactual exercise represents implementing
a set of policies within wage and salary employment to mimic the flexibility offered in self-
employment. I simulate the model with a new value for the disutility of working in wage
and salary employment with a preschool-aged child, β˜ws3 , that equals the original estimate
for the utility cost of working in self-employment, βˆse3 . I do the same for the utility cost of
working associated with having a child between the ages of 6 and 9 by setting: β˜ws4 = βˆ
se
4 .
These estimates represent an upper bound on the positive impacts of enacting policies that
make wage and salary employment comparably flexible to self-employment because these
policies have costs to employers and would likely result in lower wages for women if they
were implemented on a large scale.44
I estimate that increasing wage and salary employment flexibility would increase women’s
median lifetime earnings by 12.5%. This increase in earnings comes from two sources.
First, when wage and salary employment is more flexible, the fraction of years that women
spend not employed falls from 25% to 23% as women are encouraged to continue work-
ing even when they have young children at home. Second, women are encouraged to
switch from self-employment to wage and salary employment because self-employment
is no longer as valuable as a flexible work alternative. These two effects can be seen in
Figures 1.6 and 1.7. In Figure 1.6, the average earnings of women are increasing from both
an increase in participation and an increase in earnings conditional on employment. Figure
1.7 shows the difference in earnings conditional on employment demonstrating that higher
earnings among working women is concentrated later in life when cumulated work expe-
43See Greenberg and Robins (2008) on the importance of accounting for the value of non-market time in
cost-benefit analyses.
44See Pitt-Catsouphes et al. (2007) for details on employers’ biggest barriers to flexible work policies.
There may, however, exist policies that could make wage and salary employment more flexible than self-
employment. There are many occupations within self-employment that lack certain types of flexibility. For
example, see Goldin and Katz (2012) for a description of how pharmacists find more flexibility in wage and
salary employment.
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rience pays off. At younger ages, the wage and salary flexibility encourages lower earning
women to work, which increases median earnings among all women but puts downward
pressure on employed women’s earnings.
Figure 1.8 shows that the majority of the increase in lifetime earnings comes from rela-
tively low lifetime earners increasing their earnings. Flexible wage and salary employment
raises the lifetime earnings of low and medium type earners by over 13% but only increases
high earning types’ lifetime earnings by 2% as shown in Table 1.9. Women’s average com-
pleted fertility rises from 2.03 to 2.52 children, which represents a very large increase in
fertility. Increasing workplace flexibility increases women’s utility by around 2.8% rep-
resenting an average willingness to pay for additional wage and salary flexibility at the
beginning of estimation of $37,200 per person. As Figure 1.9 shows, increasing workplace
flexibility for mothers within wage and salary employment raises women’s employment at
all ages, but the effect is particularly large in their late 20’s and 30’s when employment
rates dip under the baseline model.
Overall, this exercise suggests that making workplaces more flexible could yield rel-
atively large increases in women’s earnings and welfare. These benefits to workers can
help explain why firms offer telecommuting options, flexible schedules, job sharing, and
parental leave. Unfortunately, there are also many barriers to implementing flexible work
policies. Top concerns among employers include concerns about monitoring employees, a
loss in productivity, and treating all employees fairly (Pitt-Catsouphes et al. (2007)). There
are also legal issues making it difficult for employers to track hourly non-exempt employees
if they work varied schedules or work from home (Yager (2014)). Finally, there are some
businesses that operate under a more traditional culture, where managers don’t promote the
implementation of flexible policies (SHRM (2010)).
These results provide a benchmark for understanding the potential benefits of increas-
ing flexible work policies. They complement previous survey evidence, which shows that
around 70% of working mothers said schedule flexibility was extremely important to them
(Parker and Wang (2013)). Given current evidence that the gender earnings gap arises when
women have children, policies targeted to benefit parents when they have young children
are likely to be particularly effective in addressing the earnings gap. Additionally, these
results suggest that workplace flexibility can encourage fertility, which could be important
for countries trying to maintain or increase their fertility rates.
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1.6.3 Decrease Barriers to Female Self-Employment
In this section, I estimate the impact of a policy to reduce the costs of entering self-
employment by 10%. This counterfactual represents any intervention that lowers the bar-
riers to entering self-employment for women. In response to some evidence that women
and minorities have more difficulty accessing capital and business networks to start a busi-
ness, there have been targeted programs to increase business ownership among these groups
(Barr (2015)). These policies include expanding small business loans backed by the Small
Business Association, and grants to provide training programs and improve connections
between successful and prospective business owners. An evaluation of these types of pro-
grams is beyond the scope of this paper, but this counterfactual highlights the potential im-
pacts of policies that successfully lower the entry costs of self-employment for women.45
Licensing requirements to operate a business or work in a profession also represent entry
costs to self-employment because the self-employed are more likely to be licensed work-
ers (Council of Economic Advisors (2015)). Licensure can include completing training
courses, passing an inspection, and filing paperwork to start a business (Kleiner (2013)).
Governments may reduce these costs by streamlining these processes or requiring only the
aspects of licensing necessary to maintain consumer safety (Council of Economic Advisors
(2015)).
As shown in Table 1.8, I find that reducing the entry cost to self-employment increases
self-employment rates by 40% and decreases women’s median lifetime earnings by 0.9%.
The policy has a modest positive effect on fertility rates and raises lifetime utility by 0.17%.
These results suggest that measures to reduce the costs of becoming self-employed for
women would increase their self-employment rates substantially, but would not influence
fertility by as much. I estimate that reducing the entry costs of self-employment for women
would increase the observed gender earnings gap. Although self-employment it relatively
more flexible for mothers, it has lower returns to future wage and salary employment earn-
ings and is on average a lower paying type of employment. Advocates of policies encourag-
ing female self-employment often have in mind promoting female entrepreneurship in high
growth industries. An intervention of this type could potentially have a positive impact on
women’s earnings because it increase their earning growth rates. The counterfactual pre-
45In general, as Barr (2015) and Michaelides and Benus (2012) mention, many programs do not have
rigorous evaluations of their impact on outcomes. In particular, there has been a lot of focus on helping
the unemployed become self-employed. Michaelides and Benus (2012) analyze a policy to promote self-
employment among individuals who are employed, unemployed and out of the labor force and find no effects
for non-unemployed individuals but positive effects for the unemployed. A recent paper by Caliendo (2016)
also finds positive effects of active labor market programs promoting self-employment for unemployed indi-
viduals.
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sented here simulates the average female self-employment experience in my sample, which
tends to be relatively slower growth areas such as child care or housekeeping.
1.7 Discussion and Interpretation
1.7.1 Robustness to Alternative Measures of Earnings
I re-estimate the model using two alternative measures of women’s earnings. First, to
address concerns that self-employment income is under-reported in the survey, I inflate
self-employment earnings by 25%. This is the estimate of average under-reporting found in
Hurst et al. (2014). Table 1.10 shows that the estimated value of self-employment flexibility
is similar to the baseline. Under the counterfactual exercise where self-employment is no
more flexible for mothers than wage and salary employment, the estimated fertility effect
and lifetime earnings effect are also qualitatively similar.
Second, I use an alternative measure of earnings that is constructed using the annual
number of hours worked and the woman’s average wage instead of job specific hours and
earnings. See Appendix B for details and information comparing the two earnings mea-
sures. Again Table 1.10 shows that the results are quite similar between the baseline and
the alternative earnings specification. The estimates of the value of self-employment flexi-
bility are within the standard errors of the original baseline estimates.
1.7.2 Robustness to Alternative Samples
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the model on a sample of white women that includes
women who get divorced. The estimation covers the years during the woman’s first mar-
riage and only includes women who are married for at least five years. I also estimate the
model on a sample of always married women of all races. Expanding the sample in these
ways lowers the overall utility levels estimated in the model because the additional women
tend to have lower earning spouses and be lower earnings themselves. In order to compare
these results to the main estimates, I normalize them by the utility of the women in the sam-
ple at age 40. As shown in Table 1.10, I find that the results are qualitatively similar among
both of the expanded samples suggesting that the sample restrictions made to estimate the
original model do not severely limit the applicability of the results to women outside the
main sample.
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1.7.3 Robustness to Alternative Specifications
In order to test some of the many modeling assumptions, I run a number of robustness
checks. First, I estimate the model with four unobserved types rather than three. Second, I
estimate it without different unobserved types to see if the results are driven by differences
across the types. Third, I estimate the model with a lower discount factor of 0.9 to see if the
results change if women discount their future earnings more heavily. Fourth, I estimate the
model using indicators for the utility from the number of children rather than the quadratic
specification. Using indicators for each number of kids allows me to match the completed
fertility distribution more closely because it is a more flexible specification. Finally, I
estimate the model weighting women’s contribution to the likelihood according to their
NLSY79 sample weights, which should make the sample more nationally representative.
As shown in Table 1.10. all of these robustness checks provide similar qualitative esti-
mates of the value of self-employment flexibility and the effect of the flexibility on fertility.
All of the alternative specifications show that the additional flexibility lowers women’s life-
time earnings by a small amount, with the exception of having only one unobserved type.
In that specification, the additional flexibility raises women’s lifetime earnings by a small
amount. This is driven by the fact that 30% of the marginal women who were induced
to become self-employed by the additional flexibility choose non-employment, compared
to 20% in most of the other counterfactuals. Overall, the main results from the paper are
robust to a variety of different specifications.
1.7.4 Evidence for Flexibility Interpretation
In this paper, I interpret the difference in the costs of working associated with having young
children between wage and salary employment and self-employment as the value of self-
employment flexibility for mothers. I use the term flexibility to encompass many features
of self-employment including the ability to control and change one’s work schedule, hours,
and location. These features may provide women with the ability to combine work and
family in ways that wage and salary employment does not.46
To provide evidence for this interpretation, I incorporate some measures of workplace
flexibility into the baseline model. These results should be viewed as suggestive because
the measures I use are noisy measures of women’s access to flexible jobs. I use these
measures to control explicitly for some of the differences in flexibility across employment
types to test whether the observed residual effect that I interpret as flexibility decreases. The
46See Lim (2016) for evidence on the ways that self-employed mothers spend their time differently from
wage and salary employed mothers.
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analysis also provides direct evidence that self-employment is more flexible along these
measures, and that flexibility decreases the costs of working for mothers. If flexibilityj
is a measure of the flexibility provided in employment type j, I modify the non-pecuniary
utility of working from:
βj2 + β
j
31(at ∈ [0, 5]) + βj41(at ∈ [6, 9]) + βse5 1(Dset = 0)
to:
βj2+α
j
1flexibility
j+βj31(at ∈ [0, 5])+βj41(at ∈ [6, 9])+βse5 1(Dset = 0)+αj2flexibilityj1(at ∈ [0, 9])
The ideal measure of workplace flexibility would capture women’s access to flexi-
ble schedules, hours, and location within wage and salary employment and within self-
employment. As a proxy for each woman’s access to workplace flexibility, I define two
imperfect measures and use variation in these measures across occupations to measure dif-
ferences across women. The first measure is the fraction of workers within an occupation
who answered yes to the question: “Do you have flexible work hours that allow you to vary
or make changes in the time you begin and end work?” This question was asked of both
self-employed and wage and salary employed workers in the May supplement of the 1989
Current Population Survey (CPS).47 The question doesn’t ask about the extent of control
over one’s schedule, but it is focused on one type of flexibility that might be important
to mothers with young children. Appendix Table A.7 shows the fraction of workers who
answered yes to the question by employment type and broad occupation group.48 Within
wage and salary employment the fraction of workers in an occupation with schedule flex-
ibility ranged from 4 to 37 percent, while in self-employment it ranged from 12 to 100.
Unfortunately the small sample size does not allow for very precise measures of access to
schedule flexibility, particularly within self-employment. For the second measure, I use
the fraction of childless women working fewer than 35 hours per week in an occupation,
following Herr and Wolfram (2012). This measure is constructed from the monthly CPS
files from 1980 to 1999. Appendix Table A.8 shows the fraction of women without chil-
dren who worked part-time across occupations. The fraction of childless women working
part-time is meant to represent access to a part-time schedule in that occupation. This as-
47The contingent worker survey was run in 1991, but the question of interest excluded self-employed
individuals. It was also run in 1995, but I use the 1989 survey because it is in the middle of when the majority
of women in my sample have young children. The overall level of schedule flexibility increased over this
time period; however, the ranking of occupations was quite similar between 1989 and 1995.
48Due to the small sample size, the analysis includes all workers, but there was very little difference in the
fraction of workers with schedule flexibility within an occupation by gender.
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pect of flexibility measures something different from schedule flexibility, and the ordering
of occupations is very different between Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8.
Along both measures of flexibility, self-employment appears to be the relatively flex-
ible employment type. In every occupation, a higher fraction of workers have schedule
flexibility in self-employment with an average difference of 32%. In all but two occu-
pations, part-time work is more prevalent in self-employment, and on average 15% more
workers work part-time in self-employment. These measures offer some direct evidence
that self-employment provides additional workplace flexibility within an occupation.49
Next, I assign a broad occupation to each woman in the sample using the job she has
prior to the birth of her first child (see Appendix Table A.9 for the crosswalk from NLSY
occupations to broad occupations). If she didn’t work prior to having a child, I use her first
job. If she never works, I assign her the occupation with the average level of flexibility. The
idea behind assigning women to an occupation is to measure individual access to workplace
flexibility. I recognize that women change occupations over their lifetime, but think of this
assignment as measuring access to flexibility at an important time in women’s lives.50
I re-estimate the model using the two different measures of workplace flexibility. Panel
B of Table 1.10 compares the coefficients of interest from the baseline specification and
the two alternatives. There is some evidence that the difference in the β3s and β4s between
employment types is smaller after controlling for the flexibility measures, although only
by $100 to $200. The estimates of α2 are small in magnitude indicating that an increase in
workplace flexibility does not have a large effect on the costs of working for mothers.
Overall the estimated value of flexibility for mothers with young children remains rel-
atively similar across all three specifications. The results from controlling for women’s
access to workplace flexibility within their occupation are consistent with my interpreta-
tion of the difference in costs across employment types arising from differences in flexi-
bility. The measures of flexibility that I use in the analysis are imperfectly measured for
a number of reasons. Access to schedule flexibility is very imprecisely estimated, while
the fraction of childless women working part-time might not reflect the type of flexibility
that mothers with young children need. Additionally, the assignment of women to one oc-
cupation likely mis-measures their access to workplace flexibility because they have the
opportunity to change occupations. The specification considers wage and salary employ-
ment and self-employment flexibility within the same occupation, but many transitions to
49Analysis not shown here shows that the self-employed have higher measures of workplace flexibility
within 3-digit occupation codes as well. These more detailed codes may represent even more similar types of
jobs than the broader occupation groups shown here.
50In my sample, 15% of women work in only 1 broad occupation during the estimation period, 21% in 2,
26% in 3 and around 35% work in 4 or more.
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self-employment represent a change in occupation. Finally, women’s occupation is endog-
neous, and there is evidence that women who want to take time out of the labor force select
into relatively more flexible occupation (Polachek (1981) and Adda et al. (2011)).51 For
these reasons, I cannot conclude from these results that the value of workplace flexibility
as measured by schedule flexibility or access to part-time employment is small for mothers
even though my estimates suggest that variation in these measures does not have a large
effect on mothers’ costs of working.
1.7.5 Discussion of Alternative Interpretations
In this section, I discuss the validity of three alternative explanations other than workplace
flexibility for the difference in the costs of working associated with having children between
wage and salary employment and self-employment. These different interpretations identify
factors that change differentially between the two employment types when women have
children.
First, mothers may use self-employment as a way to avoid discrimination in the wage
and salary employment sector, which would make self-employment appear relatively more
attractive to mothers. While previous research has established that a motherhood penalty
in earnings exists, the amount of the penalty due to discrimination appears to be relatively
small. For example, Gangl and Ziefle (2009), argue that almost all of the motherhood
wage penalty can be explained by changes to part-time or family friendly positions and
time spent out of the labor force. My model explicitly takes into account time spent not
employed, and I discuss the potential impact of family friendly positions in the previous
section. While employer discrimination against mothers may exist, it is unlikely to account
for a large portion of the difference in the utility costs of working associated with young
children between the two employment types.
Second, having children may prompt women to become self-employed to pass their
business on to their children, which would increase the value of self-employment relative
to wage and salary employment for women with kids. Women’s observed self-employment
behavior is not consistent with this motivation. Only 1.6% of US businesses are inherited
(Fairlie and Robb (2007)), and relatively few women in my data remain self-employed
for the duration of their careers. The majority of the types of businesses in the data are not
ones that are typically inherited: housekeeping, child care, hairdressing. Finally, my results
suggest that self-employment is most valuable to women with preschool aged children and
51This could explain why I estimate that women in occupations with more flexible schedules actually have
a higher average cost of working. The main effect of schedule flexibility, α1, is negative.
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less valuable to school aged children, a pattern that is not implied by a desire to pass on a
business to children.
Third, having young children could lower a woman’s tolerance for risky work mak-
ing self-employment less attractive to mothers.52 This effect would bias my estimates the
opposite direction, making them underestimates of the value of flexibility. However, the
women in my sample may be relatively more shielded from this income risk because the
majority of them are the secondary earner in the household.
While there are alternative explanations that could be contributing to the higher self-
employment rates among mothers of young children, there is relatively strong descriptive
evidence to support additional flexibility within self-employment as the key causal factor.
Overall, the evidence to support becoming self-employed to avoid workplace discrimi-
nation or pass on a business is much weaker. These motivations could contribute to the
benefits of self-employment for mothers, but the majority of the effect is likely to still be
due to a desire for flexibility.
1.8 Conclusion
As the share of households with working mothers continues to rise, workplace flexibil-
ity has become increasingly important. In this paper, I estimate a life-cycle model of
married women’s fertility and labor supply. My results provide evidence that workplace
flexibility influences married women’s fertility and employment decisions. I show that
on average self-employment imposes smaller additional costs of working on mothers with
young children than wage and salary employment. My estimates suggest that women with
preschool-aged children value the additional workplace flexibility of self-employment at
around $7,400 per year. Flexibility appears to be an important motivation for becom-
ing self-employed. I estimate self-employment rates would decline by over 40% if self-
employment were no more flexible for mothers than wage and salary employment.
My partial equilibrium counterfactual exercises suggest that policies that increase flex-
ibility within wage and salary work could have large positive effects on women’s earn-
ings, fertility and employment. I find that self-employment flexibility raises women’s em-
ployment rates, but has a small negative impact on their lifetime earnings by encouraging
women to switch from wage and salary employment to self-employment. In contrast, in-
creases in the flexibility for mothers within wage and salary employment are estimated to
52Self-employment earnings among men have been shown to have higher unconditional variance than
wage and salary earnings and therefore might represent a more risky employment option (Evans and Leighton
(1989), Hamilton (2000)). In my data, self-employment earnings actually have a lower variance, which might
be explained by my focus on married white women.
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increase both employment and lifetime earnings by substantial amounts. Because wage and
salary employment is much more common than self-employment, focusing on flexibility in
that type of employment is likely to bring the most widespread benefits to women.
A task for future research is to quantify the potential negative consequences of work-
place flexibility, including discrimination against women viewed as likely to use such poli-
cies.53 If making workplaces more flexible causes women’s wages to fall substantially,
the benefits outlined in this paper may be offset by lower lifetime earnings. Indeed, Blau
and Kahn (2013a) provide suggestive evidence that American women outpace their OECD
counterparts in attaining highly paid management positions and one potential explanation
is that the family friendly policies offered by other countries segment women into low-
earning part-time positions.
Workplace flexibility is inherently a multidimensional concept, but further documenta-
tion of the types of policies firms are offering and the policies actually utilized by workers
would help clarify the state of workplace flexibility in the US. Additional research should
also focus on potential interactions between policies. For example, a policy implementing
a flexible work schedule might be more effective for mothers when it is combined with paid
maternity leave. Finally, additional research is needed to understand whether policies that
allow both women and men to better manage work and family responsibilities could have
positive effects on marriage quality and children’s wellbeing.
53See Blau and Kahn (2013a) for a discussion of the benefits and costs of “family friendly” policies. See
Gruber (1994), Prada et al. (2015), Thomas (2014), and Ferna´ndez-Kranz and Rodrı´guez-Planas (2013) for
evidence of the effect of specific policies on women’s wages.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1: Top Jobs Among Self-Employed Women in Sample; NLSY79
Childcare	Workers	
20%	
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(Bookkeeper,	
Secretary)	
9%	
Sales	
8%	
Housekeeping	
5%	
Educa6on	
4%	Hairdresser	
3%	
Designers/
Architects/Ar6sts	
6%	
Other	
45%	
Notes: Data are from the NLSY79. Estimates are person-year unweighted observations of self-employed
white married women from the estimation sample.
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Figure 1.2: Model Timing Description
Notes: Figure shows the relevant decisions at each age in the model.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Estimation Sample
Year-Individual Observations N=23,851
Mean Standard Deviation Median
Age 36.1 8.1 36
Earnings (2000$) Wage & Salary1 28,401 31,586 22,226
Earnings (2000$) Self-Employed1 20,094 25,715 14,022
Husband’s Earnings (2000$) 44,021 60,604 34,627
Individual Observations N=1,035
Mean Standard Deviation
Fraction of the Sample:
High School or Less 41.2 . .
Some College 22.9 . .
Bachelor’s 35.9 . .
Ever Self-Employed 28.4 . .
Number of Children2 1.93 1.08 2
Age at Beginning of Estimation 25.2 5.4 24
Years of Estimation 23.0 7.0 25
Prior Years in Wage & Salary 3.6 4.7 2
Prior Years in Self-Employment 0.1 0.7 0
Prior Years Not Employed 0.4 1.5 0
Total Years in Wage & Salary 18.3 8.5 20
Total Years in Self-Employment 1.6 3.6 0
Total Years Not Employed 6.3 7.0 4
1 Only includes observations who worked in that type of employment.
2 Number of children at the end of the sample period.
Notes: Summary statistics cover the estimation period only and include white married women
who do not divorce while in the sample. Estimates are unweighted. Data are from the
NLSY79.
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Table 1.2: Percent of Observations Making Each Choice by Age of the Mother and the
Number of Children
Wage & Salary Self-Employed Not Employed N
No Birth Birth No Birth Birth No Birth Birth
All Ages 63.0 3.6 6.2 0.4 23.2 3.7 23,851
18-25 53.3 6.2 2.3 0.3 23.5 11.5 2,717
26-30 54.7 8.4 5.1 0.9 23.5 7.4 3,964
31-35 59.0 5.9 6.3 0.8 23.9 4.1 4,508
36-40 66.3 1.9 6.5 0.4 23.2 1.8 4,572
41-50 70.6 0.0 7.8 0.0 21.6 0.0 8,090
Number of Kids
0 68.0 7.6 5.0 0.6 12.8 6.0 5,402
1 57.7 6.6 5.4 0.8 22.5 7.0 4,931
2 65.6 1.1 6.0 0.2 25.4 1.7 8,932
3 58.1 0.6 9.5 0.2 30.0 1.6 3,328
4 56.0 0.0 6.8 0.0 37.2 0.0 1,258
Notes: Table includes observation-years during the estimation period. Sample includes white married
women who do not divorce while in the sample. Data are from the NLSY79.
Table 1.3: Annual Transitions Across Choices
Choice in Period t+ 1
Wage & Salary Self-Employed Not Employed Row Percent
Choice in Period t No Birth Birth No Birth Birth No Birth Birth of total
Wage & Salary
No Birth 86.9 5.0 1.3 0.2 4.9 1.7 62.7
Birth 85.3 2.7 2.5 0.1 7.7 1.8 3.7
Self-Employed
No Birth 12.9 1.1 73.6 4.6 6.9 1.1 6.1
Birth 17.0 1.0 73.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.4
Not Employed
No Birth 14.7 1.0 2.1 0.2 72.8 9.2 23.2
Birth 16.3 0.5 1.8 0.1 75.4 5.9 3.8
Notes: Table includes observation-years during the estimation period only. Sample includes white married women who do not divorce while
in the sample. Data are from the NLSY79.
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Figure 1.3: Implied Effect of Experience on Earnings
(a) Wage and Salary
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(b) Self-Employment
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Notes: Figures show how different levels of experience in the three employment choices affect women’s
expected earnings in wage and salary employment and self-employment. The levels are all relative to having
zero years in that employment type. Plots come from the earnings parameters estimates in Table 1.4. Dots
denote nodes of the piece-wise linear function.
43
Table 1.4: Log Earnings Parameter Estimates
Wage and Salary Log Earnings Self-Employment Log Earnings
Description Estimate Standard Error Description Estimate Standard Error
Wage and Salary Experience-Linear Spline Wage and Salary Experience-Linear Spline
1-2 Years 0.122* [0.019] 1-5 Years −0.002 [0.005]
3-5 Years 0.032* [0.008] 6-10 Years 0.006 [0.003]
6-10 Years 0.024* [0.003] 11-20 Years 0.015* [0.002]
11-15 Years 0.021* [0.003] 21 or More Years1 0.147* [0.018]
16-23 Years 0.030* [0.002]
24 or More Years1 0.028* [0.011]
Self-Employment Experience-Linear Spline Self-Employment Experience-Linear Spline
1-2 Years −0.013* [0.004] 1-2 Years 0.047 [0.034]
3-9 Years −0.013* [0.003] 3-9 Years 0.045* [0.010]
10 or More Years1 0.001 [0.018] 10 or More Years1 0.294* [0.055]
Years Not Employed-Linear Spline Years Not Employed-Linear Spline
1 Year −0.116* [0.003] 1 Year −0.090* [0.012]
2-9 Years −0.028* [0.001] 2-9 Years −0.041* [0.005]
10 or More Years1 0.029* [0.007] 10 or More Years1 0.191* [0.038]
Unemployment rate −0.019* [0.002] Unemployment rate −0.018* [0.008]
Some College 0.160* [0.008] Some College 0.191* [0.018]
Bachelor’s Degree 0.303* [0.007] Bachelor’s Degree 0.379* [0.017]
Type 1-Low −0.717* [0.008] Type 1-Low −0.972* [0.038]
Type 2-Medium 0.000 . Type 2-Medium 0.000 .
Type 3-High 0.514* [0.006] Type 3-High 0.650* [0.019]
Intercept −2.035* [0.031] Intercept −2.330* [0.066]
Fraction Type 1-Low Earning 22.5* [1.6]
Fraction Type 2-Medium Earning 53.6* [1.9]
Fraction Type 3-High Earning 23.9 -
Ratio Wage and Salary Earnings Ratio Self-Employment Earnings
Workers with X years of wage and salary experience versus workers with none:
3 Years 1.28 1.00
10 Years 1.46 1.02
15 Years 1.57 1.09
Workers with X years of self-employment experience versus workers with none:
1 Year 0.99 1.05
3 Years 0.96 1.14
5 Years 0.94 1.23
Workers with X years of non-employment versus workers with none:
1 Year 0.88 0.91
3 Years 0.83 0.83
5 Years 0.77 0.75
Notes: Estimates are from maximum likelihood estimation.
1. Top experience categories are just indicators for having experience levels at or above that cutoff essentially flattening out the earnings
profile. Predicted log earnings are denominated in 100,000s of $2000. Standard errors are calculated using the Fisher information matrix.
*p<0.05
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Table 1.5: Utility Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Estimate Standard Error
βws1 Marginal Utility Consumption W-S 0.91 [0.002]
βse1 Marginal Utility Consumption S-E 0.95 [0.005]
βws2 Working in W-S -3,987 [267]
βse2 Working in S-E -14,909 [607]
βws3 Youngest Child 0-5 W-S -11,310 [290]
βse3 Youngest Child 0-5 S-E -3,918 [593]
Difference -7,392 [659]
βws4 Youngest Child 6-9 W-S -5,033 [556]
βse4 Youngest Child 6-9 S-E -1,655 [1,021]
Difference -3,378 [1,163]
βse5 Entry to S-E -95,210 [2,685]
Linear Children Term-Type 1-Low 1,793 [192]
β6 Linear Children Term-Type 2-Medium 3,287 [137]
Linear Children Term-Type 3-High 4,035 [217]
Quadratic Children Term -Type 1-Low -558 [44]
β7 Quadratic Children Term -Type 2-Medium -879 [33]
Quadratic Children Term -Type 3-High -1,020 [58]
ρpi√
6
Standard Deviation  21,044 [313]
Log Likelihood -34,857
Notes: These estimates come from the second stage maximum likelihood estimation. Parameter
values are denominated in 2000$ except for the marginal utility of consumption parameters.
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Table 1.6: Model Fit-Overall Choices and Fertility
Choices Data Model
Wage and Salary, No Birth 63.0 62.1
Wage and Salary, Birth 3.6 4.5
Self-Employment, No Birth 6.2 6.7
Self-Employment, Birth 0.4 0.6
Not Employed, No Birth 23.2 23.3
Not Employed, Birth 3.7 2.9
Completed Fertility
0 12.9 11.3
1 15.9 15.6
2 44.6 40.9
3 18.6 27.8
4 8.0 4.6
Notes: Table compares overall distribution of choices and
completed fertility implied by the model with the data.
Table 1.7: Annual Transitions Across Choices Simulated Model
Model
Choice in Period t+ 1
Wage & Salary Self-Employed Not Employed
Choice in Period t No Birth Birth No Birth Birth No Birth Birth Row Percent
Wage & Salary
No Birth 72.3 3.9 4.5 0.3 17.2 1.8 62.0
Birth 52.6 16.4 4.4 1.1 20.3 5.4 4.7
Self-Employed
No Birth 41.2 2.2 36.1 2.45 16.8 1.2 6.6
Birth 30.3 7.3 33.2 8.9 16.0 4.3 0.6
Not Employed
No Birth 46.6 2.2 4.9 0.3 41.1 4.2 23.2
Birth 32.6 7.3 3.6 0.8 44.8 10.3 3.0
Notes: Table shows transitions in choices from simulated data using the estimates from Table 1.4 and Table 1.5. The simulated choices
are calculated using the estimates to simulate the model 20 times for each woman. Each woman starts with her actual initial conditions but
makes decisions according to the model with the estimated parameters. Simulation years correspond only to years that exist in the data.
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Figure 1.4: Choices Over the Life-Cycle; Model v. Data
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Notes: Figures show the proportion of individuals at each age choosing each of the six possible fertility-
employment choices from the data and from simulations from the model. Simulation years correspond only
to years that exist in the data.
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Figure 1.5: Cumulative Years Choices; Model v. Data
(a) Wage and Salary (No Birth, Birth)
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Notes: Figures show the distribution of the total number of years each woman made each of the six pos-
sible fertility-employment choices from the data and from simulations from the model. Simulation years
correspond only to years that exist in the data.
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Table 1.8: Effect of Counterfactual Exercises on Fertility, Earnings, Employment and Util-
ity
10 Percent Lower
Inflexible Flexible Wage & Salary Self-Employment
Model Baseline Self-Employment Employment Entry Cost
Completed Fertility 2.03 1.97 2.52 2.05
Pct Ever Self-Employed 29.7 20.2 21.7 41.9
PV Median Lifetime
Earnings (Thousands 2000$)
282.2 285.6 317.6 279.6
Percent Change in PV
Median Lifetime Earnings
1.2 12.5 −0.9
Fraction in Each Employment Type
Wage & Salary 67.1 70.3 72.8 64.5
Self-Employment 7.8 4.03 4.5 10.8
Not Employed 25.2 25.65 22.8 24.7
Average Cumulative Years in Each Employment Type
Wage & Salary 27.4 28.7 29.7 26.4
Self-Employment 3.2 1.6 1.8 4.4
Not Employed 10.3 10.5 9.3 10.1
PV Lifetime Utility
(Millions 2000$) Average Percentage Change Relative to Baseline1
All 1.33 −0.15 2.80 0.17
High School or Less 1.13 −0.17 3.07 0.19
Some College 1.26 −0.16 2.94 0.21
Bachelor’s Degree 1.59 −0.13 2.39 0.13
1 This is the mean of the individual percentage changes in utility.
Notes: Estimates come from comparing simulated data from the baseline model to simulated data under three counterfactual scenarios. Simulation
years include years after the individuals enters the estimation sample through age 50 and figures include the continuation value from ages 51
through 65.
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Figure 1.6: Median Earnings Over the Life Cycle Among All Women: Baseline and Coun-
terfactuals
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Notes: Figure shows women’s median earnings by age for women in the baseline and across the three coun-
terfactual scenarios. Sample includes women not working with zero earnings. Simulation years include years
after the individuals enters the estimation sample through age 50.
50
Figure 1.7: Median Earnings Over the Life Cycle Among Employed Women: Baseline and
Counterfactuals
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Notes: Figure shows women’s median earnings by age for employed women in the baseline and across the
three counterfactual scenarios. Simulation years include years after the individuals enters the estimation
sample through age 50.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of Present Value Lifetime Earnings: Baseline and Counterfactuals
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Notes: Figure shows the density of the present value of lifetime earnings in the baseline model and across
the three counterfactual scenarios. Simulation years include years after the individuals enters the estimation
sample through age 50 and values include the continuation value of earnings from ages 51 through 65.
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Table 1.9: Effect of Counterfactual Exercises on Fertility, Earnings, Employment and Util-
ity: By Unobserved Type
10 Percent Lower
Inflexible Flexible Wage & Salary Self-Employment
Model Baseline Self-Employment Employment Entry Cost
Completed Fertility
Low 2.39 2.36 2.70 2.39
Medium 1.96 1.90 2.49 1.99
High 1.83 1.75 2.44 1.87
PV Median Lifetime Earnings (Thousands 2000$)
Low 69.2 69.1 77.6 69.2
Medium 279.1 282.5 315.0 276.4
High 763.9 779.2 779.4 753.7
Average Percent Change in PV Lifetime Earnings1
Low 0.10 13.71 0.17
Medium 1.17 13.68 −0.77
High 1.06 1.75 −0.79
Average Cumulative Years in Each Employment Type
Wage & Salary (All) 27.4 28.7 29.7 26.4
Low 18.4 18.8 19.5 18.0
Medium 28.0 29.1 30.4 26.9
High 34.6 37.4 37.24 33.1
Self-Employment (All) 3.2 1.6 1.8 4.4
Low 1.9 1.3 1.5 2.8
Medium 3.0 1.7 1.9 4.2
High 4.8 2.0 2.1 6.4
Not Employed (All) 10.3 10.5 9.3 10.1
Low 20.5 20.8 19.5 20.1
Medium 9.9 10.1 8.6 9.7
High 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3
1 This is the mean of the individual percentage changes in utility.
Notes: Low earning types represent 23% of the population, medium earning types represent 53%, and high earning types represent 24%.
Estimates come from comparing simulated data from the baseline model to simulated data under three counterfactual scenarios. Simulation
years include years after the individuals enters the estimation sample through age 50 and figures include the continuation value from ages 51
through 65.
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Figure 1.9: Life-Cycle Employment Rates: Baseline and Counterfactuals
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Notes: Figure shows the fraction of women working at different ages under the baseline model and the three
counterfactual scenarios. Simulation years include years after the individuals enters the estimation sample
through age 50.
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Table 1.10: Robustness of Main Results to Alternative Specifications
Panel A:
Value of Self-Employment
Flexibility Effect Inflexible
Youngest Child Youngest Child Self-Employment
Aged 0-5 Aged 6-9 Percentage Change in:
% Utility % Utility Completed Lifetime
2000$ at 40 2000$ at 40 Fertility Earnings 1
Baseline Model 7,392 8.3 3,378 3.8 3.0 −1.2
Alternative Earnings Specifications:
1) Inflate Self-Emp Earnings for Tax Evasion 7,473 8.4 3,536 4.0 2.9 −1.7
2) Alternative Earnings Measure 7,687 8.6 3,240 3.6 2.6 −2.0
Alternative Samples:
3) Ever Married White Women 5,009 7.3 537 0.8 2.8 −1.2
4) All Races 4,630 7.3 1,011 1.6 1.9 −0.4
Alternative Specifications:
5) 4 Types 6,424 7.8 2,662 3.1 2.8 −1.8
6) 1 Type 6,697 8.2 3,161 3.9 2.7 0.9
7) Discount Factor: 0.9 6,429 7.6 2,989 3.5 2.8 −0.3
8) Indicators Utility from Kids 7,665 8.6 3,811 4.3 3.1 −2.0
9) Weighted 6,657 7.6 3,053 3.5 2.8 −1.2
Panel B:
Parameter Estimates from Alternative Specifications Controlling for Flexibility Measures
βws3 β
se
3 β
ws
4 β
se
4 α2 |βws3 − βse3 | |βws4 − βse4 |
Baseline Model
-
11,210
-3,918 -5,033 -1,655 . 7,392 3,378
10) Flexible Schedule
-
11,439
-4,238 -5,148 -1,954 647 7,201 3,194
11) Fraction Part-Time Workers
-
11,137
-3,801 -4,952 -1,586 -131 7,313 3,343
Notes: This table compares the difference in the costs of working across employment types associated with having young kids and the estimated effect of the
additional flexibility for mothers provided by self-employment under different specifications of the model.
1) Increases women’s self-employment earnings by 25% following the results from Hurst et al. (2014), which show that even in survey data self-employment
earnings may be underreported.
2) Uses an alternative earnings measure that looks at annual hours worked to compensate for some missing job earnings information for very low hour non-CPS
jobs.
3) Includes all white women from the cross-sectional sample while they are married.
4) Includes all races from the cross-sectional sample.
5) Allows for 4 unobserved types.
6) No variation on unobserved ability or preferences for kids.
7) Discount factor is set at 0.9 rather than 0.95.
8) Uses indicators for the utility from the number of children rather than a quadratic.
9) Women are weighted in the likelihood according to their sample weights from the NLSY79.
10) Controls for the fraction of workers who have a flexible schedule in the occupation the woman works at prior to the birth of her first child.
11) Controls for the fraction of childless women who work part-time in the occupation the woman works at prior to the birth of her first child.
1 Change in lifetime earnings is measured as the change in the median of the present value of lifetime earnings.
2 The value of flexibility under these specifications for women with a preschool aged child is: −1[βws3 − βse3 + α2 ∗ (flexibilityws − flexibilityse)]. The
value is calculated at the mean values of the flexibility measure and at the ones with the largest and smallest difference between the two types of employment.
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CHAPTER 2
New Evidence on Self-Employment and
Workplace Flexibility for US Mothers
Mothers of young children often reduce their labor supply to manage household respon-
sibilities. Workplace flexibility is an important determinant of these labor supply deci-
sions that have lasting implications for women’s future labor force participation and earn-
ings. This paper provides new evidence that self-employment is an alternative that moth-
ers use to gain flexibility along multiple dimensions while continuing to work. First, I
use within-person variation to show that women with young children are more likely to
be self-employed than women without young children using data from the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation. The results indicate that the self-employment rate among
women whose youngest child is two years old is 11-17 percent higher than the predicted
rate without their youngest child. Second, I show that self-employed women appear to
have more flexibility in their work location, hours, and schedule than wage and salary em-
ployed women using data from the American Time Use Survey. My findings suggest that
self-employment itself allows women to spend more time with their children even while
working the same number of hours. These results contribute to a deeper understanding of
the varied work decisions women with young children make, which can inform policies
related to child care, workplace flexibility, and programs to promote self-employment.
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2.1 Introduction
Between 1980 and 2010, American mothers increased their labor force participation by 14
percentage points.1 While this increase is impressive, many women today still take time
off work or decrease their hours when they have children.2 Among women who continue
to work, over half say that managing family and work responsibilities is “somewhat or very
difficult”.3 Previous research suggests that one important determinant of mothers’ labor
force participation decisions is workplace flexibility.4 A recent Pew Foundation survey
found that over 70% of working mothers say having a flexible work schedule is extremely
important to them (Parker and Wang (2013)).
This paper uses a nationally representative panel dataset to provide new evidence on
mothers’ use of self-employment as a more flexible work environment. Previous research
has found that self-employment rates are higher among women with children and conjec-
tured that flexibility is an important explanation for this pattern (Wellington (2006), Hund-
ley (2000)). The self-employed are more likely to be able to work from home, choose the
number of hours they work and decide when to work those hours (Devine (2001)).
My paper makes three primary contributions to the existing literature on female self-
employment and children. First, I use a large panel dataset, which allows me to control
for unobserved time invariant differences across individuals that could drive both self-
employment behavior and fertility. Previous work using cross sectional datasets or two
year panel datasets could not rule out that the positive correlation between self-employment
and children arises because women who have a preference for self-employment also have
stronger preferences for children. Second, my analysis traces out the relationship between
self-employment behavior and the age of a woman’s youngest child. While previous work
finds a positive correlation between children and female self-employment, showing self-
employment propensities by the age of the youngest child provides further evidence that
self-employment is associated with time periods when children require a large amount of
care. This finding suggests that self-employment offers the flexibility to provide that care.
Third, I investigate whether the relationship between self-employment and the age of the
youngest child has changed between 1984 and 2012. The increase in mothers entering
the labor force during this time period likely altered the composition of working mothers.
1The BLS Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey reports 70.8% of women with chil-
dren under 18 worked in 2010 compared to 56.6% in 1980.
2Byker (2012) documents that 15-20 percent of women decrease their hours worked two years after having
their first child. This pattern persists between 1980 and 2010.
3The Pew Research Center conducted a survey on work and family in 2012; see Parker and Wang (2013)
for details.
4See Goldin (2014), Herr and Wolfram (2012) for examples.
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If these newly employed women have different underlying preferences about work, their
entry may have changed self-employment rates and patterns.
I use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate the relation-
ship between self-employment and the age of a woman’s youngest child. I find that it
exhibits a positive inverted U-shaped relationship that is strongest when the youngest child
is two. My results provide evidence that self-employment is associated with time peri-
ods when children require a large amount of care, suggesting that self-employment offers
flexibility to more easily provide that care. I find no evidence that the relationship has
changed between the late 1980s and early 2010s, and the estimates are robust to a vari-
ety of sample restrictions and weighting schemes. The estimated relationship is statisti-
cally and economically significant. Women whose youngest child is two years old have
predicted self-employment rates that are 11-17 percent higher than their predicted rates
without their youngest child. Married women with young children are more likely to be-
come self-employed than single women, which could be because self-employment is easier
with a second earner. Married women may have access to spousal health insurance. They
may also have a higher tolerance for the income risk of being self-employed because their
households often have two incomes. In addition, married women might have greater access
to startup capital, which could make transitioning to self-employment easier.
The increase in self-employment rates among women with young children contrasts
starkly with their decrease in labor force participation. These patterns suggest that self-
employment provides an opportunity to combine work and family in a way that wage and
salary employment does not. I use the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) to investigate
the mechanisms through which self-employment might be more compatible with household
responsibilities. Relative to women working in wage and salary positions, I find that self-
employed women tend to work fewer hours, are more likely to work from home, and spend
more time as the primary caretaker of their children. My results are consistent with pre-
vious work that has suggested that many women become self-employed to manage family
responsibilities (Hundley (2000), Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009), Fairlie and Robb (2009)).
I find self-employed women with young children spend an extra two hours per day with
their children after conditioning on hours worked and demographic characteristics. These
results provide suggestive evidence that self-employment allows women to structure their
time differently and offer context for the observed relationship between self-employment
and the presence of young children.
Overall, my findings suggest that self-employment provides a flexible alternative to
wage and salary employment for women with young children and provide a deeper un-
derstanding of employment decisions during an important time in women’s working lives.
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There is evidence that the gender wage gap in the U.S. grows between ages 30 and 35 when
women are more likely than men to decrease their labor supply (Bertrand et al. (2010),
Goldin (2014), Guvenen et al. (2014)).5 These reductions in labor supply result in many
women having less work experience than their male counterparts, which hurts their future
employment prospects. Additionally for many women, having children coincides with the
time period when they are building their careers, meaning that time taken off can have an
especially large negative impact on their future earning potential. In a life-cycle model
of women’s fertility and labor supply decisions, Lim (2016) finds that self-employment is
better for women’s future earning potential than not working, but that it is far less rewarded
by future employers than wage and salary employment experience. The findings from this
paper detail some of the non-pecuniary benefits self-employed mothers receive, which may
compensate them for a relative loss in future earning potential.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide a short back-
ground on women’s self-employment in the US. I discuss the previous literature on female
self-employment and the labor supply of mothers in section 3. In section 4, I describe my
two data sources: the SIPP and the ATUS. In section 5, I outline my empirical strategy
for estimating the relationship between having young children and self-employment. I also
describe my analysis on time use differences between self-employed women and wage and
salary workers. I present my results in section 6 and section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Female Self-Employment Background
Female self-employment rates in the US increased sharply from 4 percent to around 7
percent during the 1970s and 1980s and have remained between 7 percent and 8 percent
since 1990 (Roche (2014), Devine (1994)).6 Table 2.1 lists the top occupations among self-
employed women over time. In general the self-employed are overrepresented in service
occupations, administrative positions, and sales. There are a large number of self-employed
women working in relatively low skilled occupations including as hairdressers, childcare
workers, and housekeepers, as well as many self-employed women working in high skilled
occupations such as physicians, lawyers, and management analysts.
5These papers study highly educated, high earning individuals. Bertrand et al. (2010) focuses on MBAs,
Goldin (2014) studies the 40 highest earnings occupations, and Guvenen et al. (2014) study the top 1% of
earners. For these women their prime childbearing ages are between 30 and 35.
6Self-employment rates are usually defined as the percent of the labor force who are self-employed. The
figures reported in this section use that definition. In my empirical analysis, I do not condition on employment
and instead focus on the fraction of the population who are self-employed.
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Roche (2014) provides a recent update on the demographic composition of the female
self-employed that largely matches what previous literature has documented. Using CPS
data for 2012, she finds that self-employment rates are increasing in age from around 1.3%
for 20-24 year olds to 16% for women over 65. Self-employment is more common among
those who are married or divorced and among those with children. There is not a strong re-
lationship between education level and self-employment rates with the exception of women
with professional degrees who have much higher self-employment rates than other groups,
and women without high school degrees who have relatively lower rates. Evidence from
the Census 5% samples, shown in Table 2.2, suggests that self-employment rates show a
U-shaped pattern with spousal income. Women with the lowest earning husbands and the
highest earning husbands generally have the highest self-employment rates.
2.3 Previous Literature
This paper adds to the literature on self-employment and motherhood by offering addi-
tional evidence that children influence mothers’ self-employment behavior. A number of
existing studies use comparisons between men and women to argue that women are more
likely than men to become self-employed to manage their family responsibilities. Daw-
son et al. (2009) analyzes responses to a large U.K. employment survey and finds that
22% of self-employed women say family responsibilities are a major reason for becom-
ing self-employed compared to only 2% of men.7 Hundley (2000) uses cross sections
from the NLSY72 and PSID to examine the relationship between demographic character-
istics and self-employment propensity and earnings. He finds that female self-employment
is positively associated with marriage, larger families, and spousal income but that male
self-employment is not. He also finds that self-employed women do more housework and
have lower earnings when they are married and have large families. He concludes that
self-employed men and women specialize in work and home production respectively. Us-
ing more recent data, Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009) analyze American Time Use Surveys to
compare time use by sex and self-employment status. They conclude that self-employed
women spend more time caring for children and less time working than men and women
working in wage and salary positions. My results are consistent with these previous find-
ings, but use better data that allow for an improved empirical strategy.
My paper highlights the contrast between the patterns of self-employment rates and
overall employment rates among mothers of young kids contributing to a relatively large
literature documenting and assessing the impact of American women’s decrease in labor
7Data come from the United Kingdom Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1999-2001.
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supply after they have children. A recent paper by Byker (2012) uses the SIPP to demon-
strate that women of all education levels reduce their labor supply after having a child in
a pattern that has been remarkably consistent since 1984. Bertrand et al. (2010) analyze
the career trajectories of women with MBAs from a top business school and find that 15
years after graduation women with children work 24% fewer hours than men and have
eight months less actual experience. They argue that these differences explain a large part
of the gender gap in wages and that this gap originates during the prime childbearing ages.
Interestingly, they find very small differences in earnings between women without children
and men. Similarly, Black et al. (2008), find that differences in college majors and actual
work experience explain a large proportion of the gender wage gap commonly observed in
cross sectional studies. These papers provide evidence that temporary reductions in labor
supply are likely contributors to the gender wage gap.
Another portion of the literature on female labor supply focuses on estimating the earn-
ings penalties associated with taking time out of the labor force. Taking time off results in
lower levels of experience, but it can also result in large earnings penalties that are unre-
lated to the amount of time the woman spends out the labor force. Goldin and Katz (2011)
find that women with MBAs who have career interruptions see a 41% reduction in their pay
that is unrelated to the length of time taken off. Goldin (2014) suggests that non-linearity
in the relationship between experience and earnings in certain professions can explain why
a small amount of time out of the labor force can result in such a large difference in earn-
ings. If women take time off when they otherwise would be earning key promotions that
further their careers, their earnings may never recover. Hotchkiss and Pitts (2003) find
that women who have career interruptions have earnings that follow a process that pro-
vides much smaller returns to experience than the process for women who are continually
employed. They find a 23% wage differential between women who they characterize as
continuous workers and those they characterize as intermittent workers. Around 90% of
that wage differential is explained by differences in the wage equation coefficients rather
than differences in the women’s characteristics. These results are concerning because they
imply that women who take time off are not experiencing the same gains to experience
as women who remain in continuous employment. If self-employment allows women to
avoid taking time out of the labor force, it might help them avoid suffering large earnings
penalties.
This paper focuses on flexibility as a reason why self-employment is attractive to moth-
ers. There are a few recent papers that examine the role of workplace flexibility in deter-
mining female labor supply. Herr and Wolfram (2012) examine Harvard undergraduates 10
and 15 years after graduation and find that women in flexible jobs are 5-6 percentage points
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more likely to stay in the labor force after having children. She considers occupations with
a higher share of childless women working part-time to be more flexible. Goldin (2014)
provides evidence that flexible occupations have the smallest gender wage gaps. Her study
characterizes the flexibility of occupations using O*Net questions to determine how sub-
stitutable another employee is for that worker. This measures tries to capture the idea that
workers without a good substitute co-worker have less flexibility in when they work. She
argues that the smaller gender earnings gaps in flexible occupations are because women in
those occupations do not have to take time off to care for children. My paper contributes
to this literature by providing additional evidence that workplace flexibility is an important
component of mothers’ employment decisions.
2.4 Data
The analyses in this paper use two main data sources: the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). The SIPP is a longitudi-
nal survey that has been conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics since 1984. Its large
sample size and panel structure make it an ideal data source for studying self-employment
behavior. My analysis requires a relatively large sample of individuals because only around
5% of women between the ages of 18 and 55 are self-employed. The panel design allows
me to control for time invariant unobservable characteristics that influence self-employment
behavior allowing me to focus on the role of having young children. In contrast, the ATUS
is a cross sectional dataset that also has a considerable sample size. This survey includes
detailed time diaries, which allow me to document the nature of the flexibility provided by
self-employment.
2.4.1 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
The SIPP provides information on respondents at a monthly level for 3-5 years depending
on the panel year of the survey.8 My analysis uses the combined 1984-1986 panels, the
1996 panel, and the 2008 panel. I select these time periods to compare three snapshots
roughly a decade apart in order to investigate changes in self-employment behavior over
time.
The analysis focuses on women who are 18 to 55 years of age and are present during
the first wave of each survey.9 Limiting the sample to women 55 and under avoids picking
8See www.census.gov/sipp/ for documentation and more information about the survey.
9The SIPP adds individuals to the survey if they move into a surveyed household.
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up self-employment as partial retirement and focuses the analysis on my population of
interest since the majority of women above age 55 do not have young children at home.10
The key variables for this paper include information on women’s employment, fertility
history, and demographic information. Women are considered to have worked in a month
if they had a paid job at any point during the month even if they were absent from that
job due to maternity leave or vacation.11 Women are considered self-employed if they
owned a business that month and worked more hours at the business than in wage and
salary employment. I determine the number of children a woman has by assigning children
to mothers using the relational identification variables within the family.12 Demographic
variables of interest include race, age, education level, and marital status.
The SIPP includes monthly weights for each individual-month observation as well as
overall longitudinal panel weights for each individual to account for the survey design and
attrition. Only individuals who participate in every month of the survey have positive values
of the panel weights. Because using the final panel weights severely decreases the sample
size, I present my main results using the monthly weights in the final period that a woman
is observed.13 I show estimates of my main specification using both the final panel weights
and no weights as a robustness check, and the results are qualitatively similar.
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the key variables separately for the three pan-
els. Some of the biggest changes across the panels are an increase in the fraction of women
working, an increase in women’s educational attainment, an increase in the percentage of
the sample who identify as Hispanic, and a decrease in the percentage of the sample who
are married. A little under half of the sample have children under 18. Women with children
are relatively more likely to be married and self-employed and less likely to be working
relative to the full sample.
2.4.2 American Time Use Survey (ATUS)
In order to characterize the flexibility associated with self-employment, I use time diaries
from the ATUS to analyze differences between women who are self-employed and those
who work in wage and salary employment. The ATUS selects individuals who are in their
10See Karoly and Zissimopoulos (2004) for evidence on self-employment as partial retirement.
11Paid jobs include the self-employed so all individuals who are self-employed are also considered work-
ing.
12This means that “mothers” in my sample only include women whose children live with them.
13Technically, these are not the correct weights to use because they overweight individuals who are similar
to those who leave the sample. Other authors have used the monthly weights from the first period of obser-
vation, but these would overweight individuals who have similar characteristics to those who remain in the
sample. See Lavelle and Smock (2012) as an example of a paper using the baseline monthly weights and
Byker (2012) and Kim (2015) as examples that use the final monthly weights.
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final month of the Current Population Survey and asks them to record their activities for
a 24 hour period. The survey is representative of the US population and includes infor-
mation about respondents’ employment and demographics. I consider individuals to be
self-employed if they indicate that they are self-employed in their main job. The main job
is the job at which the person usually works the most hours and is consistent with the way
I have defined self-employment in the SIPP. The time diaries provide information on the
type of activity, the length of its duration, its location, and who else is present during the
activity. My analysis uses the years 2003-2012 of the survey and includes women ages 18
to 55.
Table 2.4 shows summary statistics for the full ATUS sample and for the subset of
women who have children under six years of age. Overall, women with young children
are less likely to work, and if they do work, they spend less time per day on work related
activities. Not surprisingly, women with children under six spend more time caring for
children. They spend an average of 2.5 hours per day on direct childcare tasks such as
changing diapers, reading to children and helping with homework and 5 hours per day as
the primary supervisor of their children.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
To investigate the relationship between self-employment and the presence of young chil-
dren, I use the SIPP to estimate a linear probability model predicting self-employment sta-
tus as a function of the age of a woman’s youngest child. I include individual fixed effects,
which control for women’s time invariant unobserved traits. These include a woman’s pref-
erence for autonomy, risk tolerance, opportunities for self-employment within her trained
industry or occupation, her underlying skill in self-employment, her preferences for chil-
dren and housework, and her preferences for work.
Specifically, I estimate regressions of the following form:
Yijt = β0 + βXijt +
11∑
a=1
Daijtδa + αi + γt + νj + ijt
The dependent variable Yijt is an indicator for the self-employment status of woman i
in month j in year t. The vector Xijt is a vector of covariates that includes indicators
for whether the individual is married, indicators for having two, three, or four or more
children, a quadratic in the woman’s age, and state unemployment rates. I control for year
fixed effects in γt, the reference month in νj , and individual fixed effects in αi. The vector
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of indicators for the age of the youngest child, Daijt, includes indicators for each age 0
through 8, an indicator for having a youngest child between the ages of 9 and 13, and an
indicator for having a youngest child aged 14 to 17.
The coefficients of interest are the δs, which estimate the effect of the age of the
youngest child on the probability of being self-employed. The identification of these co-
efficients comes from within-person variation in the number of children and the age of the
woman’s youngest child. While the SIPP panels allow me to observe the same woman
with different numbers of children and different ages of her youngest child, the panels are
too short to observe the same woman with a youngest child at all ages between 0 and 17.
Each observation then helps with identifying the subset of coefficients corresponding to
the observed ages of the woman’s youngest child. Additionally, the reference category are
women who have no children under the age of 18, which includes both women who have
never had children and women who have children older than 18 years of age. The effect
of having a newborn relative to having no children under 18 years of age is identified by
women who have their first child during the survey.
To allow for differences across panels in the relationship between self-employment and
the explanatory variables, I estimate a separate regression for each panel. When I examine
differences by education level and marital status, I pool the panels together to increase the
precision of the estimates. This form is less flexible because it forces the relationship be-
tween the explanatory variables and self-employment propensity to be constant over time,
however, my results suggest that the relationship has not changed appreciably over this
time period.
To offer a deeper understanding of the flexibility self-employment can provide, I use the
ATUS to examine differences in time use between women in self-employment and those in
wage and salary employment. First, I compare the distributions of daily and weekly hours
worked between the two groups to look for differences in the number of hours worked.
Then I examine the mean differences in specific types of time use across women who are
self-employed and those who are not. For these comparisons, I focus on employed women
with at least one child under the age of 18. These differences show the time allocation
decisions of mothers conditional only on their choice to be self-employed or not and de-
scribe the average differences in behavior between mothers who work in wage and salary
positions and mothers who work in self-employment.
While these mean comparisons are suggestive of differences in the ease of combining
work with other activities, self-employed women differ along a number of observed dimen-
sions that could also account for differences in time allocations. Self-employed women tend
to be older, and are more likely to be white and married. By controlling for factors such
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as age, education level, number of children, hours worked, and marital status, I am better
able to isolate the time differences attributable to the ability to structure time differently
in self-employment. In interpreting the results, it is important to note that the controls, in
particular the number of hours usually worked, are in some sense controlling for part of the
effect of interest. One way that self-employment provides flexibility is allowing women
to choose the number of hours they work. The multivariate regressions are useful though
because they show that women who are similar on observed dimensions still spend their
time differently if they are self-employed. This is further evidence that self-employment
has a work environment that differs from wage and salary employment in ways that allow
mothers to spend more time with their children.
In order to control for these characteristics, I use multivariate regressions to predict
the amount of time individuals spend per day doing certain activities as a function of their
self-employment status. The regressions follow this form:
Yi = β0 + βXi + δ1self empi + νi
The outcome variable, Yi, is the number of minutes spent in an activity per day, and the
coefficient of interest is δ, which describes on average how self-employed individuals differ
in their time use controlling for a vector of covariatesXi. All regressions include indicators
for race, education level, marital status, employment status, and the month, year, and day
of week of the survey. Regressions also control for the usual number of hours worked and
quadratics in mothers’ age and the number of children. Self-employed mothers on average
work fewer hours than wage and salary employed mothers. I control for hours worked in
order to see whether self-employment itself appears to offer a different way of combining
work and home life conditional on the same number of hours of work.
I select measures of time use that represent some of the potential benefits to self-
employment for mothers of young children. The outcomes of interest for both the mean
comparisons and the multivariate regressions are the time spent actively caring for children,
supervising children, working while supervising children, sleeping, doing housework, and
the time spent in leisure activities. The ATUS distinguishes between childcare and the su-
pervision of children. Childcare includes activities like reading to a child, helping a child
with homework, feeding a child or changing a diaper. Supervising children also includes
time that the individual may be doing another primary activity, but he or she is responsible
for watching the child.14 Supervision is only recorded for children under the age of 13.
14Generally childcare is a subset of supervision, however, there are categories of childcare including wait-
ing to pick up children, attending school conferences, and organizing and planning for children that would
not be included in supervision time. Additionally, childcare activities for children over the age of 13 would
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Leisure activities include all time categorized as socializing, relaxing and leisure, sports,
exercise, and recreation and talking on the phone to relatives or friends.15 I also examine
two other types of outcomes: the percentage of women working only from home, and the
percentage of working minutes completed at home.
2.6 Results: Self-Employment and Motherhood
2.6.1 Main Results
I find that young children are associated with higher self-employment rates, and this associ-
ation is strongest when the youngest child is two to three years of age. The main regression
results are shown in Table 2.5. Figure 2.1 plots the coefficients on the age of the youngest
child indicators from the regression pooling all of the panels together, while Figure 2.2
plots the results separately for the three panels. The relationship between self-employment
status and the age of a woman’s youngest child exhibits an inverted U shape. This pattern
is present in all three panels and there is little evidence that it has changed over time.
These results are consistent with previous findings that women with young children are
more likely to be self-employed. The coefficients in Table 2.5 suggest that self-employment
rates rise with the mother’s own age at a decreasing rate; a result that is well established in
the literature. The effect of being married is not directly comparable to the same coefficient
in a cross sectional regression because it is only identified from changes in marital status
within the panel. However, my results do suggest that marriage is positively associated
with self-employment, which is in line with previous research (Evans and Leighton (1989),
Devine (2001), Hipple (2010)).
While the magnitude of the coefficients of interest are small, they represent large per-
centage changes because only 5% of women aged 18 to 55 are self-employed. I describe the
magnitude of the effects using two measures, which both show relatively large increases in
self-employment rates associated with having a young child. First, I compute the percent-
age change in self-employment propensity associated with having a youngest child of age
two relative to the predicted self-employment rate for individuals with no children under 18.
For example, in 1996, having one child who is two years of age is associated with a 1.2 per-
centage point increase in the self-employment rate. The model predicted self-employment
rate among women without a child under 18 is 5.0% so the 1.2 percentage point increase
associated with having a two year old represents a 24% increase in the self-employment
not be included in supervision time.
15Leisure does not include religious activities, volunteering, or any type of shopping.
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propensity. The percentage changes for the 1984-1986 and 2008 panels are of a similar
magnitude and are reported in Table 2.6. An alternative measure of the effect is to calculate
how the predicted self-employment rate of women whose youngest child is two years of
age would change if they had not had that youngest child. This effect can be thought of
as the marginal effect of the last child. In the 2008 panel, the predicted self-employment
rate among women whose youngest child is two years of age is 6.8%. The adjusted pre-
dicted value without the youngest child is 5.9% so the additional child raised the predicted
self-employment rate by 16 percent. Table 2.6 shows the percentage changes for all three
panels, which range from 11-17 percent. I prefer this second measure because it is calcu-
lated on the same underlying sample of women with children, which holds constant other
covariates.16
The positive relationship between having young children and self-employment con-
trasts sharply with the well-known pattern that women with young children are less likely
to work (e.g. Byker (2012)). I show the negative relationship between working and hav-
ing children, for women in my sample, by estimating the same regression specification but
with working status as the dependent variable. My definition of working requires the re-
spondent to have worked for pay at some point during the previous month.17 Figure 2.3
plots the coefficients on the age of the youngest child for these regressions. Women from
the 1984-1986 and 1996 panels who have a newborn are 17 percentage points less likely
to work than women without a child under 18. The decline in employment is slightly less
in the 2008 panel at around 13 percentage points, but it is still large. All panels show the
same pattern: women are more likely to work as their youngest child gets older.
The stark contrast between Figures 2.3 and 2.2 suggests that self-employment provides
a work environment that is compatible with having young children in ways that other em-
ployment alternatives do not. The positive relationship between self-employment and hav-
ing young children is not conditional on employment. The coefficients in Figure 2.2 imply
that even though women leave employment when they have children there must be more
women entering self-employment than leaving. Self-employment is different from wage
and salary work along a variety of different dimensions. Many of the self-employed can
choose their work location, the number of hours they work, and when they work those
hours. These aspects might be relatively more important for women with small children.
16Married women without children under 18 may differ in age, education and other observed characteristics
that could contribute to their predicted self-employment rate, which I use as the base in the first magnitude
measure.
17This definition is not the same as labor force participation because I exclude unemployed women looking
for work during the previous month from my working definition.
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2.6.2 Robustnesss
As previously mentioned, using the monthly weight from the last observation may overstate
the influence of individuals who are similar to those who leave the sample. As a robustness
check, I re-estimate the same regressions using the full panel weights, which exist only for
individuals who were interviewed in every month of the panel. I also redo the analysis on
the unweighted sample to examine the effect that the weights have on the estimates.
In Figure 2.4, I show the main coefficients of interest under the three weighting schemes
estimated on a pooled sample of women across the three panels. The results are quite
consistent across the different weights. I also redo the analysis using the full panel weights
and no weights on each panel separately, and the results are shown in Appendix Figures
C.1 and C.2. The results using the full panel weights are very similar in magnitude, but
are mostly not statistically significant because of the smaller sample size. The unweighted
results are also very similar to my main results. My general findings are also robust both
to including all women who are ever in the survey rather than only those who are selected
in the first wave and to limiting the sample to women who are in the survey for at least two
years.18
My fixed effects empirical strategy controls for time invariant differences in women’s
entrepreneurial drive and skill as well as their overall preferences for children, however,
there are time varying factors that could influence both self-employment behavior and
fertility. For example, a positive income shock could encourage women to become self-
employed and to have additional children due to an increased sense of financial security.
Additionally, it is difficult to determine whether having young children drives women to
become self-employed or whether self-employment lowers the opportunity cost to having
children and induces women to have another child. A recent paper by Noseleit (2014) finds
evidence that having children leads European women to pursue self-employment, but that
self-employment does not increase fertility offering some support for treating fertility as
exogenous to self-employment as some previous papers have assumed (e.g. Boden (1999),
Budig (2006), Lombard (2001)).
Although I cannot separate the influence of these factors from the effect of having a
young child on women’s decision to become self-employed, the pattern of the estimates is
consistent with women using self-employment to care for their young children. The expla-
nation that self-employed women decide to have more children for reasons unrelated to the
complementarities between self-employment and care taking suggests that we should see a
positive relationship between self-employment and the year prior to the birth of a child.19
18These results are available from the author upon request.
19For example, Broussard et al. (2015) argue that the self-employed have more children to have an heir for
69
I re-run my main specification on the data pooled across panels adding an indicator for the
year prior to a birth. As shown in Appendix Table C.1, the estimates are nearly unchanged,
and the year prior to a birth appears to have little association with women’s probability
of being self-employed. These results do not offer support for the idea that women who
become self-employed subsequently decide to have another a child. Interestingly, they also
do not offer evidence that women looking to combine self-employment with child care
become self-employed in anticipation of having children.
In order to assess the importance of income changes driving both self-employment
and fertility decisions, I re-run the main specification controlling for current and lagged
household income net of women’s earnings. Specifically, I control for the current month
income, income lags for each of the prior five months, and the amount of income received
in the months six to eleven months prior. The results shown in Appendix Table C.1 are
similar to the main results suggesting that income shocks are not driving the relationship
between self-employment and the age of a woman’s youngest child.
2.6.3 Results by Education Level and Marital Status
Next, I examine whether the relationship between self-employment and the presence of
young children varies by the mothers’ education level and marital status. Education level
and marital status may affect the opportunities and costs of being self-employed, which
could influence the relationship between children and self-employment. I pool all of the
panels together to increase the precision of the estimates. There are a number of reasons
to believe that education level and marital status might affect self-employment behavior.
Women with higher levels of education often have greater access to flexibility in their wage
and salary positions so they might not exhibit the same patterns of self-employment with
respect to the age of their youngest child.20 Although there is not a strong relationship
between self-employment rates and education levels, it might be the case that women with
more education have an easier time becoming self-employed because they have greater
access to capital and husbands who are also more educated. Married women may be able
to use their spouse’s health insurance and be more willing to take on the risk associated with
self-employment if they have a second household income. Empirically, self-employment
earnings have higher variance both between individuals and within individuals across time
(Hamilton (2000), Rosen and Willen (2002)). Many new businesses fail and some require
the family business, which could drive a positive relationship between fertility and self-employment.
20A recent article from the Council of Economic Advisors (2014) reports that 55% of women with a
bachelor’s degree or higher have access to some schedule flexibility compared to 38% of women with less
than a high school education.
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taking on debt to start so researchers have generally considered self-employment more
risky than wage and salary employment.
Figure 2.5 plots the coefficients from a regression including women with at least a
bachelor’s degree and one that includes women with less than a bachelor’s degree. Having
a youngest child of age two is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in self-
employment propensity for women with bachelor’s degrees compared to a 1.2 percentage
point increase for women with less than a bachelor’s degree. The point estimate on each
age indicator is higher for women with more education suggesting that young children raise
self-employment rates more for more educated women although the effects are not statisti-
cally different. In percentage terms, however, the impacts are similar because women with
bachelor’s degrees do have slightly higher rates of self-employment than women without
bachelor’s degrees. Figure 2.6 shows the results from a regression that includes women
who are married during the entire survey and one that includes only women who are single
during the entire survey. These results suggest that married women are more likely than
single women to become self-employed when they have young children at home. Although
the coefficients from the single women regression are not statistically different from zero,
they follow the same inverted U-shaped pattern as the main results. I take these results as
suggestive that single mothers may use self-employment to gain workplace flexibility, but
the size of the effect is too small to be estimated with precision with the SIPP sample size.
2.6.4 Occupational Transitions
Finally, I examine how occupations change during transitions into and out of self-employment
among women who were self-employed while they had a child under the age of 13. I find
that the majority of transitions to and from self-employment are accompanied by a change
in occupation, and that many transitions are movements to and from non-employment.
Appendix Figure C.3 shows transitions between the most common wage and salary occu-
pations to the most common self-employment occupations from the 2008 SIPP. It shows
that 40% of women who became self-employed did not work in the six months prior to
their transition, and 23% did not work in wage and salary employment but had a previ-
ous spell in self-employment. Employment across occupations in self-employment is a bit
more concentrated than in wage and and salary employment. Appendix Figure C.4 shows
the same information, but only includes individuals who worked in wage and salary em-
ployment in the six months prior to becoming self-employed. Both figures suggest a lot
of occupational switching occurs in transitions to self-employment. Appendix Figures C.5
and C.6 show occupational transitions for two digit occupation codes among all women
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and previously wage and salary employed women respectively. Even among these fairly
broad occupational categories we see a great deal of switching occupations, but there are
also noticeable flows of continuity between occupation categories including personal care
and service, sales, building and grounds cleaning and maintenance.
Transitions out of self-employment show similar patterns as shown in Appendix Figures
C.7, C.8, C.9, and C.10. Over 60% of previously self-employed individuals do not work
in wage and salary employment during the six months after they leave self-employment.
Around 24% move back into self-employment and 40% do not work in the six months
after leaving self-employment. Among those who do work in wage and salary employ-
ment, there is a lot of occupational switching during the transition. Comparing Figures
C.6 to C.10, there seems to be slightly more continuity in broad occupation groups during
transitions into self-employment relative to transitions out of self-employment.
These occupational patterns suggest wide variation in mother’s self-employment ex-
periences. For some women, moving into self-employment represents a continuation of
employment in a similar occupation as their previous wage and salary employment, while
for others it represents an occupational change. These patterns have implications for the im-
pact of self-employment on women’s future earnings because some women may be gaining
more relevant work experience than others. Overall the transitions out of self-employment
do not lend support for the idea that self-employment is a stepping stone to wage and salary
employment for this sample of mothers who were self-employed while they had children at
home. This analysis highlights the prevalence of transitions between self-employment and
non-employment. Movements between non-employment and self-employment make up
around 40% of transitions. There is also evidence that women are moving into and out of
self-employment relatively frequently. Over 20% of transitions into self-employment were
preceded by self-employment during the previous six months and a similar percentage of
transitions from self-employment result in a return to self-employment in the following six
months. Finally, while this occupational transitions analysis is suggestive, it is done on a
selected subset of self-employed women and on a relatively small sample size so the results
should not be used to describe self-employment transitions in general.21
2.7 Time Use Results: Workplace Flexibility and Self-Employment
Using the ATUS, I examine differences in time use and work location between wage and
salary employed women and those who are self-employed. These comparisons provide
evidence of how self-employment allows women to combine caring for family with their
21There are around 1,200 transitions into and out of self-employment over the panel time-frame.
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work.
Self-employed women work fewer hours on average than women in wage and salary
employment, but the distribution of their working hours has a much higher variance. Fig-
ure2.7 displays women’s weekly and daily hours worked in self-employment and wage and
salary employment. While those in wage and salary employment tend to work 40 hours per
week or 8 hours per day, the self-employed do not have hours clustered at a traditional full
time work week. A particularly large share of self-employed women work fewer than 30
hours per week and fewer than 6 hours per day.
One aspect of the flexibility provided by self-employment might be the ability to choose
a lower number of hours of work than is available in wage and salary employment. Altonji
and Paxson (1992) find evidence that women switch jobs in order to reduce their hours after
they have children, which is consistent with an inability to fully adjust their hours within
their current job. Herr and Wolfram (2012) and Goldin (2014) suggest that some positions
might require a commitment to a minimum numbers of weekly hours. These minimum
hours requirements may cause women to leave the labor force if their desired hours are
less than the minimum threshold. Blau and Kahn (2013b) suggest that one reason the U.S.
female labor force participation rate has declined relative to other countries is because other
countries have policies that provide part-time work and forbid discrimination against part-
time workers. A 2012 Pew study found that 47% of mothers thought working part-time
would be ideal, but only 19% actually worked part time (Parker and Wang (2013)). This
mismatch suggests that either suitable part time-work is not available or is not affordable
for American mothers. Self-employment may be a way for women to work part-time when
part-time work is unavailable in wage and salary employment.
2.7.1 Differences in Time Use Between Self-employed and Wage and
Salary Workers
Table 2.7 shows the coefficients on the self-employment indicator from bivariate and mul-
tivariate regressions predicting a number of time use outcomes. These regressions include
only women with children who are working, so the coefficient can be interpreted as the
difference between mothers working in wage and salary employment and self-employed
mothers. The mean comparisons show that the self-employed spend on average 43 fewer
minutes working per day than the wage and salary employed, which is consistent with the
high levels of part-time work among self-employed women.
There are large time differences in the number of minutes spent supervising children.
The mean comparisons show that self-employed women with children under six spend over
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two additional hours per day supervising their kids compared to women in wage and salary
employment. Interestingly, it appears that self-employed women multi-task by spending 40
more minutes per day working while supervising their children. These differences remain
after controlling for demographic covariates and the number of hours the women work, as
shown in the last two columns of Table 2.7. Self-employed women with young children
spend an additional 106 minutes per day supervising their children and over an extra hour
per day working while supervising their children relative to women in wage and salary
employment. Importantly these effects are conditional on the number of hours worked so
they do not reflect a reduction in work to spend more time caring for children.
On average the self-employed spend 40 more minutes per day on housework and around
8 minutes less per day commuting. The self-employed spend around the same time sleep-
ing and in leisure activities as wage and salary workers. They are 21 percentage points
more likely to work from home and on average do 38 percent more of their work at home.
Controlling for covariates has little impact on the percentage of work hours completed at
home or the percent of individuals who work exclusively from home. The ability to work
from home while self-employed appears to exist for women regardless of marital status and
education level. Self-employed women do spend more time on housework than women in
wage and salary work, but controlling for covariates accounts for half of the difference in
means.
Self-employed mothers spend more time per day in childcare tasks, but this effect is
explained by demographic differences and the number of hours worked. In order to un-
derstand the type of extra childcare being provided by self-employed mothers, I follow
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and use the detailed ATUS activity codes to categorize childcare
activities into three types: primary, educational, and recreational. Primary childcare tasks
can be thought of as addressing children’s basic needs while educational activities include
reading to children or helping them with their homework and recreational activities include
playing games or attending sporting events. Table 2.8 shows that self-employed mothers
on average spend more time in all three activities. The self-employed spend more time
in educational childcare activities in particular; they spend on average around 50% more
time per day in these activities than wage and salary employed mothers. This additional
time could have positive effects on their children’s later life outcomes. After controlling
for covariates, the self-employed and the wage and salary employed spend similar amounts
of time on childcare and breaking down the childcare time by primary, educational, and
recreational time shows no statistically significant differences by self-employment status.
After controlling for covariates and hours worked, the remaining large differences in time
mothers spend with children appears to occur through extra time spent supervising children
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while doing another primary activity.
Examining the joint distribution of time spent supervising children and time spent work-
ing reveals much more variation in how the self-employed combine these activities. As
shown in Appendix Figure C.11 the most common combination for the wage and salary
employed is to spend 8 hours per day working and 2 to 4 hours per day supervising their
children. Many self-employed mothers also spend around 8 hours per day working and 2 to
4 hours supervising children, but a much greater fraction of these women spend 12 or more
hours supervising their children per day (See Appendix Figure C.12). The differences be-
tween these figures suggests that self-employment may allow women more choice in how
they combine work and childcare supervision.
Many self-employed mothers operate family daycares and therefore almost by defini-
tion are able to spend time with their children while working and are able work from home
(Connelly (1992)). Table 2.9 shows the time use analyses excluding women who work in
childcare. There is little change in the effect of self-employment on working from home,
but there is a 15%-20% reduction in the extra minutes the self-employed spend supervising
their children and a 30% reduction in the number of minutes they spend working while
supervising their children. The coefficients remain statistically significant and economi-
cally important suggesting that the estimated effects are not only explained by women who
become childcare providers.
Comparing self-employed women and women in wage and salary positions in the ATUS
provides evidence that self-employment offers flexibility in the number of hours worked
and in work location. Women with young children who are self-employed spend substan-
tially more time supervising their children. Although on average self-employed women
work fewer hours, the difference in time spent with their children cannot be explained by
a reduction in the number of hours worked. In addition, self-employed women appear to
“multi-task” by working while supervising their children.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the self-employment motivations and behavior of
American mothers. Taken together the evidence from the SIPP and ATUS suggests that
mothers become self-employed to both care for and spend more time with their chil-
dren, particularly when their children are young. While there are a variety of reasons that
women may decide to become self-employed, this particular pattern is consistent with self-
employment providing a way for mothers to balance work and household responsibilities.
It is difficult to think of an alternative explanation for the specific inverted U-shaped rela-
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tionship between self-employment and the age of a woman’s youngest child. The effect is
greatest when children require the most care at home and declines after children are school
aged. In addition, some women may feel that there is no affordable or acceptable substitute
for the childcare they provide. For these women, self-employment may offer an alternative
work option that allows them to work while bring the primary caretaker of their children.
One important question this study does not address is the long-term effect of this self-
employment experience on women’s careers. While self-employment has many attractive
attributes, it also has many associated costs.22 Hamilton (2000) finds that the self-employed
earn 35% less than equivalent wage and salary workers. Starting a business includes time
and monetary costs and self-employment can be a risky source of income. The evidence on
the returns to self-employment experience in wage and salary employment are mixed. For
women, the research suggests that self-employment experience has smaller returns to future
wage and salary earnings than wage and salary experience but is better than time spent not
employed (Bruce and Schuetze (2004), Williams (2000), and Lim (2016)). The analyses
of transitions to and from self-employment in this paper suggest that, for mothers with
children at home, self-employment often involves an occupational transition as well. Work
experience in a different occupation may not be as valuable to future employers, hurting
women’s future earning potential. Additional research using larger datasets to investigate
how the returns to self-employment experience vary by broad occupation categories would
be useful to improve the design of existing programs that promote self-employment. If the
returns to certain types of self-employment activities is much higher than others, programs
could encourage the self-employed to start businesses in these occupations or industries.
This paper fits into a broader debate of how families combine work and household re-
sponsibilities. While it offers evidence that self-employment is one strategy that mothers
use to care for children while continuing to work, it leaves open the question of how to
provide this type of work environment at the lowest cost. Better estimates of the relative
returns to different types of employment would inform policymakers about the relative ca-
reer costs of female self-employment. These estimates could be combined with measures of
the career costs of flexible work policies within wage and salary employment to understand
whether mothers would be better served by policies that promote female self-employment
or policies that enhance workplace flexibility within wage and salary employment.
22See Pugsley (2011) for estimates of the non-pecuniary benefits of self-employment. SeeLim (2016) for
estimates of the non-pecuniary benefit associated with time, schedule and location flexibility for mothers with
young children.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Top Occupations Among Self-Employed Women Over Time
All Women
1980 1990 2000 2012
Share Share Share Share
Managers 10.4 Childcare Worker 12.5 Childcare Workers 11.8 Childcare Workers 7.7
Hairdressers 9.3 Hairdresser 7.1 Hairdressers 6.6 Hairdressers 6.5
Sales Supervisors 7.5 Sales Supervisor 5.7 Housekeepers 5.7 Housekeepers 4.9
Childcare Workers 6.4 Managers 4.5 Sales Supervisors 4.5 Real Estate Agents 4.8
Farmers 5.8 Bookkeepers 4.3 Real Estate Agents 3.4 Secretaries 4.1
Bookkeepers 5.3 Farmers 4.0 Bookkeepers 3.1 Sales Supervisor 4.0
Real Estate Agents 3.8 Real Estate Agents 4.0 Salesperson 2.9 Bookkeepers 3.1
Secretaries 3.5 Secretaries 3.1 Secretaries 2.7 Managers 2.7
Other Teachers 3.4 Salesperson 2.7 Farmers/Ranchers 2.7 Designers 2.5
Salesperson 3.1 Designers 2.5 Designers 2.4 Other Teachers 2.5
Door to Door Sales 2.6 Janitors 2.5 Other Teachers 2.0 Salesperson 2.2
Designers 2.0 Other Teachers 2.2 Accountants 1.6 Accountants 2.0
63.1 55.1 49.5 46.9
Women with Bachelor’s Degree
1980 1990 2000 2012
Share Share Share Share
Other Teachers 8.8 Managers 5.6 Lawyers 4.7 Real Estate Agents 5.4
Physicians 8.3 Other Teachers 5.3 Other Teachers 4.4 Other Teachers 4.9
Managers 6.9 Real Estate Agents 5.1 Designers 4.2 Designers 4.0
Lawyers 6.9 Sales Supervisors 5.1 Real Estate Agents 4.0 Accountants 4.0
Psychologists 5.3 Childcare Workers 4.4 Sales Supervisors 3.9 Lawyers 3.9
Sales Supervisors 4.3 Designers 4.3 Childcare Workers 3.9 Sales Supervisor 3.5
Artists 3.9 Lawyers 3.9 Accountants 3.7 Management Analysts 3.3
Real Estate Agents 3.8 Psychologists 3.6 Management Analysts 3.4 Physicians/Surgeons 3.2
Authors 3.6 Physicians 3.5 Psychologists 3.0 Managers 3.1
Designers 2.9 Artists 3.0 Physicians/Surgeons 2.9 Childcare Workers 3.1
Farmers 2.0 Accountants 2.9 Writers/Authors 2.6 Psychologists 2.7
Management Analysts 2.0 Bookkeepers 2.6 Salesperson 2.5 Secretaries 2.1
58.7 49.2 43.0 43.2
Notes: 1980, 1990, and 2000 data come from the Census 5% sample and 2012 data come from the ACS. Data were downloaded from IPUMS and
estimates include all self-employed women ages 18-65 and are weighted using person weights.
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Table 2.2: Self-Employment Rates of Married Women by Spousal Income
Quintile
All Women Employed Women
Spousal Income Quintile 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
1 4.6 5.8 6.2 7.0 8.0 8.2
2 3.5 5.3 6.0 5.6 7.3 7.7
3 3.2 5.5 6.0 4.6 6.9 7.3
4 3.4 6.0 6.5 5.0 7.4 7.8
5 4.5 7.8 8.3 7.6 10.5 10.7
All 3.8 6.3 6.8 5.9 8.3 8.5
Notes: 1980, 1990, and 2000 data come from the Census 5% sample. Spousal in-
come is defined as the total household income less the woman’s total personal pre-
tax income. Data were downloaded from IPUMS and estimates include all married
women ages 18-65 and are weighted using person weights.
78
Table 2.3: SIPP Summary Statistics
1984-1986 1996 Panel 2008 Panel
Pooled Panels
All Women
Age 34.0 35.4 36.1
Percent of Sample:
Married 62.4 58.3 53.7
With Children Under 18 46.7 44.6 41.5
Working 64.0 70.0 68.2
Self-Employed 4.9 5.4 4.9
White Non-Hispanic 77.4 69.1 61.8
Black 12.9 14.3 13.8
Hispanic 6.6 11.8 16.0
High School or Less 59.8 42.8 28.3
With Associates Degree/Some College 22.2 33.2 38.9
With Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 17.9 24.0 32.8
Number of Observations 32,389 26,318 27,069
Women with Children Under 18
Age 34.0 34.8 36.0
Age of Youngest Child 6.8 6.6 6.6
Percent of Sample:
Married 77.1 72.2 68.4
Working 57.3 66.1 65.4
Self-Employed 5.5 5.7 5.3
White Non-Hispanic 74.6 62.3 57.4
Black 14.2 15.6 14.3
Hispanic 8.0 14.4 20.2
High School or Less 65.1 47.2 31.7
With Associates Degree/Some College 19.9 32.3 38.3
With Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 15.0 20.5 30.0
Number of Observations 16,856 13,585 13,423
Notes: The sample includes women ages 18-55 who are present during the first wave of the survey.
Summary statistics are weighted using the monthly weight from each woman’s final observation, but the
number of observations are unweighted.
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Table 2.4: American Time Use Survey Summary Statistics
Women with Children Women with Children
Under 18 Under 6
Age 35.5 31.7
Percent of Sample:
Married 69.5 73.8
Working 66.4 59.7
Self-Employed 5.6 4.7
White-Non-Hispanic 61.2 57.0
Black 13.7 13.8
Hispanic 19.8 23.5
High School or Less 42.7 43.7
Associates Degree or Some College 28.9 26.6
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 28.4 29.7
Average Number of Weekday Hours:
Working if Employed 7.3 7.2
Childcare if Children Under 13 1.9 2.5
Supervising Children if Children Under 13 4.3 5.0
Leisure 3.5 3.3
Sleeping 8.3 8.5
Housework 2.3 2.3
Number of Observations 31,855 14,834
Notes: The sample includes women ages 18-55 in the ATUS 2003-2012 dataset with at least one child under 18.
Summary statistics are weighted using the survey person weight, but the number of observations are unweighted.
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Table 2.5: Self-Employment Propensity
Dependent Variable: Self-Employment Status
1984-1986 1996 Panel 2008 Panel All Panels
Pooled Panels Pooled
Married 0.630** 0.464 0.315 0.461**
[0.291] [0.320] [0.325] [0.185]
Age 0.446** 0.360** 0.439*** 0.430***
[0.166] [0.170] [0.164] [0.098]
Age Squared −0.006** −0.005** −0.006*** −0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Indicator for 2 Children 0.241 0.211 0.355 0.295
[0.268] [0.352] [0.327] [0.183]
Indicator for 3 Children −0.494 −0.578 1.040** 0.099
[0.454] [0.612] [0.525] [0.304]
Indicator for 4 or More Children −1.354** −0.585 0.503 −0.470
[0.585] [1.006] [1.020] [0.495]
Youngest Child Indicators:
Age 0 0.375 0.567 0.323 0.398
[0.346] [0.426] [0.549] [0.264]
Age 1 0.943** 1.033** 0.615 0.859***
[0.399] [0.482] [0.597] [0.296]]
Age 2 1.425*** 1.203** 1.262** 1.326***
[0.435] [0.514] [0.584] [0.304]
Age 3 1.159*** 1.240** 1.275** 1.259***
[0.449] [0.539] [0.575] [0.303]
Age 4 0.839* 0.986* 1.264** 1.080***
[0.476] [0.539] [0.568] [0.306]
Age 5 0.925* 0.986* 1.050* 1.021***
[0.490] [0.557] [0.579] [0.314]
Age 6 0.983* 0.807 0.587 0.800**
[0.517] [0.548] [0.577] [0.318]
Age 7 0.867* 0.340 0.659 0.628**
[0.521] [0.544] [0.565] [0.315]
Age 8 0.519 0.509 0.304 0.415
[0.493] [0.533] [0.539] [0.301]
Aged 9-13 0.596 0.355 0.189 0.354
[0.453] [0.478] [0.472] [0.270]
Aged 14-17 0.170 0.190 −0.208 0.137
[0.362] [0.386] [0.338] [0.207]
Mean Self-Employment Rate 4.6 5.2 4.9 4.9
Observations 823,686 950,501 1,117,047 2,891,234
Number of Individuals 31,080 26,065 27,069 84,214
Notes: Regressions predict self-employment status; additional controls include the state unemployment rate, and
year, month of interview, and individual fixed effects. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.
The sample includes women ages 18-55 who are present in wave 1 of the panel. Results are weighted by the monthly
weight of the woman’s final observation and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Separate regressions
are run for the 1984-1986 pooled data, the 1996 panel, and the 2008 panel. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Magnitude of Effects
1984-1986 1996 Panel 2008 Panel
Pooled Panels
Predicted Self-Employment Rate:
Women with No Children Under 18 4.0 5.0 4.5
Adding Coefficient for Youngest Child of
Two
5.4 6.2 5.8
Percentage Change 35.5 24.2 28.1
Predicted Self-Employment Rate:
Women with Youngest Child of Two 5.6 6.3 6.8
Without their Youngest Child of Two 4.8 5.7 5.9
Percentage Change 16.8 10.6 15.7
Notes: Predicted self-employment rates use fixed effect regressions described in Table 2.5. The first
row is the predicted self-employment rate for women without children under 18. The second row adds
the coefficient for a youngest child of two to the first row and the third row is the implied percentage
change associated with having a child who is two years of age. The fourth row is the predicted self-
employment rate among women whose youngest child is two years of age. The fifth row is the predicted
self-employment rate if those women had not had their youngest two year old child. The sixth and final
row is the percentage change in the predicted self-employment rate associated with the two year old
youngest child.
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Table 2.7: Differences in Time Use Associated with Self-Employment
Mean Comparisons Multivariate Comparisons
Dependent Variable Women with Women with Women with Women with
Children Children Children Children
Under 18 Under 6 Under 18 Under 6
Minutes Spent On:
Work −43.3 −59.8
[7.2] [10.5]
Childcare 17.7 27.6 5.3 5.2
[3.1] [5.8] [3.0] [5.6]
Supervising Children <13 75.3 123.7 56.4 105.5
[8.3] [12.9] [7.6] [12.7]
Working while Supervising Children <13 39.7 59.6 43.5 67.1
[3.9] [7.1] [4.3] [8.0]
Leisure −7.0 −1.5 −5.3 1.4
[4.4] [6.7] [4.3] [6.4]
Sleeping −4.0 −0.1 3.0 6.6
[3.5] [5.7] [3.3] [5.4]
Housework 39.3 39.7 17.7 19.8
[4.3] [5.8] [4.0] [5.6]
Commuting −7.6 −7.8 −6.4 −6.2
[0.8] [1.1] [0.8] [1.2]
Percentage Working from Home 21.1 20.0 21.1 20.3
[1.2] [1.8] [1.3] [2.0]
Percentage of Work Done at Home 38.4 37.6 34.8 33.1
[1.2] [1.8] [1.6] [2.6]
Notes: The sample for columns 1 and 3 includes women ages 18-55 in the ATUS 2003-2012 who are employed and have at least one
child under the age of 18. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to women with a child under the age of 6. All columns only include
weekday observations. Mean comparisons include only a constant and a self-employment indicator term. Coefficients reported
represent the difference in means between individuals who are self-employed and individuals in wage and salary employment.
Multivariate regressions include controls for respondents’ education, race, age, number of children, hours worked, employment
status and a self-employment indicator. Coefficients reported represent the effect of being self-employed relative to working in a
wage and salary position.
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Table 2.8: Differences in Childcare Types Associated with Self-Employment
Mean Comparisons Multivariate Comparisons
Dependent Variable Women with Women with Women with Women with
Children Children Children Children
Under 18 Under 6 Under 18 Under 6
Minutes Spent On:
Primary Childcare 7.9 15.2 2.3 4.8
[2.3] [4.5] [1.3] [4.6]
Mean Primary Childcare 44.2 75.5 44.1 75.5
Educational Childcare 6.4 6.6 1.1 1.6
[1.1] [1.9] [0.6] [1.7]
Mean Educational Childcare 12.6 11.3 12.6 11.3
Recreational Childcare 3.4 5.8 0.8 −1.2
[1.4] [2.9] [0.8] [2.8]
Mean Recreational Childcare 18.0 31.5 18.0 31.5
Notes: The sample for columns 1 and 3 includes women ages 18-55 in the ATUS 2003-2012 who are employed and have at least one
child under the age of 18. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to women with a child under the age of 6. All columns only include
weekday observations. Mean comparisons include only a constant and a self-employment indicator term. Coefficients reported
represent the difference in means between individuals who are self-employed and individuals in wage and salary employment.
Multivariate regressions include controls for respondents’ education, race, age, number of children, hours worked, employment
status and a self-employment indicator. Coefficients reported represent the effect of being self-employed relative to working in a
wage and salary position
84
Table 2.9: Differences in Time Use Associated with Self-Employment Excluding Childcare Workers
Mean Comparisons Multivariate Comparisons
Dependent Variable Women with Women with Women with Women with
Children Children Children Children
Under 18 Under 6 Under 18 Under 6
Minutes Spent On:
Work −55.1 −73.9
[7.3] [10.6]
Childcare 20.3 31.4 6.3 6.2
[3.1] [6.2] [3.1] [6.1]
Supervising Children <13 63.8 104.8 44.5 82.3
[8.3] [13.0] [7.5] [12.3]
Working while Supervising Children <13 27.8 40.2 30.2 45.2
[3.2] [5.8] [3.5] [6.7]
Leisure −6.4 −2.0 −5.4 0.1
[4.7] [7.2] [4.6] [7.0]
Sleeping −1.7 2.8 5.8 9.0
[3.6] [5.7] [3.5] [5.5]
Housework 41.5 39.7 18.2 21.9
[4.5] [5.8] [4.3] [6.0]
Percentage Working from Home 19.4 18.7 19.0 18.8
[1.3] [1.9] [1.3] [2.1]
Percentage of Work Done at Home 36.2 35.3 31.5 29.5
[1.7] [2.6] [1.7] [2.6]
Notes: The sample for columns 1 and 3 includes women ages 18-55 in the ATUS 2003-2012 who are employed, but are not
childcare workers, and have at least one child under the age of 18. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to women with a child
under the age of 6. All columns only include weekday observations. Mean comparisons include only a constant and a self-
employment indicator term. Coefficients reported represent the difference in means between individuals who are self-employed
and individuals in wage and salary employment. Multivariate regressions include controls for respondents’ education, race, age,
number of children, hours worked, employment status and a self-employment indicator. Coefficients reported represent the effect
of being self-employed relative to working in a wage and salary position.
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Figure 2.1: Female Self-Employment Rates and the Age of the Youngest Child; SIPP Wave
1 Respondents Using Final Month Weights
-0.4 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
1.8 
2 
2.2 
No 
Children 
Under 
18 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-13 14-17 P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
P
oi
nt
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
n 
Se
lf-
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
P
ro
pe
ns
ity
 
Age in Years of Youngest Child 
Notes: The regressions predict self-employment status controlling for age, marital status, number of chil-
dren, and fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers denote statistical
significance at the 5% level and the light lines represent the 95% confidence interval. The estimation sample
includes women ages 18-55 who are present in the first wave of each SIPP panel. Observations are weighted
using the monthly weight from the individual’s final month in the survey.
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Figure 2.2: Female Self-Employment Rates and the Age of the Youngest Child; SIPP Wave
1 Respondents Using Final Month Weights
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Notes: The three lines are plots of the coefficients on the age of the youngest child from regressions using
different SIPP panels. The regressions predict self-employment status controlling for age, marital status,
number of children, and fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers
denote statistical significance at the 5% level. The estimation sample includes women ages 18-55 who are
present in the first wave of each SIPP panel. Observations are weighted using the monthly weight from the
individual’s final month in the survey.
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of Women Working by the Age of the Youngest Child; SIPP Wave
1 Respondents Using Final Month Weights
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Notes: The three lines are plots of the coefficients on the age of the youngest child from regressions using
different SIPP panels. The regressions predict working status controlling for age, marital status, number of
children, and fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers denote statistical
significance at the 5% level. The estimation sample includes women ages 18-55 who are present in the first
wave of each SIPP panel. Observations are weighted using the monthly weight from the individual’s final
month in the survey.
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Figure 2.4: Female Self-Employment Rates and the Age of the Youngest Child; Pooled
SIPP Panels; Different Weights
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Notes: The three lines are plots of the coefficients on the age of the youngest child from regressions of the
pooled surveys using no weights, the longitudinal panel weights and the final month of observation weights.
The regressions predict self-employment status controlling for age, marital status, number of children, and
fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers denote statistical significance
at the 5% level. The estimation sample includes women ages 18-55 who are present in the first wave of each
SIPP panel.
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Figure 2.5: Female Self-Employment Rates and the Age of the Youngest Child; Pooled
SIPP Panels Using Final Month Weights; By Education Level
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Notes: The two lines are plots of the coefficients on the age of the youngest child from regressions on the
sample of women with at least a bachelor’s degree and women without a bachelor’s degree. The regressions
predict self-employment status controlling for age, marital status, number of children, and fixed effects with
standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers denote statistical significance at the 5% level.
The estimation sample pools all SIPP panels together and includes women ages 18-55 who are present in the
first wave of a SIPP panel. Observations are weighted using the monthly weight from the individual’s final
month of the survey.
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Figure 2.6: Female Self-Employment Rates and the Age of the Youngest Child; Pooled
SIPP Panels Using Final Month Weights; By Marital Status
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Notes: The two lines are plots of the coefficients on the age of the youngest child from regressions on the
sample of women who are married throughout the entire survey and women who are single throughout the
entire survey. The regressions predict self-employment status controlling for age, marital status, number of
children, and fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers denote statistical
significance at the 5% level. The estimation sample pools all SIPP panels together and includes women ages
18-55 who are present in the first wave of a SIPP panel. Observations are weighted using the monthly weight
from the individual’s final month of the survey.
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Figure 2.7: Distributions of Hours of Work By Self-Employment Status
Weekday Daily Hours Worked; Working Mothers from ATUS
Notes: These histograms show the weighted daily hours recorded as working in the ATUS for employed
women with children under the age of 18 who were interviewed on a weekday and worked at least one
minute that day. Observations are top coded at 16 hours. Self-employment status is determined according to
the main job of the individual.
Usual Weekly Hours Worked; Working Mothers from ATUS
Notes: These histograms show the weighted usual weekly hours worked in the ATUS for employed women
with children under the age of 18 who were interviewed on a weekday and worked at least one minute that
day. These data come from the respondents’ answer to a question about usual hours worked and not directly
from the time diary data. Observations are top coded at 90 hours per week. Self-employment status is
determined according to the main job of the individual.
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CHAPTER 3
The EITC and Self-Employment Among
Married Mothers
While the EITC provides a disincentive to work for most married women, previous re-
search suggests that it encourages the reporting of self-employment earnings to the IRS
when filing taxes (LaLumia (2009)). Using the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation, we use variation in EITC generosity across and within states between 1990 and
2012 to estimate the impact of the credit on married mothers’ self-employment behavior.
We estimate that the average increase in EITC generosity over this time period led to a
4 percentage point increase in the proportion of EITC-eligible married mothers reporting
positive self-employment hours. This paper adds to the existing literature on the EITC and
women’s labor supply by providing new evidence that the EITC affects married mothers’
employment type. By measuring self-employment as positive reported hours worked in
a business, our results suggest that the EITC induces a real increase in self-employment
behavior. These findings supplement previous work showing that the EITC encourages
the reporting of self-employment earnings to the IRS. This observed shift towards self-
employment could arise from an alleviation of credit constraints, a desire for flexible work,
or an attempt to maximize the size of the credit through targeted changes in reporting and
labor supply.
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3.1 Introduction
In 2012, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provided $64 billion of income to 28 million
households. This paper provides new evidence that the credit influences married women’s
decision to pursue self-employment contributing to two strands of the existing EITC lit-
erature. Previous work has focused on how the EITC affects single and married women’s
labor supply decisions; finding that the credit encourages work among single mothers and
discourages employment among married mothers.1 In this paper, we show that in addi-
tion to affecting women’s employment decisions, the credit affects the type of employment
they choose. Other research finds that changes in the EITC cause particularly strong re-
sponses among the self-employed as measured by reported income to the IRS.2 We use an
alternative measure of self-employment, hours worked at a business, to offer evidence that
the EITC may increase real self-employment effort in addition to any changes in reporting
behavior.
There are a number of reasons to expect the EITC to influence the choice between self-
employment, wage and salary employment, and non-employment among married women.
It is well documented that the self-employed are able to manipulate their reported income
for tax purposes to maximize their EITC so policy-induced increases in the EITC could
encourage individuals to become self-employed to take better advantage of the credit (Saez
(2010), LeMaire and Schjerning (2013)). Increases in EITC generosity could also provide
additional income that facilitates starting a business either through capital funding or an
improved financial situation that allows women to move to an arguably riskier type of em-
ployment.3 Although this income effect influences all EITC-eligible women, we expect it to
have a larger impact on married women because it is likely easier for them to become self-
employed with a secondary earner in the household to provide income security and health
insurance.4 Finally, part-time work is much more prevalent among self-employed women
relative to wage and salary employed women so mothers may be using self-employment as
a way to decrease their labor supply without exiting the labor force in response to the credit
1For example, see Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Hoynes and Patel (2015)
for evidence that the credit increases single mothers’ labor supply. See Eissa and Hoynes (2004) for evidence
of the credit’s effect on married women’s employment.
2See Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2013) for evidence on income bunching by the self-employed.
3See Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Hall and Woodward (2010) for analyses of the risk of
investing in one’s own business and Ekelund et al. (2005) for evidence on the relationship of risk preferences
and self-employment behavior.
4Self-employment rates among married women in 2012 are 9.1% compared to 3.2% among never married
women. Access to spousal health insurance, a second income to reduce risk from income shocks, and possibly
better access to capital all make it easier for married women to become self-employed (see Velamuri (2012),
Lombard (2001); Fairlie et al. (2010), and Heim and Lurie (2010)).
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(Lim (2016)).
Because the credit is based on total household income there is a marriage penalty for
many dual-earner households creating disincentives for secondary earners to work. Ap-
proximately three-quarters of married filers eligible for the EITC have earnings in the
phase-out region of the schedule, meaning that each extra dollar of earnings reduces house-
hold EITC benefits by around 20 cents. Over the past decade, efforts have been made to
reduce the marriage penalty by extending the income threshold for married filers, although
many married couples still face marriage penalties associated with the EITC (Holtzblatt
and Rebelein (2000), Lin and Tong (2012), Michelmore (2015)). This disincentive applies
to both work in self-employment and wage and salary employment. Previous research by
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) has documented that expansions of the EITC between 1984 and
1996 led married women to decrease their overall employment by around one percentage
point, but their work did not distinguish between types of employment.
This paper uses a simulated instrument strategy (Currie and Gruber (1996), Cohodes
et al. (2014)), to estimate the effect of EITC expansions at the federal and state level on
married women’s self-employment behavior. First, we build on prior work that estimates
the impact of the EITC on married women’s labor supply by distinguishing between labor
supply in wage and salary employment and self-employment. Previous research suggests
that mothers with young children are more likely to be self-employed, which may allow
them to spend more time with their children and pay less for childcare (Laughlin (2013)),
Hundley (2000), Lim (2016)). This additional time may represent an improvement in the
quality of care for children of low-income mothers.5
Second, we illustrate that work effort, as measured by hours worked, in self-employment
increases when EITC generosity increases. Previous work using tax return data has been
unable to determine whether increases in reported self-employment income represents ad-
ditional work effort or merely a change in reporting to the IRS (LaLumia (2009)). Distin-
guishing between a real response and a reporting response is important for evaluating the
effectiveness of the EITC in encouraging or discouraging work. Self-employment earn-
ings are relatively easy to misreport since there is often no third-party reporting to the
IRS. A recent paper by Kuka (2013) compares the impact of the 1993 federal EITC ex-
pansion on unmarried individuals’ self-employment rates between the IRS tax data and
the Current Population Survey (CPS). She finds a positive effect of the expansion on self-
employment in both datasets, but the effect in the tax data is much larger leading her to
5Higher quality care has been shown to improve children’s cognitive development (See Duncan (2003)).
Care provided by the mother could represent an increase or decrease in quality depending on the quality level
of the alternative care provider.
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conclude that the majority of the increase in self-employment represents a reporting ef-
fect. We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which may
have more accurate accounts of self-employment earnings and effort than the CPS or tax
data. In contrast to those annual data sources, SIPP respondents are interviewed every four
months, which is intended to reduce recall bias among survey responses. This quarterly
interviewing strategy may be particularly important for capturing self-employment work
effort, as self-employment tends to be relatively short-lived. In our data, around 9% of self-
employed married mothers are no longer self-employed in the following quarter. Rissman
(2006) finds that among men 20-45 years of age in the NLSY79 half of self-employment
spells end within a year. Additionally, we focus on changes in both hours spent working in
self-employment and earnings because reported hours worked are less likely to be impacted
by the incentives to evade taxes.6
Finally, we are able to corroborate previous evidence on the labor supply of self-
employed workers and married women using a new source of variation in EITC generosity:
state EITC expansions. Much of the earlier work on the EITC uses a federal expansion of
the credit in the early 1990s to analyze how an increase in income affects outcomes for
households with children compared to childless individuals. While the expansion was gen-
erous, it is now nearly 20 years old and affected all families with children at the same time.
The identification strategy relies on a parallel trends assumption between women with no
children and women with at least one child. This might be a particularly strong assumption
especially for outcomes like female labor supply, which may differ substantially between
households with no children and households with children. Using the implementation and
expansion of state EITCs provides multiple sources of variation; variation in the timing of
state expansions as well as variation in the generosity of benefits. Our empirical strategy
provides an estimate of the effect of a dollar amount increase in the average EITC benefit on
the employment decisions of married mothers, which may be more useful for considering
current policy changes than the overall effect of previous expansions.
Our results indicate that policy-induced increases in the EITC discourage work over-
all for married mothers, but encourage self-employment. The average EITC for married
women with children increased by $690 over our sample period. We estimate that this in-
crease led to a 4 percentage point increase in self-employment rates as measured by positive
hours worked in one’s own business. This increase in self-employment hours suggests that
6Hurst and Pugsley (2014) find underreporting of self-employment earnings in the PSID by about 25%
relative to wage and salary workers. They argue that individuals report the same underreported earnings as
on their tax returns. Because the SIPP is quarterly and will often be conducted prior to tax time for that year,
it may be less susceptible to this underreporting. Additionally some individuals in our sample will have an
incentive to over-report and others to underreport depending on their location on the EITC schedule.
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the EITC encourages real work effort in self-employment among married women rather
than merely an increase in reported self-employment earnings to the IRS for tax filing. We
find a small increase in the number of self-employment hours worked and a decrease in the
number of wage and salary hours worked. Our results provide important evidence that the
EITC influences the type of employment among married women in addition to affecting
their overall labor supply. Additionally, our results suggest that relatively small increases
in income encourage low-income married mothers to become self-employed. This could
be evidence that credit constraints are a barrier to self-employment or of an income effect
that encourages some women to pursue self-employment when the family’s overall earning
potential has increased. Alternatively, women may choose self-employment over wage and
salary employment as a function of EITC generosity because they are able to more pre-
cisely adjust their labor supply and earnings, or their reporting of it to the IRS. On average
self-employed women tend to work less and spend more time with their children (Hund-
ley (2000), Gurley-Calvez et al. (2009)). If increases in the EITC induce women to shift
to self-employment, this could have positive implications for their children. On the other
hand, because self-employed women tend to have lower earnings than wage and salary em-
ployed women (Devine (1994), Hamilton (2000), our findings suggest potentially negative
implications for women’s earnings trajectories.
3.2 The Earned Income Tax Credit
The EITC began as a small, temporary credit in 1975, worth up to $400 ($1,750 in 2014
dollars) for households earning less than $8,000. Since then, the credit has been expanded
several times at both the federal and state level, with the federal credit worth up to $6,000
in 2014 for households earning less than $53,000. The credit is fully refundable, so house-
holds with no tax liability receive the EITC in the form of a tax refund.
The EITC benefit structure is made up of three segments: a phase-in region, plateau,
and phase-out region. For a household with two children in the phase-in region, every
dollar of earned income increases the EITC benefit by 40 cents. Once earnings reach a
certain threshold, benefits remain constant until earned income reaches a second threshold.
For incomes above the second threshold benefits are taxed at approximately 20 percent.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the federal EITC benefit structure for the 2014 tax year. The solid
lines indicate the benefit structure for a single tax payer, while the dotted lines illustrate
the structure for a married couple. Prior to the early 2000s, married filers were subject
to the same income thresholds as head of household or single filers. Beginning in 2002,
the plateau region of the benefit structure was extended for married couples in an effort
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to reduce the marriage penalty associated with the EITC. In 2002, the plateau region was
extended for an extra $1,000 for married couples and by 2014, married couples could earn
an extra $5,430 before the phase-out took effect.
The trapezoidal structure of the EITC benefit schedule creates incentives for individu-
als on the phase-in portion of the schedule to increase their earnings because each dollar
of earnings is associated with a larger EITC benefit. In contrast, those in the phase-out
region have and incentive to reduce their earnings as each additional dollar of earnings is
associated with a decline in EITC benefits. For individuals on the plateau, small changes in
earnings will not affect EITC benefits. Workers may move from wage and salary employ-
ment to self-employment because self-employment may allow households to more easily
target their earnings to maximize their EITC benefit. The self-employed could have more
control over their number of hours worked and their income. Further, unlike wage and
salary earnings, self-employment earnings are often not verified via third-party reporting
to the IRS, making it easier for households to misreport income in order to maximize their
tax refunds.
In addition to the federal benefit, 25 states and the District of Columbia have their own
EITCs. These credits have the same eligibility criteria as the federal EITC, and increase
the total EITC value by between 3 and 45 percent of the federal benefit. State level EITCs
began in the late 1980s, but the majority of states implemented credits following welfare
reform in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many states used federal block grants intended
to reduce the number of welfare caseloads to fund their new EITCs. A list of states and the
year they implemented the credit can be found in Appendix Table D.1.
3.3 Data and Methodology
The data for our study come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
panels from 1990 to 2008, covering the years 1990 through 2012. The SIPP is a nationally-
representative panel dataset surveying families for up to 60 months per panel. Households
are interviewed once every four months regarding income and household characteristics
of the previous four months. Information on all individuals living in the household is
collected. The SIPP is an ideal data source for this analysis because of its large sample
size (roughly 50,000 households per panel), and because it contains monthly information
on labor force participation and income.
We focus our analysis on married women between the ages of 18 and 55 who have at
least one child under 19 living in the household. This captures women during their prime
working years, but avoids including self-employment behavior that could be characterized
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as partial retirement.7 For our main analysis, we exclude childless married women because
only a small fraction are eligible for the EITC, and they are likely to exhibit very different
working patterns than women with children.8 We focus on married women in this analysis
because we believe that they are the most likely to alter their decision between wage and
salary work and self-employment because they have a potential second earner living in the
household. Married mothers are about twice as likely to be self-employed as single mothers
in the SIPP (8% of married mothers compared to 4% of single mothers).9
To identify the impact of EITC generosity on the self-employment patterns of married
women, we compare the labor force participation of EITC-eligible married mothers to that
of non-eligible married mothers as a function of state EITC generosity. We identify EITC-
eligible households using income and family structure in the first year of each SIPP panel.
We include married women with zero family earnings in the EITC eligible group. The SIPP
does not contain reliable information on EITC receipt, so this measure represents an intent-
to-treat effect. Take up of the EITC tends to be quite high, often over 80% (Scholz (1994),
Currie (2004)). We then exclude observations from the first year of each SIPP panel in our
analysis to reduce concerns of endogeneity of EITC-eligibility to the outcomes of interest.
We focus on the reference month observations since each SIPP wave asks about the usual
number of hours worked at the business during the previous four months.10 These observa-
tions can be thought of as quarterly observations that summarize work activity during the
previous four months. This results in a sample of 261,781 quarter-person observations.
3.3.1 Dependent Variables
In each interview, respondents are asked whether they have any business income and
how many hours they usually spend doing activities for their business. We measure self-
employment by whether the respondent reports any hours worked as part of a business in
each wave. We construct an alternative measure of self-employment based on whether the
respondent reports any positive income from a business during the reference period, which
is a subset of individuals reporting any hours worked as part of their business. We construct
a similar measure for whether the respondent is working a wage and salary job based on
whether they report positive usual hours worked during the quarter. We also test whether
7Self-employment rates are much higher among older workers. See Karoly and Zissimopoulos (2007)
and Bruce et al. (2000) for evidence on self-employment and partial retirement.
818% of married women with no children in our data have income that falls within the EITC-eligible
range. Around half of them have 0 family earnings.
9We also conducted our analysis on single mothers, women with no children under 19 at home, and
married fathers. Results are shown in Table 3.7.
10Results are not sensitive to this restriction.
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married women are more likely to work in both self-employment and wage and salary em-
ployment as a function of EITC generosity to understand whether the EITC encourages
women to combine types of employment. In addition, we examine the impact of the EITC
on quarterly transitions between non-employment, self-employment and wage and salary
employment to examine how the credit influences the gross flows of workers between em-
ployment types. Finally, we also measure the effect of the EITC on self-employment and
wage and salary employment by analyzing the number of hours worked and earnings in
self-employment and wage and salary employment as a function of EITC generosity.11
3.3.2 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to examine how the propensity to work in self-employment is affected by
changes in EITC benefits. To estimate this effect, however, we cannot simply regress self-
employment behavior on own EITC benefits. Because EITC benefits are determined by
family size and family income, working in self-employment is likely to be endogenous
to own EITC benefits. Families with higher EITC benefits also have lower incomes than
those who are not eligible for the EITC. These individuals may also be less likely to work
in self-employment for reasons that are unrelated to their EITC benefits.12
To overcome this endogeneity problem, we employ a simulated instruments method,
capturing changes in the EITC that are due to policy changes at the federal and state level
and unrelated to potentially endogenous decisions within the household. This is similar to
the approach used by Hoynes and Patel (2015), who simulate the impact of policy-induced
increases in the EITC on employment and income.13 This approach is also similar to a
difference-in-differences methodology, but allows us to capture several policy changes over
time. Further, since states implement EITCs of varying degree of generosity, this method
also allows us to incorporate variation in the generosity of the treatment over time.
To construct our simulated measure of EITC generosity, we use the National Bureau
of Economic Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM model to generate the average household EITC
for each state in each year for a nationally-representative sample of married filers. We
then match this state-year measure of the average EITC to our sample of married mothers
11The effect of the EITC on the number of hours worked and on earnings includes both an intensive margin
effect (changes in hours or earnings among those already working that employment type) and an extensive
margin effect.
12Self-employment rates are higher among women with wealthier husbands suggesting a positive relation-
ship between family income and women’s self-employment (Bruce (1999)). Self-employment also has been
shown to pay less suggesting a negative correlation between family income and self-employment (See e.g.
Hamilton (2000), Hurst and Pugsley (2014)).
13 This method has also been used in the Medicaid literature (Currie and Gruber (1996), Cohodes et al.
(2014)), as well as in the case of education tax credits (Bulman and Hoxby (2015)).
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by their year and state of residence. Our average EITC benefit represents the combined
federal and state EITCs for each state-year combination.
We use a nationally-representative sample rather than using characteristics from a state
level population to avoid any policy endogeneity arising from states changing their EITC
policies in response to different concentrations of EITC-eligible households. To construct
the nationally-representative sample of households, we take the sample of married respon-
dents with children in the 1997 year of the SIPP survey, as this is the first full calendar year
of data from the 1996 SIPP. We then replicate this sample for each year, adjusting nominal
income levels using the Consumer Price Index. This avoids concerns that changes in EITC
generosity over time reflect changes in the national income distribution over time.
Variation in our measure of average EITC benefit reflects only EITC policy variation
across states in a given year and within states over time, eliminating variation due to en-
dogenous household decisions about geographic location, household size, or household in-
come in relation to the outcomes of interest. The variation in our measure comes from both
state level and federal level variation in the EITC. We use variation generated by changes
in state EITC policies over time, both in the timing of implementation and in the generosity
of the state credits. Our specification includes year fixed effects, which account for aver-
age level changes in the EITC from federal EITC legislation. However, federal changes
to the EITC automatically impact state level EITC values because they are structured as
a percentage of the federal EITC. The differential impact of federal changes across states
is variation we use to identify the effect of the EITC on self-employment decisions. Be-
tween 1990 and 2012, the federal EITC was expanded several times.14 In the early 1990s,
the EITC was drastically expanded for households with at least two children. In the early
2000s, the plateau region was expanded multiple times for married couples, allowing mar-
ried filers with higher earnings than single and head of household filers to be eligible for the
EITC. Additionally beginning in 2008, families with three or more children were eligible
for a higher EITC than families with two children.
This approach has several advantages over other identification strategies. Using one’s
own EITC includes both variation in the benefits that is driven by policy changes, which
is the variation of interest, and variation due to other household decisions that may be
endogenous to the outcomes of interest, such as changes in employment or family structure
over the course of the year. Using the maximum potential credit value in a given state and
year eliminates concerns of endogeneity of own eligibility to the outcomes of interest, but
not all families are eligible for the maximum credits so this measure might not be relevant
to most of the EITC-eligible population.
14See Falk (2014) for a history of the federal and state EITCs.
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Figure 3.2 shows how our average EITC measure changed over this time period. The
average simulated household tax credit increased over this time period from $275 in 1990
to $960 in 2012. Due to the variation in when states began implementing EITCs, there was
also significant cross-sectional variation in the average household EITC across states over
this time period. Figure 3.3 illustrates this variation, with each observation representing a
different state-year combination. In any given year, the variation in the average simulated
household tax credit between the most generous and least generous state was about $300.
We model the impact of an increase in average household EITC benefits in a state and
year on the self-employment patterns of married women using the following form:
Yijt = β0 +β1(avgbenst)+β2(Eligi)+β3(avgbenst∗Eligi)+β4Xist+β5Zst+δs+γt+ist
where i indexes individuals, s indexes states, and t indexes years. Yist is the outcome
of interest. These outcomes include an indicator for whether an individual has any self-
employment hours, any wage and salary hours, neither, or both. We also examine self-
employment earnings, the number of hours worked in self-employment and wage and
salary employment per week, and transitions between employment types. We model out-
comes as a function of the average EITC benefits in thousands of dollars, as measured by
our simulated instrument, in a state and year (avgbenst). We construct a measure of EITC-
eligibility (Eligi) using family income and the number of children living in the household
during the first year of the SIPP survey. Our coefficient of interest, β3, represents the effect
of an increase in the value of the average EITC in a state and year for EITC-eligible house-
holds relative to non-eligible households on outcome Yist. Our specification includes year
fixed effects, which will absorb the average effect of federal changes in EITC legislation.
Our coefficient of interest, β3, is identified from variation within states over time, as well
as cross-state policy differences in EITC generosity at a single point in time.
By allowing state EITC generosity to have a differential impact on the EITC population
compared to the non-eligible population, we control for any other policies or events occur-
ring at the same time as EITC implementation that may also affect the self-employment
patterns within each state. Further, we allow EITC-eligible married women to have differ-
ent employment levels than ineligible women by controlling for EITC-eligibility alone. The
interaction of these two terms therefore captures the effect of state EITC policy changes on
the working patterns of the EITC-eligible population relative to the non-eligible population.
Our identifying assumptions are that there are no other state policies or factors that
differentially impact self-employment behavior by EITC eligibility status that change at
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the same time as changes in the EITC and that eligible and ineligible women would have
similar trends in the dependent variables in the absence of EITC changes. We provide
some evidence that state level EITC changes were not related to other state policies or eco-
nomic conditions in Appendix Table D.2. We find evidence that states with more generous
EITCs spend more on welfare and higher education. When we limit the sample to only
states that ever implement EITCs (but including all pre-EITC years), we still find a pos-
itive association between state EITC generosity and spending on welfare. We also find a
positive correlation between state EITC generosity and state GDP, suggesting that states
with larger economies have more generous EITCs. To reduce concerns that these state
policies and economic conditions are confounding our results, we include controls for state
level measures of the minimum wage, unemployment rates and the top marginal tax rate.
Additionally, interpreting the estimate as the impact of increases in EITC generosity re-
quires that our control group be unaffected by EITC increases. To the extent that married
women who have incomes during the first year of the survey that make them ineligible for
the EITC are also affected by the policy (or become eligible in subsequent years15), our
estimates would be biased towards zero.
We also include a vector of individual demographic characteristics of the wife including
her age, race, education level, and number of children living in the household; a vector of
state-by-year level characteristics such as state unemployment rates, and the state minimum
wage; state, year, and month of interview fixed effects; and state specific linear time trends.
State fixed effects control for time-invariant differences across states, such as political ide-
ology and industrial makeup that may affect self-employment rates in a given state. The
year fixed effects control for national economic conditions and, state specific time trends
control for differences across states in linear trends in our dependent variables. Controlling
for state-year unemployment rates and minimum wages accounts for other factors at the
state-year level that may be correlated with state EITC generosity that may also impact
self-employment rates.
Our main analysis focuses on married women with at least one child under 19 years
of age at the start of the survey.16 As previously mentioned, the sample excludes the first
calendar year of observations. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for our main sample
by EITC-eligibility based on family income in the first year of the SIPP panel. The average
EITC calculated based on a nationally representative sample of married women with chil-
15Approximately 11% of ineligible households in the first year of each SIPP panel become eligible for the
EITC in the following year. Among those eligible in the first year of each SIPPP panel, 72% are eligible in
the following year, and 66% are eligible two years later.
16Women may divorce in later years, but we control for marital status in our analysis.
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dren is around $760.17 The average credit is slightly higher for the EITC eligible sample,
likely reflecting that more generous states have higher percentages of their population that
are EITC eligible. Around 8 percent of married mothers have positive self-employment
hours and 65 percent have positive wage and salary hours. Women who are not EITC eligi-
ble are more likely to be employed than women who are EITC eligible. Overall, roughly a
third of the sample have a high school diploma or less, a third have some college experience
and a third have a bachelor’s degree. The EITC eligible population is much less educated
than the ineligible population; around 60 percent of individuals have no more than a high
school diploma. Around one in four households are considered EITC eligible; nearly three-
quarters of those eligible have family income that places them on the phase-out region of
the EITC benefit schedule.
3.4 Results
Our main results show that increases in state level EITC generosity between 1990 and
2012 raised the proportion of individuals working in self-employment relative to wage and
salary employment, as shown in Table 3.2. The average difference between the highest
value of our EITC measure and the lowest value within a state during this time period is
$690. This implies that, in that average state, increases in the EITC over our sample period
increased self-employment rates by 4 percentage points or 52 percent.18 Although not
directly comparable, this estimate is similar in magnitude to the effect found in LaLumia
(2009), who finds a 4 percentage point increase in self-employment rates among married
filers during the expansion of the federal EITC between 1994 and 1998.19
The same policy-induced increase in the EITC leads to a decline in the share of wage
and salary employed individuals by 2 percentage points or 3 percent although this estimate
is not statistically significant. We do find a statistically significant increase of around 1
percentage point in the fraction of women reporting both positive self-employment and
positive wage and salary employment hours. This result suggests that some women are
simultaneously combining self-employment with wage and salary employment. However,
the much larger estimated 4 percentage point effect on any self-employment hours indicates
that many women are in fact switching between employment types rather than combining
17All figures are in 2011 dollars.
18Our point estimate of 0.062 is for a $1000 increase in average ETIC so scaling the effect by 0.690 gives
us the effect of the $690 increase.
19LaLumia’s analysis compared married couples with children to married couples without children. Our
analysis focuses on women only and our control group includes childless married women as well as higher-
income married women.
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both wage and salary employment and self-employment at the same time.
We do not find evidence that higher levels of the EITC discourage work among married
mothers as in Eissa and Hoynes (2004). There are several key differences between our anal-
yses. First their empirical strategy uses a different sample restriction and measure of EITC
eligibility, both of which we will explore further below. Second, they focus on a different
time period 1989-1996 and use federal level variation in the EITC. Finally, their measure
for employment is whether the woman is employed at all during the previous calendar year
excluding households who receive most of their income from self-employment, while we
are looking at any type of employment at a quarterly frequency.
In Table 3.3, we examine quarterly transitions into and out of self-employment to in-
vestigate how the EITC impacts the gross flows of workers across employment types. We
find that increased EITC generosity increased both inflows to and outflows from self-
employment, but it increased inflows by more. These results suggest that the EITC en-
couraged more married women to try self-employment. In Appendix Table D.3 we show
quarterly transitions between wage and salary employment, self-employment and non-
employment. We find evidence that the EITC increases transitions from both non-employment
and wage and salary employment to self-employment, with a relatively stronger effect com-
ing from non-employment. The point estimates suggest that the EITC also increased transi-
tions out of self-employment to both wage and salary and non-employment although these
effects are not statistically different from zero. These findings suggest that increases in the
EITC increase transitions into and out of self-employment, and that a large fraction of the
newly self-employed are coming from non-employment.
In Table 3.4, we show the effect of EITC generosity on self-employment earnings and
the number of hours worked. We find no statistically significant impact of the EITC on
the level of self-employment earnings, but we do find a significant increase in the number
of self-employment hours as a function of EITC generosity. Our estimates indicate that
the increase in the average EITC over our time period increased the hours spent in self-
employment by about 1.2 hours per week. We estimate a negative effect of the EITC on
the number of wage and salary hours worked, however, it is not statistically different from
zero.
We would expect to find different labor supply responses to expansions of the EITC
depending on where households lie on the EITC benefit structure. Individuals in the phase-
in region have an incentive to increase the number of hours worked when the EITC becomes
more generous because each additional dollar of earnings is associated with a larger EITC.
Individuals in the phase-out region may have an incentive to decrease the number of hours
worked, as each additional dollar of earnings is associated with a lower EITC benefit. For
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the phase-in region, each dollar of earnings is associated with 34-45 cents in additional
EITC benefits depending on the number of children in the household, while benefits phase
out at a rate of 21 cents for each dollar of earnings beyond the plateau. Individuals in the
plateau region have neither an incentive nor disincentive to change the number of hours
worked, as small changes in earnings result in no change in EITC benefits.
Using household income from the first year of the survey, we characterize households
as being located in one of these three regions. We acknowledge that households may in-
tentionally ‘bunch’ at one of these kink points in order to maximize their EITC benefits, so
these results should be interpreted in light of potential endogeneity of household position-
ing on the EITC benefit structure with respect to self-employment. Table 3.5 shows our re-
sults interacting region on the EITC benefit schedule with our instrument. We find evidence
that increases in the EITC lead to increases in self-employment particularly among individ-
uals in the phase-in and plateau regions. These individuals are precisely those who have the
most to gain (or the least to lose) in EITC benefits from increasing their work effort. How-
ever, we also find positive but insignificant increases in self-employment among married
mothers on the plateau and phase-out portions of the EITC schedule. An increase in self-
employment behavior does not necessarily represent an increase in labor supply because
many self-employed women work relatively few hours per week. In addition to the differing
incentives across the regions of the EITC schedule, EITC expansions increase household
income, which could allow women the financial ability to become self-employed. The re-
sults for wage and salary hours are not precisely estimated, but suggest that increases in
the EITC encourages wage and salary employment for married women in the phase-in re-
gion of the credit and discourage it for women in the phase-out region. These results are
consistent with the incentive structure of the EITC.
Finally, we examine the effect of the EITC on the employment decisions of married
fathers, single mothers, and childless married women. In Table 3.6, we show that the EITC
increases the fraction of married fathers reporting positive self-employment hours, but that
most of this effect arises from men working in both wage and salary and self-employment.
We estimate that the increase in ETIC generosity from 1990 to 2012 led to a 5 percentage
point or 30% increase in the fraction of married fathers with positive self-employment
hours. These results suggest that expansions in the EITC encouraged fathers to increase
their labor supply by becoming self-employed in addition to working in wage and salary
employment. We find that the EITC encourages wage and salary employment among single
mothers, which is a well-established result in the literature (e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996),
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Hoynes and Patel (2015)). However, we see an imprecisely
estimated small positive effect on self-employment. Finally, our estimates suggest a larger
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EITC encourages married women with no children under 19 years of age at home to become
self-employed and discourages them from working. Households without children at home
are only eligible for the EITC if they have very low earnings and the credit amount is small
so these estimates arise from a very selected group.
3.5 Robustness
Our main results in Table 3.2 are not sensitive to the inclusion of state and year fixed effects
or state-specific time trends as shown in Appendix Table D.4.20 Given our implicit triple-
difference strategy comparing differences between eligible and ineligible women across
states over time, this is not entirely surprising. We do find that the coefficient on the effect
of EITC generosity is sensitive to the fixed effects included in the models, which reveals
some patterns about the types of states that have more generous EITC benefits. For in-
stance, with no state fixed effects in the model, we find a negative association between
EITC generosity and self-employment, implying that more generous states tend to have
lower self-employment rates. After including year fixed effects, we still find a negative
relationship between EITC generosity and self-employment, although it is attenuated and
no longer statistically significant. Once controlling for state fixed effects, the relationship
flips and states that increase their EITCs have higher self-employment rates. EITC eligi-
ble individuals have lower self-employment rates relative to ineligible individuals, but this
difference does not depend on the fixed effect controls. Including state-specific linear time
trends does little to change the coefficients on the terms of interest, but an F-test of their
joint significance rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients are zero. This suggests
that the state-specific linear time trends do improve the fit of the models.
The SIPP imputes data for individuals who do not answer certain questions. As shown
in Appendix Table D.5 our results are not sensitive to excluding the 9.5% of individuals
with imputed wage and salary or self-employment earnings.21
We also investigate an alternative definition of self-employment: positive business earn-
ings, as shown in Appendix Table D.6. Around 65 percent of individuals with positive self-
employment hours report positive business earnings. Appendix Table D.6 shows that the
$690 increase in EITC generosity led to a 2.5 percentage point increase in the proportion of
women reporting positive business income. The percent change for these results is similar
20See Wolfers (2006)) and Meer and West (2013) for a discussion of how including linear time trends
can produce misleading results and Heckman and Hotz (1989)) for a discussion how leaving our linear time
trends can also be problematic.
21We exclude all imputed observations even if they were imputed from the respondents’ answer during a
previous SIPP wave, which are likely to be more accurate than other types of imputations.
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to using the positive hours self-employment definition, suggesting that the marginally self-
employed are not necessarily the self-employed with zero business earnings. Across both
measures, we find suggestive evidence that increases in the EITC increase the likelihood of
having both self-employment hours and earnings among married mothers.
3.6 Alternative Specifications
3.6.1 Comparison to Difference in Differences
Our empirical strategy identifies EITC eligible individuals according to the EITC schedule
using the number of children and the household’s income from their first calendar year in
the SIPP. Households are considered EITC eligible if their 1st year income places them
within the EITC schedule given their number of children. This approach differs from pre-
vious papers that have used a difference in difference approach comparing, for example,
married women with children to married childless women. In order to compare the two
strategies, we re-do our analysis using our measure of EITC eligibility on a sample of
married women with and without children and compare it to the difference in difference
specification that compares married women with children to married women without. Fol-
lowing Eissa and Hoynes (2004) we focus on a sample of married women with low levels
of education and only include women with no more than a high school education in our
sample.22
The key difference between these approaches is how the treated and control groups are
defined. Using our measure, treated individuals will include very low-income childless
women and relatively lower income women with kids, while the control group will include
higher income childless women and higher income women with children. The difference
in difference treated group will be married women with children and the control group in-
cludes childless married women. Table 3.7 compares the results across 5 different control
and treatment groups. Column 1 uses our simulated instrument to determine EITC eligibil-
ity and estimates the effect on married women with kids subject to the sample restriction of
12 or fewer years of education. Column 2 again uses our simulated instrument, but includes
childless married women. The results from these two columns show that our main result on
self-employment is robust to including childless married women in our sample and restrict-
ing the sample to low educated individuals. Column 5 shows the difference in difference
results using childless married women as the control group and married women with chil-
22Their specification focuses on women with less than a high school education, but focusing on that group
makes our sample quite small. Additionally as the EITC expanded over time, more highly educated women
became eligible for it because the credit extended into higher income levels.
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dren as the treated group. These results show that the difference in difference specification
does not estimate a positive effect of the EITC on the self-employment behavior of married
women with children.
To better understand which changes to the treatment and control groups are driving
the differences in the result on positive self-employment hours, we estimate two additional
specifications. The first uses a very narrow definition of the control group; including only
income ineligible, childless women in the control group. The second uses a broad definition
of the control group and considers all childless women and income ineligible women with
children as the control group. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.7 show the results using the
narrow and broad definitions of the control groups. Both specifications have positive point
estimates for the effect of the EITC on self-employment, but the broad control group is
relatively closer to our main results.
In the second panel of Table 3.7 we show the same results, but for the outcome of wage
and salary employment. Comparing columns 1 and 2 shows that the inclusion of childless
married women in the sample makes a big difference in the estimated effect of the EITC
on wage and salary employment. These results suggest that EITC eligible married women
with children may have different responses to the EITC than married ETIC eligible women
without children. The estimates are quite similar between our eligibility measure in column
2 and the difference in difference estimator in column 5. In the final panel of Table 3.7,
we show the same specifications, but the outcome is overall employment. This outcome
is particularly sensitive to the specification and is the combination of what is happening in
self-employment and wage and salary employment.
Taken together these results suggest that income ineligible mothers respond to increases
in the EITC by decreasing their wage and salary employment, but they do not increase and
may even decrease their self-employment. While we consider these individuals ineligible
for the EITC, and therefore part of the control group in our analysis, increases in the EITC
do lead to a further bowed out budget constraint, which could cause some households above
the phase-out threshold to improve their welfare by reducing labor supply in response to
the larger credit. While this could motivate an overall reduction in labor supply among
these women, the differences between columns 4 and 5 might be too large to reasonably
suspect that this is the only explanation. In contrast, childless married women who are
EITC eligible, according to their 1st year SIPP income, respond to EITC increases by re-
ducing their wage and salary employment and increasing their self-employment. Childless
married women are only eligible for the EITC if their household income is very low and
the credit they are eligible for is at most around $500 making this large estimated response
to changes in the EITC puzzling. Around 4% of childless married women have at least one
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child in the following years of the SIPP panel so some of the effect could be coming from
higher realized future EITC amounts.
We believe that our measure may do a better job of identifying EITC eligible families
than the difference in difference specification. In the less educated sample, our measure
categorizes around 35% of the women as EITC eligible, while the difference in differ-
ence strategy would consider 65% of the women EITC eligible. Among married women
with children, who are all EITC eligible under the difference in difference specification,
our measure characterizes only 46% of them as EITC eligible. Income ineligible married
women with children have average family incomes of nearly $70,000. When we compare
our results to Eissa and Hoynes (2004), we are able to replicate their negative finding on
wage and salary employment using a similar sample in both our main specification and their
difference in difference specification (columns 2 and 5). However, the two methodologies
yield different results for the impact of the EITC on self-employment. Further investigation
of the responses of married mothers with income above the phase-out threshold would be
useful to confirm and explore differences in their employment behavior relative to married
mothers with household incomes located within the EITC schedule.
3.6.2 Reduced Form Specification
Finally, we look at the reduced form effect of EITC generosity on self-employment rates
among married mothers. The specification does not use our measure of EITC eligibility
so the results can be interpreted as the effect of increases in the average EITC on self-
employment rates. Table 3.8 shows the results for married women with children and mar-
ried men with children. The estimates for married mothers remain positive and statistically
significant, but are larger than our main estimates from Table 3.2. The reduced form esti-
mates for fathers are not similar to our main specification from Table 3.6. The reduced form
estimates are a combination of the impact of higher levels of the EITC on both eligible and
ineligible individuals, and therefore are a combination of the average EITC coefficient and
the interaction coefficient in our main specifications. As can be seen from Tables 3.2 and
3.6, ineligible married mothers have higher self-employment rates when there are higher
average EITC levels while ineligible married fathers have lower self-employment rates in
states and years with higher average ETIC levels. The point estimate on the average EITC
from our main specifications is more sensitive to SIPP imputations (Appendix Table D.5)
and the inclusion of fixed effects in the model (Appendix Table D.4). The comparison of
the reduced form estimates to our main estimates suggests that our strategy of compar-
ing ineligible individuals to eligible individuals may be controlling for important changes
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in self-employment behavior that are not being fully captured by the fixed effects in the
model.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the relationship between the EITC and self-employment among
married mothers. Our main results find that increases in EITC generosity between 1990
and 2012 resulted in around a 4 percentage point increase in self-employment rates among
married mothers. As a small share of the total labor force is self-employed, these effects
represents a relatively large increase in self-employment behavior.
These findings corroborate previous work indicating an increase in reporting of self-
employment earnings associated with the EITC by showing an increase in work effort as
well (LaLumia (2009)). This is in contrast to the findings in Kuka (2013), who estimates
much smaller increases in self-employment behavior when using survey data. The author
focuses on unmarried individuals, who in our sample are far less likely to be self-employed
perhaps making it more difficult to find a precise estimate using survey data. Indeed, in
our own analysis of single mothers, we find no significant increase in self-employment
among those eligible for the EITC as a function of EITC generosity. Our analysis also
differs from previous work in that we are able to measure self-employment patterns at a
more frequent interval (quarterly) than that in annual datasets. Because self-employment
transitions are relatively common, assessing employment at the annual level may be too
crude a measurement for capturing short spells in self-employment.
Our paper provides evidence that the EITC encourages self-employment among mar-
ried women with children. Future work should focus on further distinguishing between
the tax evasion motivation and the income effect. If the credit induces women to become
self-employed to avoid taxes and better maximize their credit that would provide further
evidence that the EITC distorts labor supply. However, if it is the increase in income that
allows women to pursue self-employment, then these results might suggest the presence of
credit constraints.
Finally, our analysis uses a different source of exogenous variation in EITC generosity
and a different empirical strategy than previous work on the ETIC, self-employment and
married women’s labor supply, and we find somewhat different results. LaLumia (2009),
Kuka (2013), and Eissa and Hoynes (2004) all utilize federal variation in the EITC from
the early 1990s, with different associated treatment and control groups. While this paper
has speculated on some of the differences between various empirical strategies for estimat-
ing the effect of the EITC on employment behavior, we leave it to future work to more
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deeply investigate the underlying reasons for the mixed evidence on the EITC and married
women’s employment.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: 2014 EITC Benefit Structure by Number of Children
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Figure 3.2: Average Household EITC by Year; Simulated Instrument
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
Av
er
ag
e 
EI
TC
 (2
01
1$
)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Tax Year
Figure 3.3: Average Household EITC by State and Year; Simulated Instrument
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by EITC-eligibility
All EITC-eligible
Not EITC-
eligible
Average EITC-simulated instrument (2011$) 761.80 772.14 757.82
Fraction of Sample:
EITC-eligible 0.28 1.00 0.00
On Phase-in or Plateau 0.09 0.30 0.00
On Phase-out 0.19 0.70 0.00
Self-Employed: Positive Hours 0.083 0.065 0.090
Self-Employed: Positive Earnings 0.048 0.034 0.053
Wage and Salary Employed: Positive Hours 0.654 0.496 0.714
Both Self-Employed and Wage and Salary Employed: Positive 
Hours 0.024 0.015 0.027
High School or Less 0.36 0.60 0.27
Some College 0.34 0.30 0.35
College Degree 0.30 0.10 0.38
Monthly Self-Employment Earnings (2011$) 107.17 45.78 130.55
Weekly Self-Employment Hours 1.60 1.14 1.77
Weekly Wage and Salary Hours 23.62 17.12 26.10
Number of Children Under 19 2.0 2.1 1.9
Number of Person-Quarter Observations 261,781  70,555    191,226  
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 years of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their 
first year in the SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP.  Observations 
exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted using 
monthly weights.
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Table 3.2: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Different Employment Types: Married
Mothers
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Both Self-
Employed and 
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Working
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 0.079** 0.048 0.028 0.098
(0.036) (0.124) (0.03) (0.133)
EITC-eligible2 -0.055*** -0.144*** -0.016*** -0.183***
(0.013) (0.032) (0.005) (0.029)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.062*** -0.029 0.016** 0.017
(0.017) (0.042) (0.006) (0.038)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.083 0.654 0.024 0.710
State Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X X
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first year in the 
SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP.  Individuals with negative earnings in their 
first year of the survey were dropped from the sample.  Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the 
reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  All regressions control 
for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal income tax rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally representative sample 
using TAXSIM.
2 Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the survey.  Households with no 
earned income are considered eligible for the EITC.
116
Table 3.3: Effect of Average EITC on Quarterly Transitions To and From Self-
Employment: Married Mothers
Transitions to Self-
Employment
Transitions From 
Self-Employment
Average EITC ($1,000s) 0.0203** -0.0063
(0.0070) (0.0133)
EITC-eligible -0.0079*** -0.0040**
(0.0021) (0.0019)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.0106*** 0.0050**
(0.0026) (0.0023)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0073 0.0075
State Fixed Effects X X
Year Fixed Effects X X
Month Fixed Effects X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781
Notes: Indicators for self-employment are dummy variables equal to one if the respondent 
reports positive hours of work in that type of employment, zero otherwise. Sample includes 
married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first 
year in the SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the 
SIPP.  Individuals with negative earnings in the first year were dropped from the sample. 
Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the reference month for 
the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  All 
regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal 
income tax rate.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
117
Table 3.4: Effect of Average EITC on Self-Employment Earnings and Hours Worked: Mar-
ried Mothers
Monthly Self-
Employment 
Earnings ($1,000s)
Self-Employment 
Hours
Wages and Salary 
Hours
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 238.92** 1.69 1.84
(110.67) (1.45) (4.56)
EITC-eligible2 -46.70 -1.51*** -5.965***
(33.95) (0.53) (1.36)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 4.48 1.72** -1.53
(40.19) (0.66) (1.70)
Mean of Dependent Variable 98.00 1.74 35.52
State Fixed Effects X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781 261,781
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first 
year in the SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP.  Individuals with 
negative earnings in the first year were dropped from the sample. Observations exclude the first calendar year of data 
and only include the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered at the 
state level.  All regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal income tax 
rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally 
representative sample using TAXSIM.
2 Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the survey.  Households 
with no earned income are considered eligible for the EITC.
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Table 3.5: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Different Employment Types by EITC
Region: Married Mothers
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Both Self-
Employed and 
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Working
Average EITC ($1,000s) 0.087*** 0.047 0.031 0.104
(0.036) (0.125) (0.029) (0.136)
Phase in -0.049 -0.243*** -0.027** -0.265***
(0.032) (0.047) (0.011) (0.051)
Average EITC*Phase in 0.086** 0.081 0.033** 0.135*
(0.042) (0.059) (0.016) (0.067)
Plateau -0.123** -0.131 -0.025** -0.229***
(0.049) (0.079) (0.012) (0.082)
Average EITC*Plateau 0.157** -0.030 0.033* 0.095
(0.070) (0.095) (0.017) (0.100)
Phase-out -0.028* -0.042 -0.005 -0.064*
(0.016) (0.041) (0.007) (0.036)
Average EITC*Phase out 0.025 -0.086 0.002 -0.063
(0.021) (0.052) (0.009) (0.045)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.083 0.654 0.024 0.710
State Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X X
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first year in the 
SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP.  Individuals with negative earnings in their 
first year of the survey were dropped from the sample.  Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the 
reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  All regressions control for 
the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal income tax rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally representative sample 
using TAXSIM.
2 Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the survey.  Households with no 
earned income are considered eligible for the EITC.
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Table 3.6: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Different Employment Types: Married
Fathers, Married Childless Women, and Single Mothers
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Both Self-
Employed and 
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Working
Married Fathers
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 -0.189* -0.031 -0.102 -0.117**
(0.106) (0.061) (0.061) (0.051)
EITC-eligible2 -0.045 -0.156*** -0.058*** -0.143***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.011) (0.019)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.077** 0.034 0.067*** 0.044*
(0.034) (0.037) (0.015) (0.024)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.162 0.824 0.049 0.937
Number of Observations 244,933 244,933 244,933 244,933
Single Mothers
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 -0.073 0.093 -0.046 0.066
(0.078) (0.212) (0.034) (0.177)
EITC-eligible2 -0.013 -0.172*** -0.013* -0.172***
(0.014) (0.040) (0.008) (0.038)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.026 0.111** 0.013 0.123***
(0.017) (0.047) (0.009) (0.045)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.042 0.693 0.014 0.721
Number of Observations 127,546 127,546 127,546 127,546
Childless Married Women
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 0.059 -0.106 -0.012 -0.034
(0.072) (0.167) (0.042) (0.173)
EITC-eligible2 -0.064*** -0.021 -0.02 -0.064
(0.023) (0.056) (0.042) (0.053)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.090*** -0.138* 0.023 -0.071
(0.030) (0.069) (0.017) (0.061)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.080 0.709 0.024 0.775
Number of Observations 145,120 145,120 145,120 145,120
State Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X X
Notes: Sample includes individuals 18-55 of age.  Married fathers and single mothers have at least one child under 19 living with 
them during their first year in the SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP.  
Individuals with negative earnings in their first year of the survey were dropped from the sample.  Observations exclude the first 
calendar year of data and only include the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered 
at the state level.  All regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal income tax rate. 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally representative sample 
using TAXSIM.
2 Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the survey.  Households with no 
earned income are considered eligible for the EITC.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Self-Employment: Married Women
with 12 or Fewer Years Education; Comparing Different Control Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Simulated 
Instrument-
Married 
Women with 
Kids
Simulated 
Instrument-
Married 
Women
Narrow Broad Diff in Diff
EITC Eligibility Group
Income Ineligible; Childless Excluded Control Control Control Control
Income Eligible; Childless Excluded Treated Treated Control Control
Income Ineligible: With Children Control Control Treated Control Treated
Income Eligible; With Children Treated Treated Treated Treated Treated
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 0.004 0.030 0.031 0.044 0.052
(0.082) (0.060) (0.065) (0.060) (0.062)
EITC-eligible2 -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.026 -0.055*** -0.004
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.071** 0.079*** 0.033 0.055** -0.001
(0.028) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 -0.070 -0.077 -0.043 -0.095 -0.088
(0.151) (0.138) (0.141) (0.136) (0.147)
EITC-eligible2 -0.179*** -0.115*** 0.052 -0.142*** 0.084***
(0.044) (0.025) (0.032) (0.034) (0.028)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.000 -0.089*** -0.186*** -0.013 -0.0814**
(0.057) (0.030) (0.040) (0.044) (0.038)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593 0.593
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 -0.108 -0.086 -0.051 -0.092 -0.078
(0.144) (0.138) (0.136) (0.134) (0.144)
EITC-eligible2 -0.228*** -0.168*** -0.031 -0.184*** 0.0824***
(0.037) (0.020) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.054 -0.022 -0.153*** 0.031 -0.080**
(0.050) (0.027) (0,040) (0.043) (0.038)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644
State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X X X
Number of Observations 102,178 157,555 157,555 157,555 157,555
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 of age who have a high school education or less.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 
2008 panels of the SIPP.  Individuals with negative earnings in their first year of the survey were dropped from the sample. Observations exclude the 
first calendar year of data and only include the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered at the state 
level.  All regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal income tax rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally representative sample using TAXSIM.
2 Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the survey.  Households with no earned income are 
considered eligible for the EITC.
Dependent Variable: Self-Employed (Hours)
Dependent Variable: Working
Dependent Variable: Wage and Salary Employment (Hours)
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Table 3.8: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Different Employment Types: Married
Mothers; Reduced Form Specification
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Self-Employed 
(Earnings)
Wage & 
Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Both Self-
Employed and 
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Working
Married Mothers:
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 0.092** 0.093*** 0.014 0.031 0.075
(0.038) (0.028) (0.116) (0.029) (0.125)
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781
Married Fathers:
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 -0.170 -0.024 -0.041 -0.088 -0.122**
(0.103) (0.072) (0.064) (0.061) (0.061)
Number of Observations 244,933 244,933 244,933 244,933 244,933
State Fixed Effects X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X X X
Notes: Sample includes married individuals 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first year in the SIPP.  Data 
come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP. Individuals with negative earnings in their first year of the survey were 
dropped from the sample.  Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are 
weighted and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  All regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state 
marginal income tax rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally representative sample using TAXSIM.
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Table A.1: Top Occupations Among Self-Employed Women Over Time
All Women
1980 1990 2000 2012
Share Share Share Share
Managers 10.4 Childcare Worker 12.5 Childcare Workers 11.8 Childcare Workers 7.7
Hairdressers 9.3 Hairdresser 7.1 Hairdressers 6.6 Hairdressers 6.5
Sales Supervisors 7.5 Sales Supervisor 5.7 Housekeepers 5.7 Housekeepers 4.9
Childcare Workers 6.4 Managers 4.5 Sales Supervisors 4.5 Real Estate Agents 4.8
Farmers 5.8 Bookkeepers 4.3 Real Estate Agents 3.4 Secretaries 4.1
Bookkeepers 5.3 Farmers 4.0 Bookkeepers 3.1 Sales Supervisor 4.0
Real Estate Agents 3.8 Real Estate Agents 4.0 Salesperson 2.9 Bookkeepers 3.1
Secretaries 3.5 Secretaries 3.1 Secretaries 2.7 Managers 2.7
Other Teachers 3.4 Salesperson 2.7 Farmers/Ranchers 2.7 Designers 2.5
Salesperson 3.1 Designers 2.5 Designers 2.4 Other Teachers 2.5
Door to Door Sales 2.6 Janitors 2.5 Other Teachers 2.0 Salesperson 2.2
Designers 2.0 Other Teachers 2.2 Accountants 1.6 Accountants 2.0
63.1 55.1 49.5 46.9
Women with Bachelor’s Degree
1980 1990 2000 2012
Share Share Share Share
Other Teachers 8.8 Managers 5.6 Lawyers 4.7 Real Estate Agents 5.4
Physicians 8.3 Other Teachers 5.3 Other Teachers 4.4 Other Teachers 4.9
Managers 6.9 Real Estate Agents 5.1 Designers 4.2 Designers 4.0
Lawyers 6.9 Sales Supervisors 5.1 Real Estate Agents 4.0 Accountants 4.0
Psychologists 5.3 Childcare Workers 4.4 Sales Supervisors 3.9 Lawyers 3.9
Sales Supervisors 4.3 Designers 4.3 Childcare Workers 3.9 Sales Supervisor 3.5
Artists 3.9 Lawyers 3.9 Accountants 3.7 Management Analysts 3.3
Real Estate Agents 3.8 Psychologists 3.6 Management Analysts 3.4 Physicians/Surgeons 3.2
Authors 3.6 Physicians 3.5 Psychologists 3.0 Managers 3.1
Designers 2.9 Artists 3.0 Physicians/Surgeons 2.9 Childcare Workers 3.1
Farmers 2.0 Accountants 2.9 Writers/Authors 2.6 Psychologists 2.7
Management Analysts 2.0 Bookkeepers 2.6 Salesperson 2.5 Secretaries 2.1
58.7 49.2 43.0 43.2
Notes: 1980, 1990, and 2000 data come from the Census 5% sample and 2012 data come from the ACS. Data were downloaded from IPUMS and
estimates include all self-employed women ages 18-65 and are weighted using person weights.
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Table A.2: Second Stage Parameters and Identifying Variation
Parameter Description Main Source of Identifying Variation
Utility Parameters
βws1
Marginal Utility Consumption Wage
and Salary Employment
Differences in wage and salary employment rates by similar
women with different earning spouses.
βse1
Marginal Utility Consumption
Self-Employment
Differences in self-employment rates by similar women with
different earning spouses.
βws2 Cost Wage and Salary Employment
Conditional on earnings; identified by the overall share of
women selecting wage and salary employment relative to
non-employment
βse2 Cost Self-Employment
Conditional on earnings; identified by the overall share of
women selecting self-employment relative to non-employment.
βws3
Cost Wage and Salary Employment
Associated with Youngest Child 0-5
Identified by differences in wage and salary employment rates
between similar women with a youngest child aged 0-5 and those
without a child under 10 years of age.
βse3
Cost Self-Employment Associated
with Youngest Child 0-5
Identified by differences in self-employment rates between
similar women with a youngest child aged 0-5 and those without
a child under 10 years of age.
βws4
Cost of Wage and Salary Employment
Associated with Youngest Child 6-9
Identified by differences in wage and salary employment rates
between similar women with a youngest child aged 6-9 and those
without a child under 10 years of age.
βse4
Cost of Self-Employment Associated
with Youngest Child 6-9
Identified by differences in self-employment rates between
similar women with a youngest child aged 6-9 and those without
a child under 10 years of age.
βse5 Entry Cost of Self-Employment Identified by fraction ever becoming self-employed.
β6 Linear Term Utility Children Identified by distribution of number of children
β7 Quadratic Term Utility Children Identified by distribution of number of children
ρ Measure of Variance of epsilon
Identified by extent to which observed decisions differ from
predictions from the model net of epsilon shocks.
Earnings Parameters
γ0 Intercept Identified by average earnings in data
γ1 Unemployment
Identified by differences in earnings of similar women in years
with different economic conditions
f(Dwst , D
se
t , D
ne
t )
Piece-wise Linear Terms for
Experience Levels
Identified by differences in earnings across similar women with
different experience levels
γ Education
Identified by average differences in earnings for women with
similar experience levels but different education
Type Specific Parameters
βk6 Linear Term Utility Children
Differences across types are identified by the distribution of the
number of children conditional on the opportunity cost of
children for that type.
βk7 Quadratic Term Utility Children
Differences across types are identified by the distribution of the
number of children conditional on the opportunity cost of
children for that type.
γk0 Earnings Intercept
Differences across types are identified by differences in average
earnings and choices persistent over time for an individual.
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Table A.3: Always Married Versus Divorced Individuals
Always Married Divorced
P-Value
Equality
Age 36.1 34.2 0.000
Age at Marriage 25.2 22.2 0.000
Number of Kids 1.9 1.9 0.621
High School or Less 43.0 54.6 0.000
Some College 22.5 25.8 0.081
Bachelor’s Degree 34.5 19.5 0.000
Person-Year Observations 23,851 19,077
N 1,035 979
Choices
Wage and Salary No Birth 63.0 61.3 0.000
Wage and Salary Birth 3.6 3.3 0.219
Self-Employment No Birth 6.2 5.5 0.003
Self-Employment Birth 0.4 0.4 0.611
Not Employed No Birth 23.2 25.3 0.000
Not Employed Birth 3.7 4.2 0.004
Notes: Column 2 shows summary statistics for the estimation sample, which includes women who are
always married. Column 3 shows the same statistics for women who divorce in the data for the years in
which they are married. Column 4 provides the p-value for a test of equality of means.
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Table A.4: Weekly Child Care Expenditures; Positive Payment and Weekly Amount
Marginal Effects Conditional
Variables Probability of Payment Expenditure (2000$)
Youngest Child 0-1 0.391** 50.63 **
[0.009] [1.526]
Youngest Child 2-5 0.397** 35.69 **
[0.008] [1.292]
2 Children −0.038** 15.20 **
[0.007] [1.004]
3 Children −0.113** 8.53 **
[0.009] [1.647]
4+ Children −0.153** 8.36 **
[0.012] [2.166]
Self-Employed −0.252** −5.86 *
[0.011] [2.601]
Mother’s Age 0.029** 4.44 **
[0.004] [0.662]
Mother’s Age Squared -4E-4** −0.05 **
[6E-5] [0.010]
Some College 0.045** 7.39 **
[0.008] [0.010]
Bachelor’s Degree 0.128** 24.50 **
[0.008] [1.264]
Year Since 1985 −0.006** 1.75 **
[0.001] [0.092]
Constant −68.04 **
[10.618]
N 42,463 16,923
R2 0.156
Notes: Column 1 shows the marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the inde-
pendent variables from a probit where the dependent variable is an indicator for positive
child care expenditures. The dependent variable in column 2 is the total weekly expendi-
ture on child care services. Data are from SIPP panels 1984-2008. The sample includes
employed married women living with at least one child under 10. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level and *p<0.05, **p<0.01
127
Table A.5: Husband’s Log Income (2000$); Predicted by Wife’s Characteris-
tics
Estimate Standard Error
Linear Spline in Age
18-24 0.070* [0.012]
25-29 0.032* [0.006]
30-34 0.016* [0.006]
35-39 0.017* [0.006]
40 Plus 0.002 [0.004]
Linear Spline in Age X College Educated
18-24 −0.045 [0.037]
25-29 0.038* [0.015]
30-34 0.021* [0.010]
35-39 −0.006 [0.010]
40 Plus 0.011* [0.006]
Unemployment Rate −0.029* [0.005]
Person-Year Observations 13,865
R2 0.59
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of husband’s annual earnings; independent variables
are characteristics of the wife. Regressions include individual fixed effects. Sample
includes women from the NLSY79 who are never observed to be divorced during the
sample period. Only estimation years are included in the regression and standard errors
are clustered at the individual level. *p<0.05
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Table A.6: Log Earnings Residuals by Children and Employ-
ment Type
Residuals (Data-Predicted)
Youngest Child 0-5
−0.162*
[0.027]
Youngest Child 6-9
−0.160*
[0.025]
Youngest Child 0-5 −0.174
*Self-Employed [0.123]
Youngest Child 6-9 0.024
*Self-Employed [0.133]
Self-Employed
0.068
[0.101]
Notes: Regression to investigate systematic mis-predictions of earn-
ings by presence of youngest child and employment type. I regress
indicators for having a youngest child in each age category and in-
teractions with self-employment status on the residuals from the log
earnings predictions from the model. Standard errors are clustered at
the individual level.
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Table A.7: Fraction of Workers with Schedule Flexibility by Broad Occupation Group
Fraction With Fraction of Workers
Occupation Group Schedule Flexibility in Occupation
Wage & Self- Wage & Self-
Salary Emp. Salary Emp.
Forestry, Fisher, Hunter/Trapper 37 34 0.1 0.5
Social, Recreation and Religious Workers 35 69 0.9 0.4
Mathematical/Computer Scientists, Nat Scientists 34 54 1.2 0.8
Lawyers and Judges 32 41 0.5 2.0
Writers, Artists, Entertainers and Athletes 28 51 1.2 4.9
Postsecondary Teachers 28 . 0.7 0.0
Non-Retail Sales 26 42 4.2 13.1
Social Scientists 23 62 0.3 0.6
Executive, Administrative and Managerial 22 42 9.3 14.2
Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors 22 70 1.9 0.7
Farmers-Related Agricultural 21 55 1.9 11.8
Technologists-Non-Health 21 51 2.2 0.8
Management Related 18 47 3.6 2.3
Retail Sales 18 46 6.7 5.2
Private Household Services 16 68 0.9 0.7
Health Assessment and Treating, Therapists 15 34 2.1 0.6
Health Diagnosing 14 31 0.5 3.3
Other Service-Cleaning, Other Personal Services 14 29 3.5 9.6
Administrative Support 13 55 16.4 3.7
Supervisors Administrative 11 100 0.5 0.0
Transportation and Material Moving 11 43 4.3 3.0
Food Service 10 27 4.3 0.8
Protective Services 9 44 1.8 0.1
Construction 9 45 3.8 10.3
Health Technologists 9 67 1.3 0.1
Mechanics and Repairers 8 40 4.2 4.0
Health Service 8 33 2.0 0.2
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners and Laborers 7 40 4.1 0.6
Precision Production 7 46 3.1 2.2
Extractive 6 12 0.1 0.1
Plant and Systems Operators 5 100 0.3 0.0
Teachers Not Postsecondary and Librarians 5 41 4.1 1.7
Machine Operators, Assemblers and Inspectors 4 49 8.1 1.8
Mean Across Occupations 0.17 0.49
Standard Deviation 0.10 0.18
Mean in Estimation Sample 0.15 0.47
Standard Deviation 0.07 0.11
Notes: Data from May 1989 CPS supplement and show fraction of individuals answering that they are able to change
when they work. Mean values across occupations are average with equal weight to each occupation, while mean
values in estimation sample are mean values across the women in the estimation sample based on their assigned
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Table A.8: Fraction of Part-Time Workers by Broad Occupation Group
Fraction of Workers Fraction of Workers
Occupation Group Part Time in Occupation
Wage & Self- Wage & Self-
Salary Emp. Salary Emp.
Food Service 47 19 6.6 1.5
Private Household Services 44 64 2.2 1.1
Retail Sales 44 53 9.1 8.2
Other Service-Cleaning, Other Personal Services 40 36 4.0 18.8
Postsecondary Teachers 40 . 0.6 0.0
Transportation and Material Moving 38 35 0.8 0.7
Farmers-Related Agricultural 34 39 0.7 6.2
Health Service 26 32 3.6 0.8
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners and Laborers 26 37 1.7 0.4
Writers, Artists, Entertainers and Athletes 26 42 1.2 7.1
Protective Services 24 28 0.6 0.0
Health Technologists 23 32 2.1 0.3
Health Assessment and Treating, Therapists 23 36 3.7 1.1
Forestry, Fisher, Hunter/Trapper 23 32 0.0 0.1
Administrative Support 20 46 28.5 10.9
Construction 19 39 0.2 0.9
Teachers Not Postsecondary and Librarians 18 68 6.0 2.8
Social, Recreation and Religious Workers 17 49 1.0 0.3
Precision Production 16 42 1.2 2.7
Social Scientists 15 43 0.3 1.1
Technologists-Non-Health 13 37 1.4 0.4
Health Diagnosing 13 20 0.2 1.2
Non-Retail Sales 12 21 2.9 12.7
Machine Operators, Assemblers and Inspectors 12 39 7.7 1.4
Lawyers and Judges 11 17 0.3 0.9
Executive, Administrative and Managerial 10 22 7.1 14.9
Mathematical/Computer Scientists, Nat Scientists 9 31 0.8 0.4
Management Related 9 32 3.5 2.6
Mechanics and Repairers 9 38 0.3 0.4
Plant and Systems Operators 7 21 0.0 0.0
Extractive 7 41 0.0 0.0
Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors 6 33 0.3 0.2
Supervisors Administrative 6 27 0.3 0.2
Mean Across Occupations 0.20 0.35
Standard Deviation 0.13 0.13
Mean in Estimation Sample 0.22 0.39
Standard Deviation 0.12 0.12
Notes: Data come from the monthly CPS 1980-1999 and tabulate the fraction of childless women that work fewer
than 35 hours per week. The mean values across occupations is the average providing equal weight to each occupa-
tion, while the mean values in the estimation sample are the mean values across the women in the estimation sample
based on their assigned occupation. 131
Table A.9: Occupational Code Crosswalk
Broad
Codes
Description Standardized NLSY Codes Included
1 Executive, Administrative and Managerial Occupations 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22
2 Management Related Occupations 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
3 Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59
4 Mathematical and Computer Scientists, Natural Scientists 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83
5 Health Diagnosing Occupations 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89
6 Health Assessment and Treating Occupations and Therapists 95, 86, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106
7 Teachers Postsecondary
113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 123, 125, 127, 128, 139, 145, 149,
150, 154
8 Teachers Not Postsecondary and Librarians 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 163, 164, 165
9 Social Scientists 166, 167, 168, 169, 173
10 Social, Recreation and Religious Workers 174, 175, 176
11 Lawyers and Judges 178, 179
12 Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and Athletes 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 193, 195, 198, 199, 200
13 Health Technologists 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208
14 Technologists-Not Health
213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 233, 234,
235
15 Sales Non-retail 243, 253, 243, 255, 256, 258
16 Sales Retail 274, 275, 276, 277, 283
17 Supervisors Admin 303
18 Administrative Support
308, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 323, 326, 328, 329, 336,
337, 338, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 355, 356, 357, 359,
361, 364, 365, 368, 373, 376, 377, 378, 379, 383, 384, 385, 386,
387, 389
19 Private Household Services 405, 407
20 Protective Services 415, 417, 418, 423, 425, 426, 427
21 Other Service-Food 434, 435, 436, 438, 439, 443, 444
22 Other Service-Health 445, 446, 447
23 Other Service-Cleaning, Other Personal Services
448, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465,
468, 469, 748
24 Farmers-Related Agricultural Occupations 473, 474, 475, 476, 479, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489
25 Forestry-Fisher, hunter, trapper 496, 498
26 Mechanics and Repairers
503, 505, 507, 508, 509, 516, 518, 519, 523, 525, 526, 527, 533,
534, 535, 536, 538, 539, 543, 544, 549
27 Construction
558, 563, 567, 576, 575, 577, 579, 583, 584, 585, 588, 589, 593,
594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599
28 Extractive Occupations 614, 615, 616, 617
29 Precision Production Occupations
628, 634, 637, 643, 644, 645, 646, 649, 653, 657, 658, 659, 666,
667, 668, 669, 674, 675, 677, 679, 684, 686, 687, 688, 693
30 Plant and Systems Operators 694, 695, 696, 699
31 Machine Operators, Assemblers and Inspectors
703, 706, 708, 709, 713, 717, 719, 723, 724, 726, 727, 728, 729,
733, 734, 735, 736, 738, 739, 743, 744, 745, 747, 749, 753, 754,
755, 756, 757, 759, 763, 764, 765, 766, 768, 773, 774, 779, 783,
784, 785, 789, 796, 799
32 Transportation and Material Moving Occupations
803, 804, 808, 809, 813, 823, 824, 825, 829, 834, 844, 848, 853,
859
33 Handlers, Equipment Cleaners and Laborers 865, 866, 869, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 883, 885, 887, 888, 889
34 Military 905
Notes: Standardized NLSY codes follow the categories in Meyer and Osborne (2005). Broad occupation codes follow the broad codes from the 1990s occupational codes from the
BLS http://www.bls.gov/nls/quex/r1/y97r1cbka1.pdf.
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APPENDIX B
Dataset Construction for Chapter 1
B.0.1 NLSY79 Dataset Construction
Sample Creation
The original NLSY sampling design included a nationally representative sample, an over-
sample of minorities, and a military sample. My analysis includes non-Black, non-Hispanic
women from the nationally representative sample only and includes data through the 2012
survey year. Next, I restrict the sample to women who have observations above the age of
18, after they are no longer enrolled in school and who are observed to marry. I eliminate
individuals who have more than one child within a year during the sample, and women
who have fewer than five years of data during the estimation period. This sample of 2,078
women makes up the ever married sample of women. My primary sample of always mar-
ried women, excludes women who are observed to divorce and includes 1,064 women.
Finally, 29 additional women are eliminated because they have no spousal income infor-
mation, which is necessary to estimate the model of husband’s income. This leaves a final
sample of 1,035 women.
Table B.1 shows how each sample restriction affects the sample size.
Employment, Fertility, Earnings, Demographic Variable Construction
Education
I used both the highest grade attended to assign women into three education categories:
high school or less, some college, and a Bachelor’s degree or higher. The some college
category includes women who had fewer than 4 years of completed college. I assign the
highest education level observed in the survey to each woman for all years of the estimation.
Around 23% of my sample re-enroll in school after the estimation begins according to the
school enrollment variable, but for 77% of those years the women are characterized as
working.
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Employment
I use the weekly arrays on labor force status created by the NLSY79 staff to characterize
women’s weekly activity. For each year, I assign the most common status among the weeks
in that year. I consider women who were unemployed or out of the labor force to be not
employed. I classify women into self-employment and wage and salary employment ac-
cording to the job they worked at the longest during that year. Ties are broken by assigning
the earliest job.
Earnings
Women’s earnings are the sum of their weekly earnings across all of their jobs. I use the
hourly wage and usual hours worked to construct weekly earnings for each job. I add up
the earnings across weeks to get annual earnings. In years when women are self-employed,
I take out the employer portion of the payroll tax to make the pre-tax self-employment
earnings comparable to the pre-tax wage and salary earnings. The self-employed have to
pay both the employee and employer portion of the payroll tax, while the wage and salary
earnings are net of the employer portion.
I winsorize hourly wages above $1,000 per hour and below $1 per hour. This change
affects around 2.4% of person-years, but it might only affect one of the jobs worked at
during that year. I winsorize annual hours of work at 5,200 hours, which affects only 0.1%
of person-years.
The alternative earning measure uses the average wage at jobs throughout the year and
the total annual hours worked at all jobs. This measure does not apply each job’s wage
rate to the hours worked at that job, but gets around missing data that arises in the survey
because it doesn’t collect hours and earnings information from non-main jobs with rela-
tively low levels of hours. The main earnings data are missing for 6.6% of years and the
alternative measure is missing for 2.5%. Figures B.1 and B.2 show the distributions for
the two earnings measures within wage and salary employment and self-employment. The
measures are very similar in years where the individual is wage and salary employed, but
a bit different in self-employment years. This is likely because years of self-employment
are more likely to have multiple simultaneous jobs and multiple jobs throughout the year.
These make the missing data problem more severe and make applying the average wage to
all hours worked that year perhaps more inaccurate. Earnings under the alternative measure
are higher both because they include the hours worked at very low hour dual jobs and be-
cause they apply an average wage rate to all annual hours. Self-employment hourly wages
are on average lower than wage and salary hourly wages so this measure of an average
134
annual wage may be applying too high of a wage to hours worked in self-employment.
I use information on spousal earnings to estimate a model of husband’s earnings. Hus-
band’s earnings are the sum of spousal income from wage and salary work and business
income in each interview year. The top coding rules for income changed over time in the
NLSY yielding vastly different maximum values of income across years. In order to make
these measures consistent, I follow Armour et al. (2014) and fit a Pareto distribution to the
top 20% of incomes by year and assign the estimated mean of the top coded values to all
top coded observations.
Fertility
Using the NLSY79 fertility history on children’s birth month and year, I assign children
born between January and June of year t to that year and children born between July and
December of year t to the following year t+ 1. As previously mentioned, I do not include
women in the sample who have more than one child within one year. I do include children
born after age 18 but prior to the estimation period. Around 13% of women have children
prior to the beginning of estimation so they begin the estimation with children.
Table B.1: Effect of Sample Restrictions on Sample Size
Sample Size
Full NLSY79 Sample Women 6,283
Eliminate Individuals:
Military Subsample 5,827
Supplementary Subsample 3,108
Black and Hispanic 2,477
No Observations Over 18, Post Schooling 2,441
Never Marry 2,226
Multiple Births in One Year 2,178
Fewer than 5 Estimation Years 2,078
Ever Divorce in Estimation Period 1,064
No Spousal Income Information 1,035
Notes: Data are from the NLSY79.
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Figure B.1: Density of Log Earnings in Wage and Salary Employment for Main and Alter-
native Earnings Measures
0
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.4
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Log Earnings 2000($)
Main Earnings Alternative Earnings
Notes: Figure shows the density of log earnings in wage and salary employment for women using two
alternative measures of earnings. Data are from the NLSY and sample is estimation sample of married white
women.
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Figure B.2: Density of Log Earnings in Self-Employment for Main and Alternative Earn-
ings Measures
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Notes: Figure shows the density of log earnings in self-employment for women using two alternative mea-
sures of earnings. Data are from the NLSY and sample is estimation sample of married white women.
B.0.2 SIPP Child Care Expenditure Dataset Construction
Child care expenditure questions have been asked in SIPP topical modules in all panels.
See Table B.2 for details on which month child care questions were asked across panels. I
focus on creating a consistent measure of weekly expenditures on child care for all children.
The SIPP asks whether monetary payment is usually made and for families who make a
monetary payment the survey asks for the total expenditures for a typical week. If the
survey asks about payments for each child individually, I sum up the payments. Child
care expenditures are only available consistently for employed mothers. Additionally, my
analysis limits the sample to women with at least one child under the age of 10. Other
covariates used from the SIPP include the age of the woman’s youngest child, the number
of children, her own age, education level and race, the year of the survey and the self-
employment status of the mother. Women are considered self-employed if they worked in
their own business more hours than they worked at a wage and salary job.
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Table B.2: SIPP Child Care Data Used
SIPP Panel Year Wave Month, Year Interview
1984 5 May 1986
1985 6 Jan 1987
1986 3,6 Jan 1987, Jan 1988
1987 3,6 Jan 1988, Jan 1989
1988 3,6 Jan 1989, Jan 1990
1989 3 Jan 1990
1990 3 Jan 1991
1991 3 Jan 1992
1992 6,9 Jan 1994, Jan 1995
1993 3,6 Jan1994, Jan 1995
1996 4,10 Jul 1997, Jul 1999
2001 4 May 2002
2004 4 May 2005
2008 5,8 Apr 2010, Apr 2011
Notes: Data from these SIPP waves were used to construct the
child care models described in Table A.4
B.0.3 Other Data
National level annual unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Specif-
ically state unemployment rates are from the local area unemployment statistics database
and the national unemployment rates are from the CPS database.
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Figure C.1: Female Self-Employment Rates and the Age of the Youngest Child; SIPP Full
Panel Respondents Using Final Panel Weights
-0.4 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
No 
Children 
Under 
18 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9-13 14-17 
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
P
oi
nt
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
n 
Se
lf-
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
P
ro
pe
ns
ity
 
Age in Years of Youngest Child 
1984-1986 Panels 
1996 Panel 
2008 Panel 
Notes: The three lines are plots of the coefficients on the age of the youngest child from regressions using
different SIPP panels. The regressions predict self-employment status controlling for age, marital status,
number of children, and fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers
denote statistical significance at the 5% level. The estimation sample includes women ages 18-55 who are
present in the first wave of each SIPP panel who are observed during every month of the survey. Observations
are weighted using the final panel weight for the individual, with the exception of the 2008 panel which uses
the 2012 longitudinal weights, which are the most recent weights available.
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Figure C.2: Female Self-Employment Rates and the Age of the Youngest Child; SIPP Wave
1 Respondents Unweighted
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Notes: The three lines are plots of the coefficients on the age of the youngest child from regressions using
different SIPP panels. The regressions predict self-employment status controlling for age, marital status,
number of children, and fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The markers
denote statistical significance at the 5% level. The estimation sample includes women ages 18-55 who are
present in the first wave of each SIPP panel. Observations are unweighted.
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Figure C.3: Specific Occupation Transitions Among All Women Transitioning to Self-
Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are from the most recent wage and salary employment in the previous six
months. Occupations on the right are the most common 3 digit self-employment occupations. The sample
includes women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-employed
while they have a child under 13.
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Figure C.4: Specific Occupation Transitions Among Previously Wage and Salary Em-
ployed Women Transitioning to Self-Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are from the most recent wage and salary employment in the previous six
months. Occupations on the right are the most common 3 digit self-employment occupations. The sample
includes women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-employed
while they have a child under 13 and who worked in wage and salary employment during the 6 months prior
to the transition to self-employment.
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Figure C.5: Broad Occupation Transitions Among All Women Transitioning to Self-
Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are from the most recent wage and salary employment in the previous six
months. Occupations on the right are the most common 2 digit self-employment occupations. The sample
includes women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-employed
while they have a child under 13.
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Figure C.6: Broad Occupation Transitions Among Wage and Salary Employed Women
Transitioning to Self-Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are from the most recent wage and salary employment in the previous six
months. Occupations on the right are the most common 2 digit self-employment occupations. The sample
includes women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-employed
while they have a child under 13 and who worked in wage and salary employment during the 6 months prior
to the transition to self-employment.
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Figure C.7: Specific Occupation Transitions Among All Women Transitioning From Self-
Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are the most common pre-transition 3 digit self-employment occupations.
Occupations on the right come from the first wage and salary employment in the following six months. The
occupations on the right are the most common 3 digit self-employment occupations. The sample includes
women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-employed while they
have a child under 13.
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Figure C.8: Specific Occupation Transitions Among Women Transitioning From Self-
Employment who Move to Wage and Salary Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are the most common pre-transition 3 digit self-employment occupations.
Occupations on the right come from the first wage and salary employment in the following six months.
The sample includes women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-
employed while they have a child under 13 and who worked in wage and salary employment during the 6
months following the transition from self-employment.
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Figure C.9: Broad Occupation Transitions Among All Women Transitioning From Self-
Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are the most common pre-transition 2 digit self-employment occupations.
Occupations on the right come from the first wage and salary employment in the following six months. The
occupations on the right are the most common 3 digit self-employment occupations. The sample includes
women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-employed while they
have a child under 13.
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Figure C.10: Broad Occupation Transitions Among Women Transitioning From Self-
Employment who Move to Wage and Salary Employment
Notes: Occupations on the left are the most common pre-transition 2 digit self-employment occupations.
Occupations on the right come from the first wage and salary employment in the following six months.
The sample includes women ages 18-55 present in the first wave of the 2008 SIPP panel who become self-
employed while they have a child under 13 and who worked in wage and salary employment during the 6
months following the transition from self-employment.
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Figure C.11: Joint Distribution of Hours Worked and Hours Spent Supervising Children;
Wage and Salary Employed Women With Children Under 13
Hours	of	Work 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12	or	
More
0 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.7% 2.9%
1 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.9% 4.5%
2 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 3.4%
3 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 2.9%
4 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 3.7%
5 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 3.9%
6 0.2% 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 5.8%
7 0.2% 1.2% 1.6% 2.0% 1.8% 1.5% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 10.4%
8 0.7% 3.6% 5.0% 5.5% 5.8% 3.6% 1.6% 0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 27.6%
9 0.5% 2.5% 3.3% 3.6% 2.4% 1.6% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 15.7%
10 0.4% 2.0% 2.4% 1.9% 1.5% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 9.5%
11 0.4% 1.3% 1.3% 0.7% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 4.8%
12	or	More 0.6% 1.7% 1.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 4.9%
3.6% 13.9% 17.0% 16.8% 15.0% 10.5% 6.6% 4.0% 2.6% 2.3% 1.8% 1.7% 4.3% 100.0%
Hours	of	Children	Supervision
Notes: The sample includes wage and salary employed mothers of children under 13 years of age who are
18-55 years in age from the ATUS 2003-2012. The sample is limited to mothers who spent positive minutes
supervising children and working.
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Figure C.12: Joint Distribution of Hours Worked and Hours Spent Supervising Children;
Self-Employed Women With Children Under 13
Hours	of	Work 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12	or	
More
0 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.9% 4.9%
1 0.0% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 1.9% 7.9%
2 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 1.2% 5.9%
3 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.2% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 5.0%
4 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.7% 4.8%
5 0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 1.0% 1.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.8% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 6.8%
6 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 1.4% 0.7% 1.0% 0.6% 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.8% 7.0%
7 0.1% 0.9% 1.7% 1.2% 2.8% 1.1% 0.9% 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 10.2%
8 0.6% 1.3% 2.7% 1.7% 2.2% 1.3% 0.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.1% 1.1% 12.4%
9 0.1% 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 1.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.7% 9.4%
10 1.0% 2.4% 1.7% 1.5% 1.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.9% 9.6%
11 0.3% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.9% 7.6%
12	or	More 0.8% 2.0% 1.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 1.6% 8.5%
3.6% 11.5% 13.4% 12.1% 12.9% 9.3% 6.0% 4.0% 4.5% 4.0% 2.7% 3.3% 12.5% 100.0%
Hours	of	Children	Supervision
Notes: The sample includes self-employed mothers of children under 13 years of age who are 18-55 years
in age from the ATUS 2003-2012. The sample is limited to mothers who spent positive minutes supervising
children and working.
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Table C.1: Self-Employment Propensity
Dependent Variable: Self-Employment Status
All Panels Pooled
Main Year Prior to Income
Birth Indicator Controls
Youngest Child Indicators:
Age 0 0.398 0.380 0.702*
[0.264] [0.294] [0.284]
Age 1 0.858** 0.845*** 1.062**
[0.300] [0.311] [0.317]
Age 2 1.326*** 1.316*** 1.632***
[0.304] [0.311] [0.322]
Age 3 1.259*** 1.250*** 1.391***
[0.303] [0.308] [0.320]
Age 4 1.080*** 1.073*** 1.084***
[0.306] [0.310] [0.322]
Age 5 1.021*** 1.015*** 1.063***
[0.314] [0.316] [0.329]
Age 6 0.800** 0.800** 0.840**
[0.318] [0.319] [0.332]
Age 7 0.628** 0.624** 0.565
[0.315] [0.316] [0.326]
Age 8 0.415 0.412 0.339
[0.301] [0.301] [0.312]
Aged 9-13 0.354 0.352 0.321
[0.270] [0.270] [0.279]
Aged 14-17 0.137 0.136 −0.057
[0.207] [0.207] [0.212]
Pre-Birth Year −0.036
[0.171]
Other Income (2015$):
Current Month 0.289***
[0.078]
One Month Prior 0.062
[0.047]
Two Months Prior 0.080**
[0.037]
Observations 2,891,234 2,891,234 1,844,584
Number of Individuals 84,214 84,214 76,305
Notes: Regressions predict self-employment status; additional controls include the state unemployment rate, and year, month
of interview, and individual fixed effects. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. The sample includes
women ages 18-55 who are present in wave 1 of the panel. Results are weighted by the monthly weight of the woman’s final
observation and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Additional income controls for the regression in the third
column include lagged monthly income for three, four, and five months prior as well as a control for income six months to 11
months prior. The point estimates are small and not statistically significant and are available from the author upon request.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 151
Table C.2: Differences in Time Use Associated with Self-Employment: Multivariate Regressions
Women Children Under 6 Men Children Under 6
Time Spent in Activity
ATUS Two
Digit Code
Mean
Multivari-
ate
Mean
Multivari-
ate
Personal Care 1 -10.1 -0.9 8.0 12.0*
Household Activities 2 39.7* 18.8* 1.3 -4.4
Caring for and Helping Household Members 3 28.8* 6.3 6.2 3
Caring for and Helping Nonhousehold Members 4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.01
Work and Work-Related Activities 5 -59.8* -17.2 1.8 3.2
Education 6 -5.9* -5.4* -2.6* -0.9
Consumer Purchases 7 -1.1 -3.7 -5.6* -5.3*
Professsional and Personal Care Services 8 1.5 1.2 -0.7 -0.8
Household Services 9 -0.03 -0.2 0.2 0.2
Government Services and Civic Obligations 10 -0.3* -0.2* -0.04 0.07
Eating and Drinking 11 4.6* 0.4 -0.3 -1.5
Socializing, Relaxing and Leisure 12 -4.9 -1 -12.5 -8.8
Sports, Exercise & Recreation 13 3.5 2.6 2.7 2.9
Religious and Spiritual Activities 14 5.2* 4.5* 4.1* 3.5*
Volunteer Activities 15 2.3 -0.3 2.4 1.5
Telephone Calls 16 1.4 1.5 -0.06 0.02
Traveling 18 -7.4* -8.2* -2.5 -2.6
Notes: The sample for column 1 includes women ages 18-55 in the ATUS 2003-2012. In column 2, the sample is restricted to women with a child
under the age of 6. Regressions include controls for respondents’ education, race, age, number of children, hours worked, employment status and
a self-employment indicator. Coefficients reported represent the effect of being self-employed relative to working in a wage and salary position.
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Table D.1: States Earned Income Tax Credits
State Year of Implementation
Rhode Island 1986
Vermont 1988
Wisconsin1 1989
Iowa 1990
Minnesota2 1991
New York 1994
Massachusetts 1997
Oregon 1997
Kansas 1998
Maryland 1998
Colorado 1999
DC 2000
Illinois 2000
Maine 2000
New Jersey 2000
Oklahoma 2002
Indiana 2003
Nebraska 2003
Delaware 2006
Virginia 2006
New Mexico 2007
North Carolina 2008
Michigan 2008
Louisiana 2008
Connecticut 2011
Washington 2008 (announced; unfunded)
Ohio 2013
Source: Leigh (2010), "Who Benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit? 
Incidence among Recipients, Coworkers and Firms," The B.E. Journal of 
Economic Analysis & Policy
1: Wisconsin has a system based on the number of children in the household.
2: Minnesota has a system based on whether there are any children living in the 
household, and after 1997, household earnings. 
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Table D.2: Test Exogeneity of State EITC Benefits
Dependent Variable:
Sample: All States
Conditional on 
Ever Having a 
State EITC
Mean Dependent Variable: 5.36 2.77
VARIABLES (1) (2)
State GDP per Capita (in $1000s) 0.31 1.06
(0.313) (1.042)
Lagged State GDP per Capita (in $1000s) 0.03 0.25*
(0.040) (0.115)
Unemployment Rate 0.00 0.02
(0.003) (0.009)
Lagged Unemployment Rate 0.00 0.00
(0.003) (0.007)
Top Marginal Income Tax Rate 0.00 -0.01
(0.005) (0.013)
Lagged Top Marginal Income Tax Rate -0.01 -0.04
(0.008) (0.03)
Real Minimum Wage 0.00 0.01
(0.003) (0.015)
Lagged Real Minimum Wage 0.00 -0.01
(0.005) (0.019)
Maximum Family of 3 Monthly Welfare Benefits (in $100s) 0.002* 0.017*
(0.007) (0.007)
Lagged Maximum Family of 3 Monthly Welfare Benefits (in $100s) 0.01 0.02
(0.015) (0.017)
Spending on Higher Education 0.01* 0.01
(0.005) (0.009)
State and Year Fixed Effects X X
R-squared 0.861 0.845
Observations 1000 320
Source: State-level data from 1992-2013. State-level unemployment rates from Bureau of Labor Statistics. State GDP from Burea
of Economic Analysis regional data. State top tax bracket from the National Bureau of Economic Research. State-level minimum
wage from the Tax Policy Center's Tax Facts. State-level spending on higher education from the State Higher Education Executive
Officers. State-level welfare benefits from the Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Database.  *** p<.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10
State EITC generosity
155
Table D.3: Effect of Average EITC on Quarterly Transitions Between Employment Types:
Married Mothers
Wage and 
Salary to Self-
Employment
Wage and 
Salary 
Employment 
to Non-
Employment
Self-
Employment 
to Wage and 
Salary 
Employment
Self-
Employment 
to Non-
Employment
Non-
Employment to 
Wage and 
Salary 
Employment
Non-
Employment 
to Self-
Employment
Average EITC ($1,000s) 0.0123** 0.0072 0.0082 -0.0054 0.0201 0.0081*
(0.0057) (0.0201) (0.0087) (0.0057) (0.0124) (0.0044)
EITC-eligible -0.0031* 0.0110** -0.0029 -0.0013 0.0129*** -0.0048***
(0.0017) (0.0049) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0040) (0.0015)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.0038* -0.0046 0.0044 0.0017 -0.0026 0.0068***
(0.0020) (0.0059) (0.0028) (0.0015) (0.0054) (0.0019)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0041 0.0225 0.0054 0.0030 0.0236 0.0032
State Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X X X X
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781
Notes: Indicators for self-employment and wages and salary employment are dummy variables equal to one if the respondent reports positive hours of work in 
that type of employment, zero otherwise.  Transitions between wage and salary employment and self-employment include switching transitions or transitions 
to both types of employment.  Sample includes married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first year in the 
SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP. Individuals with negative earnings in their first year of the survey were 
dropped from the sample.  Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted 
and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  All regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal income tax 
rate.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table D.4: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Self-Employment with Different Lev-
els of Fixed Effects: Married Mothers
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 -0.042*** -0.049 0.055* 0.079**
(0.014) (0.035) (0.028) (.036)
EITC-eligible2 -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.055***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (.013)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.062***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (.017)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.082
State Fixed Effects X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781 261,781 261,781
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first year in 
the SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP.  Individuals with negative earnings in 
their first year of the survey were dropped from the sample.  Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include 
the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  All regressions 
control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state marginal income tax rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally representative sample 
using TAXSIM.
2 Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the survey.  Households with no 
earned income are considered eligible for the EITC.
157
Table D.5: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Different Employment Types: Married
Mothers No Imputed Earnings
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Both Self-
Employed and 
Wage & Salary 
Employed 
(Hours)
Working
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 0.045 0.048 0.023 0.070
(0.038) (0.149) (0.032) (0.142)
EITC-eligible2 -0.055*** -0.132*** -0.015*** -0.172***
(0.014) (0.035) (0.005) (0.031)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.063*** -0.059 0.013** -0.010
(0.019) (0.046) (0.006) (0.041)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.077 0.624 0.021 0.680
State Fixed Effects X X X X
Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Month Fixed Effects X X X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X X X
Number of Observations 236,891 236,891 236,891 236,891
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with them during their first year in the 
SIPP..  Individuals with imputed earnings were dropped from this analysis. Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 
2008 panels of the SIPP.  Individuals with negative earnings in their first year of the survey were dropped from the sample.  
Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted 
and standard errors are clustered at the state level.  All regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top 
state marginal income tax rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a nationally representative sample 
using TAXSIM.
2  Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the survey.  Households with no 
earned income are considered eligible for the EITC.
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Table D.6: Effect of Average EITC on Likelihood of Self-Employment Using Alternative
Definition: Married Mothers
Self-Employed 
(Hours)
Self-Employed 
(Earnings)
Average EITC ($1,000s)1 0.079** 0.086***
(0.036) (0.027)
EITC-eligible2 -0.055*** -0.035***
(0.013) (0.010)
Average EITC*EITC-eligible 0.062*** 0.035***
(0.017) (0.012)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.082 0.049
State Fixed Effects X X
Year Fixed Effects X X
Month Fixed Effects X X
State-Specific Linear Time Trends X X
Number of Observations 261,781 261,781
Notes: Sample includes married women 18-55 of age with at least one child under 19 living with 
them during their first year in the SIPP.  Data come from the 1990-1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, and 
2008 panels of the SIPP. Individuals with negative earnings in their first year of the survey were 
dropped from the sample.. Observations exclude the first calendar year of data and only include the 
reference month for the survey.  Estimates are weighted and standard errors are clustered at the state 
level.  All regressions control for the state minimum wage, unemployment rate, and top state 
marginal income tax rate. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
1 Average EITC is calculated for each state and year using the state level EITC rules applied to a 
nationally representative sample using TAXSIM.
2 Eligibility for the EITC is determined using income and family structure from the first year of the 
survey.  Households with no earned income are considered eligible for the EITC.
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